Editorial Review

At a secret arms-design contest in Stalin’s Soviet Union, army technicians submitted a stubby rifle with a curved magazine. Dubbed the AK-47, it was selected as the Eastern Bloc’s standard arm. Scoffed at in the Pentagon as crude and unimpressive, it was in fact a breakthrough—a compact automatic that could be mastered by almost anyone, last decades in the field, and would rarely jam. Manufactured by tens of millions in planned economies, it became first an instrument of repression and then the most lethal weapon of the Cold War. Soon it was in the hands of terrorists.In a searing examination of modern conflict and official folly, C. J. Chivers mixes meticulous historical research, investigative reporting, and battlefield reportage to illuminate the origins of the world’s most abundant firearm and the consequences of its spread. The result, a tour de force of history and storytelling, sweeps through the miniaturization and distribution of automatic firepower, and puts an iconic object in fuller context than ever before. The Gun dismantles myths as it moves from the naïve optimism of the Industrial Revolution through the treacherous milieu of the Soviet Union to the inside records of the Taliban. Chivers tells of the 19th-century inventor in Indianapolis who designs a Civil War killing machine, insisting that more-efficient slaughter will save lives. A German attaché who observes British machine guns killing Islamic warriors along the Nile advises his government to amass the weapons that would later flatten British ranks in World War I. In communist Hungary, a locksmith acquires an AK-47 to help wrest his country from the Kremlin’s yoke, beginning a journey to the gallows. The Pentagon suppresses the results of firing tests on severed human heads that might have prevented faulty rifles from being rushed to G.I.s in Vietnam. In Africa, a millennial madman arms abducted children and turns them on their neighbors, setting his country ablaze. Neither pro-gun nor anti-gun, The Gun builds to a terrifying sequence, in which a young man who confronts a trio of assassins is shattered by 23 bullets at close range. The man survives to ask questions that Chivers examines with rigor and flair.

Throughout, The Gun animates unforgettable characters—inventors, salesmen, heroes, megalomaniacs, racists, dictators, gunrunners, terrorists, child soldiers, government careerists, and fools. Drawing from years of research, interviews, and from declassified records revealed for the first time, he presents a richly human account of an evolution in the very experience of war. ... Read more

Reviews

Compelling History, October 15, 2010
Chris Chivers knows how to tell a story that has historical significance, depth and insight. The Gun explains how one rifle changed the face of war in the late 20th Century. Formerly the New York Times correspondent in Moscow, Chivers takes the reader behind the scenes inside the Soviet industrial and propaganda machine, laying out a fascinating narrative of how the regime plotted and schemed to engineer myth while designing the automatic rifle that was the most significant technical factor in the North Vietnamese victory over the south. Chivers wraps his deep understanding about military history inside a refreshing compendium of characters - heroes, inventors, knaves and entrepreneurs. He knows the secret of story-tellling; the reader finishes each page by asking, and then what happened? - Bing West, Newport, RI

The Power of Iron, October 24, 2010
The AK-47 and its numerous variants and successors are ubiquitous instruments of destruction currently appearing in all troubled regions of the globe. The rifle, known for its quadruple attributes of extreme design simplicity, rugged durability, ease of use and tremendous destructive capacity has achieved legendary status. Of course, this is all well known and has been thoroughly discussed and written about. After all, the AK series are instantly recognizable to military, police, criminals, terrorists and the general public as the seminal firearms of the 20th Century.

C.J. Chivers of "The New York Times" and late of the USMC has, in "The Gun" provided, through the history of the AK series, a lucid exposition of the development of automatic weapons from their inception to the present time. Additionally and more importantly, "The Gun" explores a hitherto largely uninvestigated dimension of the modern assault weapon. He asks, "What is its role as a socio-political instrument of state and how did it achieve this goal?"

As might be expected, the originator of the eponymous weapon, Mikhail Kalashnikov, has become a mythical figure. It well-served the propaganda purposes of the Soviet Union to extol the virtues of a genuine, nearly unlettered proletarian who, enjoying the Benefits of the Worker's Paradise, arose from a humble and unassuming background to the pinnacle of firearms design. By legend, he proceeded virtually unaided and motivated primarily by Love of the Fatherland.

Hagiography aside, Kalashnikov (and the state-supported teams of machinists, engineers, industrialists, ballistics experts and legions of others) served a realpolitik purpose: they built a foundational weapon in accord with pragmatic considerations of state defense and did so expediently, logically, methodically and cheaply. The AK is a model of the axiom, "Form follows function." Its presence over 60 years after its inception is a testament to that, just as the Colt M1911, Browning Hi-Power, Bren, MG42 and their successors enjoy similar prominence in their own niches.

Chivers traces the history of the Gatling and Maxim guns; the prototype of the assault rifle, the German machinenpistole 43/sturmgewehr 44; the role of ammunition in the genesis of the military rifle, beginning again with WW-II German advances in the form of the 7.92x33mm Kurz cartridge, evolving to the M1943 Soviet round that powered the AK; the introduction and dissemination of AK rifles according to Soviet policy and, of course, the introduction of the ArmaLite AR-15 rifle, soon to become the standard US arm in the form of the M-16 series. In doing so, he acknowledges the role of the PPSh-41 submachine gun (a Soviet WW-II era arm featuring metal stamping, chromed barrel lining and a blowback action) but, in my estimation, underplays its contribution. Like the AK, this weapon was extremely simple, very robust, easily manufactured (millions were made in factories and small Russian machine shops during the war) and murderously effective at usual combat ranges. Also like the AK, it turned up in many subsequent conflicts, ranging from Korea to Vietnam. A curious omission from the history was the fallschirmjagergewehr-42(FG42)which also featured a gas-operated mechanism, a plastic stock (initially), a 20 round magazine and a selector for semiautomatic and full automatic fire. In other words, the FG42 was also a legitimate precursor to the modern assault rifle. Of course, the Thompson M1921, the "Chicago Piano", makes its necessary appearance. Despite its minor role in the civilian arena, the fearsome performance of this weapon in gangster-era criminal activities gave it a larger-than-life role in the American conscience and lead to laws banning the private ownership of automatic weapons in the US, laws which Chivers notes were not generally implemented outside Western Europe and North America...with devastating consequences.

As Chivers notes, no history of the AK series would be complete without a recounting of the follies and foibles surrounding its US counterpart, the M16. Initially, the US military assumed a dismissive attitude toward the concept of the assault rifle, despite emerging evidence of its deadly utility. Rather than simply stealing the design and reverse-engineering an American version of an obviously successful weapon, ideological blinkers initially prevented development of a comparable US combat arm. The M14 (successor to the M1 Garand) was heavy and cumbersome. It fired a round that was ill-suited to modern combat. By the time an alliance of arms manufacturers and unscrupulous agents convinced influential elements of the American military hierarchy of the need to purchase an American version of the assault rifle (which just happened to be on hand in the form of the Colt's AR-15), the AK was routinely arming the current adversary: the Viet Cong. The AR was rushed into action, despite known problems with the ammunition propellant and the propensity of the weapon to jam in use. Soon, it was discovered that the weapon was prone to rust and the gas-operated bolt assembly to fouling. No matter: a cover-up was in order and, despite losses to American personnel from misfiring in combat, perpetuated. While the modern version (the M4 carbine) is better, it is still suboptimal in comparison to its Russian counterpart in the author's estimation and as noted in a separate chapter at the book's end.

Arms sales and transfers have become a standard form of political influence. The USSR, as a centrally-controlled, "non-market" economy, manufactured, stockpiled, licensed and exported AK weapons to satellite nations and client states. With the collapse of the system, enormous weapons and ammunition stocks became available. Private arms dealers, corrupt government officials and simple thievery resulted in the appearance of AK variants in every "hot zone" on the planet. Chivers acerbically notes that, at present, the largest purchaser of AK weapons is...the US. We send them to regimes we are hoping to influence and whose loyalties we wish to secure worldwide and to proxies. Not surprisingly, other nations do that as well. So, Chivers reports that, with a humble small arm, the AK, weapons systems producers (US, Russia, France, China, Israel and others) have become major arms merchants, themselves; this is the socio-political connection which was not begun by, but seems to have been cemented into convention, by the AK-47. Chivers does well to remind the reader of the modern engine of this phenomenon.

The book concludes with some horrible vignettes dealing with the effects of assault weaponry in the Third World: the murderous Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, the attack on an official in the Kurdish region of Iraq being two of them. Chivers readily acknowledges that "small wars" will be with us forever, AK or no AK. Its just that the tremendous destructive potential of the modern assault rifle magnifies the carnage. Despite the experiences of child soldiers; despite the combat experiences of literally millions of veterans worldwide; despite the adoption of RPGs and AK type weaponry by terrorists, wars will persist for all the reasons they always have. Perhaps, aside from the pragmatic and ideological attractions of armed conflict, there is another and more elemental aspect of combat. It was Homer in "The Odyssey" who wrote, "Iron has powers to draw a man to ruin"; true then and true now.

Interesting, but disjointed, October 31, 2010
"The Gun" provides some very interesting insights into the history of machine guns and modern arms trade, yet it is not a complete book, but rather a series of separate articles. It is hard to find a leading idea that would join the separate stories conveyed in "The Gun".

The book starts with an excellent historical account of developments of the machine gun and goes on to describe the invention of AK-47 and M-16 in this way. But then it stops - for no apparent reason. I would very much like to read about what were the developments in assault rifle design since 1960's, but the historical account stops there.

A very interesting chapter describes all the problems with the adoption of M-16 by the US armed forces. But the description is tiresome and definetely too detailed. For no good reason the author delves into who-said-what-to-whom-and-when and tries to figure out who deserves the blame for US Marines' deaths in Vietnam. It is an interesting story, but a different one from the historical account in other chapters. And just when I hoped that the author would describe a similar problems with a botched implementation of UK's SA80 rifle - the story shifts again.

Third topic covered in this book is terrorism and warfare in third world countries. But since the first part of the book was taken up by other subjects, this one is also covered in a partial fashion - with no real background or details. This part of the book reads more like a collection of trivia - from strange beliefs of African rebels, through partial retelling of terrorist attack during the Munich Olympics, to description of one person's gunshot injuries - with no clear train of thought to connect it.

There is also a discussion of morals and life story of M. Kalashnikov, which could be a nice study of lifestyle choices in a totalitarian state, but - when jammed between three other subjects - is just too brief and disjointed.

Despite those problems, the book is a fine read, interesting and engaging, but it feels like a "bait and switch" - starting on one topic for just long enough to instill curiosity, and then switching to different matters.

Don't buy the Kindle version. It is too expensive and full of bugs - simply an inferior product, and with no text-to-speech. (The bugs include: bad typesetting, typos, errors in format conversion, notes that are in wrong order, special formatting - i.e. bold text, chapter titles' emphasis - that is only visible when you use "next page" function and not when you skip directly to some chapter, the illustrations at the end are not listed in the table of contents and can be easily missed).

The Gun, November 17, 2010
I bought the book after hearing the author being interviewed on NPR's "Fresh Air ". He was fascinating. The book is very well written. Unfortunately it contains no photographs or diagrams of the various inventors or guns mentioned. I find this diminished my enjoyment in reading.

Fantastic read, October 27, 2010
Chivers' book, The Gun, is a masterpiece on many levels. Using the history of this weapon as a lens through which to analyze recent history is brilliant. The battle scenes are riveting and heartwrenching, and the characters are rendered with charisma.
The politics are head spinning, chiefly because most of us don't look at the world this way and I think we don't appreciate how much battle tactics reflect times, politics and ideologies. It's an important book with extraordinary analysis, but full of swashbuckling tales.

First rate - very well written and extremely well researched, October 29, 2010
If you have a even a passing interest in firearms, you should buy this book - I couldn't put it down!

From Armament to Icon - Unfortunately, November 11, 2010
It is scary how many people recognize the silhouette of the AK: the distinct banana clip, stubby barrel, and steep sight post. I realized this when my wife (perhaps due to my unfortunate influence) properly identified it in a book club discussion. As the author points out it has become the primary firearm of the world - "a weapon that rearranged the rules". It is carried by more than fifty national armies, hoisted by passionate guerillas, provided by dictators, used for intimidation and more by criminals, and wielded by child soldiers.

Seldom jamming, easy to maintain, simplistic in components and design, and lightweight with incredible firepower, the AK has been massed produced, "licensed" for production, and knocked off with impunity. If there was an accurate count on casualties inflicted by the AK since its inception, it may well be the leader far ahead of any single conventional weapon. The author notes, "The United Nations convened a conference in 2001 by noting that small arms were principal weapons in forty-six of the forty-nine major conflicts in the 1990s, in which 4 million people died." The AK has proved to be the perfect instrument for the proxy conflicts of the Cold War which eased itself smoothly into the terrorist weapon of choice.

The book covers Avtomat Kalashnikova and the propaganda surrounding the AK's development, includes a history of small arms weapon development covering Gatling, Maxim, Spandau, Thompson, and Schmeisser, features an examination of the differences in the process of development which leads to an overly long comparison with the US's M16, along with historic uses of the AK including Sadat's assassination and the Munich Olympics. And this is where Chivers may have gone wrong with this effort - it was just too long. However. it is now the new standard on the subject surpassing Kahaner's AK-47: The Weapon that Changed the Face of War, Cutshaw's Legends and Reality of the AK, Burrows Trigger Issues: Kalashnikov AK47, and Iannamico's AK-47 The Grim Reaper (along with many other efforts).

Samuel Cummings, a noted and colorful arms dealer, called the flow of arms "an index of the world's folly." The AK may well be the primary factor in that index. For those interested in a similar type of exploratory, look to Patrick Wright's "Tank: The Progress of a Monstrous War Machine".

Jack of all trades, master of none, November 2, 2010
This book tries to be everything for everyone and fails. I read glowing reviews and at least one excerpt from this book before buying it. It tries to be more than a history of the AK-47 but it is less than a book on intermediate caliber automatic weapons. On the plus side, it informed me of Soviet post- World War II small arms development and how it related to German developments. But it seems more of a collection of vaguely related topics, discussing Gatling and Maxim while almost skipping over John M. Browning and other innovators. The reviews indicated that this book would do much to discuss the early problem with the M-16 in Vietnam, yet it failed to provide any new information. Even with Soviet small arms, it leaves huge gaps. Although it discusses the Automat, there is no discussion of why this was chambered in 6.5mm Ariska or how it was operationally employed.

There certainly is not enough useful or complete information to keep this as a reference. I suggest you wait until it comes out in paperback or pick up a slightly used copy. I am certain that the price will fall dramatically in the next few months.

Four stories in one, December 28, 2010
C.J. Chivers knows wars and weapons very well. In The Gun, he sets out to tell us about the rise of automatic weapons, the development of the most widely manufactured automatic weapon in history (the AK-47), what happened when US forces first encounter the weapon and attempted to respond with their own, and the lasting legacy of the AK-47 in the post Soviet world.

On the plus side, this book is very well researched, has copious and helpful notes, and benefits from both the author's experience of being a Marine infantry captain as well as his time as the Moscow bureau chief for the New York Times. It is hard to imagine an author with a more suitable background for such a tale.

On the minus side, Chivers sometimes gives us too much detail, or stops a story in mid stride, only to detour to another before coming back to the first story. His style is a bit staccato, but the reader will be well rewarded for hanging in there to the end.

Of the four stories, I thought the section on the introduction of the M-16 into Vietnam, and the subsequent problems with that gun were the strongest part of the book. Chivers knows exactly what went wrong, who caused it, and can tell heart-breaking anecdote after anecdote about the US soldiers who died while trying to unjam their weapons as the Viet Cong approached with the far more reliable AK-47's. This is emotional stuff, told with the kind of detail that removes any doubt about the author's veracity. If he is looking for another book to write, I'd suggest making this a full length book.

I also enjoyed the section which detailed the AK-47's antecedents, especially the Gatling gun and the Maxim machine gun. Here, Chivers is blessed by two interesting and individualistic inventors, and by the story of how each gun changed the practice of warfare. He is really well informed here and this section makes a cracking good read.

I liked the section on the impact of the AK-47 as it becomes "...the world's gun...", but it is in this section that his urge to break away in mid stream from one story line to another becomes a bit exasperating. He does a very credible job of describing how the socialist countries had a tendency to overproduce arms to ridiculous extremes, and how the breakup of the Soviet empire dispersed a vast trove of weapons with a half life of fifty years or more int the third world.

Ironically, the section I liked the least was about the development of the AK-47 itself. Mikhail Kalashnikov's early life is interesting, but as he gets older, the story line becomes less compelling. The simple fact is that he is one of those guys who does something really impressive early in life, and never comes close to matching it as he gets older. Perhaps if Chivers had done more to explain step by step how the gun worked with visual diagrams, this would have caught my fancy more.

If you like well researched history by someone who knows what he's talking about, or you like military history, this will be a good book for you. ... Read more

Editorial Review

In early August 1974, despite incredible political, military, and intelligence risks and after six years of secret preparations, the CIA attempted to salvage the sunken Soviet ballistic missile submarine K-129 from the depths of the North Pacific Ocean. The audacious effort was undertaken with the cover of an undersea mining operation sponsored by eccentric billionaire Howard Hughes. Azorian incorrectly identified as Project Jennifer by the press was the most ambitious ocean engineering endeavor attempted by man. It can be compared to the 1969 moon landing in its level of technological achievement. Following the accidental sinking of a Soviet missile submarine in March 1968, U.S. intelligence agencies were able to determine the precise location and to develop a means of raising the submarine from a depth of 16,560 feet. Previously, the deepest attempt to salvage a submarine had been accomplished at 245 feet. The remarkable salvage effort of the K-129, which contained nuclear-armed torpedoes and missiles as well as crypto equipment, was conducted with Soviet naval ships a few hundred yards from the lift ship, the Hughes Glomar Explorer. While other books have been published about this secret project, not one was based on interviews with the participants or on classified government documents. The authors conducted interviews with men who were on board the Glomar Explorer and the USS Halibut, the submarine that found the wreckage, with U.S. naval intelligence officers, and with the Soviet submarine division commander. The authors had access to the Glomar Explorer s logs and other documents from U.S. and Soviet sources. The book is based, in part, on the research for Michael White's documentary film Azorian: The Raising of the K-129, released in late 2009. The research for the book and the documentary forced the CIA to issue a report on Project Azorian in early 2010, with one-third of the document censored. In this book, the untold story of the CIA s Project Azorian is finally revealed after decades of secrecy. ... Read more

Reviews

FACTS STRANGER THAN FICTION, October 26, 2010
"Project Azorian: The CIA and the Raising of K-129" by naval historian Norman Polmar and documentary film producer Michael White provides the first unclassified, factual accounting of a unique event in world history - the loss of a nuclear-missile-equipped submarine in 1968, and its subsequent clandestine (partial) salvage by the CIA in 1974.

In the intervening 35-plus years, there have been many magazine and newspaper articles and several books addressing the K-129 and the CIA's recovery attempt -- incorrectly identifying the CIA effort as "Project Jennifer". Such reportings devolved over the years, as ignorance gradually was replaced by unsupported theories, wild speculation, and finally by absolute nonsense. These distortions and fantasies (represented as factual accountings) eventually motivated several men who participated in CIA's Project Azorian to step forward for in-depth interviews revealing the history of "Azorian" in intimate detail.

Added to the information obtained in these interviews of CIA & Naval officers, men onboard the Hughes Glomar Explorer, and ex-Soviet officials, Polmar & White have published actual photography of the K-129 wreck and, most astonishingly, have published the recorded sound trace of the catastrophe which sank that unfortunate ship. The acoustic recordings were captured by the U.S. Air Force hydrophone system operated by the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) - and Polmar & White reveal that the Navy's SOSUS system never detected the deployment or identified the acoustic events associated with the loss of the K-129.

To these unprecedented sources, add a lengthy interview with ex-Soviet Admiral Viktor Dygalo, who was the K-129's Division Commander in 1968, and add a document review of Russian-language sources concerning Soviet naval activity in the Pacific in 1968. Polmar & White also include declassified documents revealing U.S. Pacific fleet surveillance and operational activities in the northern Pacific from February through May 1968, KH-4B satellite photography of the Petropavlavsk submarine complex in September 1967, and interviews with U.S. naval personnel who participated in events that conspiracy theorists can only speculate about (specifically an interview with the Officer-of-the-Deck of USS Swordfish when she bent her periscope, and with individuals involved in the 1971/72 Trieste dives north of Kauai). Finally, the book integrates the information revealed in a heavily censored 50-page CIA history released in 2010 in reaction to Michael White's documentary film. From these threads, Polmar and White weave the most complete and detailed rendering of this event available outside of the U.S. intelligence community.

Determining the cause of the loss by accident of any vessel is made difficult or impossible if there are no survivors to question, and lacking a forensic reconstruction of recovered parts. Yet, with a very detailed analysis of the acoustic information, Polmar & White come close to an explanation of the catastrophe. When the acoustics are combined with an examination of the photography, and Russian reports of K-129 communications problems at-sea are integrated - certain events identify themselves.

Like many such catastrophes, "Project Azorian" reveals that two or more highly improbable failures occurred in succession, finding a pathway to disaster which designers never considered, and provided no safety cut-out to prevent. Further expertise (probably only available in Russia from ex-Soviet naval architects, equipment designers, naval officers, and training specialists) will be required to verify and explain all the new evidence and identify a definitive chain-of-events to failure as well as "first cause".

After an extensive and detailed narrative of the CIA's "Project Azorian" salvage attempt, and its planned successor "Project Matador", Polmar & White review what the CIA salvaged from the wreck, and whether or not the "take" was worth the cost. An exquisitely detailed blow-by-blow discussion of the Project's intelligence-and-political-review process is included, providing the reader with an understanding of how "black" ops are evaluated and approved within the Executive Branch of government.

The book ends with eight appendices containing information on the K-129, its crew, its missiles, the USS Halibut (SSN-587), the lift ship (Hughes Glomar Explorer), the capture vehicle (the claw), and the "Hughes Mining Barge" (the submersible dry dock for the capture vehicle), 14 pages of "Notes", a "Book List", and a complete index. The "Book List" is a bibliography of earlier books concerning "K-129" with an evaluation of the factual or speculative nature of their contribution to the public's knowledge of this unprecedented event.

If the above does not reveal my unbounded enthusiasm for this book, it is a failure as a review. Others have postured and pretended, promising a unique knowledge of the K-129 and the CIA's salvage effort to recover it from 3-miles beneath the surface but delivering only speculation and destortions. Polmar & White, finally deliver the goods -- they deliver a book demonstrating comprehensive knowledge of this fascinating and heretofore highly-classified incident which occurred at the height of the Cold War.

The CIA Project "Azorian" cost American tax payers about $1.4 billion (2010 dollars), spent between 1968 - 1975. Now for the first time, we can see what our representatives in the "black" communities did with our money, and evaluate for ourselves whether they properly protected our interests during those years of confrontation and threat.

"Project Azorian: The CIA and the Raising of K-129" is the ONLY authoritative unclassified source of reliable information on this event, and should not be read as just another layer of speculation accumulating since 1975. Azorian (this book) is the bible for FACTUAL data leading to an understanding of these events, and for identifying and measuring the purposeful misdirection, fictions, errors, and speculation which have been published over the past 35 years.

Buy it; read it; and appreciate that finally facts have been separated from the fancy and disinformation which has surrounded the K-129 loss since 1968. Also highly recommended is the complementary DVD film by Michael White Productions which, in two hours, covers the same story visually: Azorian: The Raising of the K-129

Polmar & White have produced a tour-de-force.

Mission almost accomplished, November 10, 2010
In this spellbinding book,the authors have written a masterful account of one of the most intriguing moments in the saga of the Cold War Intelligence history. The Cold War waa in many ways a war of shadows which was also played out in the depths of the seas and oceans.
One of the most ambitious and daring projects was the CIA'S attempt to raise from the depth of the seabed the K-129 Russian submarine,which was carrying nuclear-armed torpedoes,missiles and other intelligence material. It took the Americans six years of technical preparations in order to attempt and salvage the submarine.This project,named"Azorian" cost the American taxpayers at least 500 milllion dollars and the ship which was supposed to carry out this mission was the "Hughes Glomar Explorer",financed by the mysterious billionaire Howard Hughes.
Unfortunately,only "some 38 feet of the submarine were recovered", while the targeted ballistic missiles and cryptologic material were not brought into the "Glomar"'s pool. Yet the project was successful,since Soviet intelligence agencies were unable to detect the US salvage effort. Material reovered fron the wreck,including two nuclear torpedoes and documents,did have intelligence value.
The project was a great technological achievement and the book reads like a Jules Verne adventure story.The authors dismiss many conspiracy-like theories as to why the submarine disappeared. It is based on extensive interviews and newly declassified CIA documents and will serve as another significant addition to the literature of the Cold War History.Highly recommended.

Finally, the Facts About the Sinking of K-129, November 4, 2010
This book presents the reader with well researched facts about the sinking of a Soviet Golf II Class submarine (K-129) in 1968 and how the U.S. located it and later recovered it (or part of it) with the purpose-built lifting ship "Glomar Explorer". This book provides not-seen-before photos of the Golf on the sea bottom (3 miles below the ocean surface) and of the US efforts to raise it. Of particular interest, is the analysis of the acoustic data collected by US sensors when the K-129 went down. This data was used to locate the position of K-129 when it sank. Recent re-analysis of this acoustic data provides the first fact-based assessment of what cause K-129 to sink--debunking conspiracy theories offered in several recent books that stated that K-129 was setting up to fire it's ballistic missiles at Hawaii when it sank. If you want the truth and can handle the truth, read this book.

You Are There, November 9, 2010
This book is an excellent synthesis of investigation, research, reporting, analysis and writing. In covering a most complex intelligence operation in such rich detail, Polmar and White make readers feel as though they were actually standing bridge watches on the recovery ship during the operation. I was amazed at the volume and quality of the new information revealed by the authors, down to the weekly menu offered by the "stew burners" on board the Hughes Glomar Explorer. The technical data and background information contained in the book are superbly presented and help the reader to more fully understand the context and the components of the amazing Azorian project. In addition, the authors enlarge on the main topic by debunking some of the myths surrounding other Cold War submarine operations, e.g., the loss of USS Scorpion, and provide an update on the recent activities of some of Azorian's chief elements. This is an authoritative, compelling and well-told account that will be invaluable to scholars, Cold War historians, ship buffs, students of intelligence operations and all those who enjoy precise and factual reporting and who seek solid nonfiction that is even more exciting and provocative than a good novel.

An amazing story, December 28, 2010
The true story of project Azorian has to be read to be believed. The sheer "balls" of the CIA and the engineers involved is stunning. The fact that it cost almost as much as the moon landing is even more amazing. A must read for anyone interested in the cold war and marvels in engineering.

Exploding the Myths, December 3, 2010
This detailed book, in addition to being impeccably researched and written puts to bed once and for all the myths planted by the book Red Star Rogue and also related books on the loss of USS Scorpion SSN 589. These myths rooted within the unquestioning credibility given to Dr. John Craven by our Navy do a disservice to both our Navy and the Soviet Union. K-129 was not a roque trying to launch a missle at Pearl Harbor, nor was she sunk by a collision with USS Swordfish. Further, the Scorpion was not sunk by a Russian torpedo. Norman Polmar who also wrote an excellent book on the loss of USS Thresher backs up the true story with facts provided by the outstanding research of Mr. Michael White.

This book is a must for anyone interested in Cold War Submarine Ops and CIA intelligence operations.

Dennis Mosebey

The Incredible Story of an Audacious Intelligence Operation, November 29, 2010
By early 1968, the Cold War had been raging for two decades. The U.S. and the Soviet Union each had strategic bombers and nuclear-tipped Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) aimed at each other on hair-trigger alert. Missile-carrying submarines of both nations' navies prowled the oceans, ready to launch devastating nuclear strikes at a moment's notice. Tensions between the two superpowers were high, with memories of the Berlin Blockade, the shootdown of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 spyplane and the Cuban Missile Crisis still fresh.

On February 25, 1968, Soviet submarine K-129, a diesel boat carrying three 755-nautical-mile-range ballistic missiles each armed with a 1-megaton thermonuclear warhead, sailed from its base at Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula and headed for its patrol station on a 60-day mission. The 324-foot, 3,610-ton submarine never made it. On March 11, the K-129 sank in the northern Pacific Ocean in 16,400 feet of water about 1,600 nautical miles northwest of Hawai'i. All 98 men aboard perished.

"Project Azorian: The CIA and the Raising of the K-129" tells the full, almost unbelievable story of the most audacious American clandestine operation of the Cold War (at least of those the public knows about). Conducted in the summer of 1974, the operation involved nothing less than secretly attempting to salvage the forward 136 feet of the K-129 (which had broken off from the stern section) from the ocean floor. If it could do so, the U.S. would gain insights of incalculable value into its adversary's naval equipment, capabilities and operational procedures. Intelligence analysts practically drooled at the thought of the information they expected the K-129 to yield--cryptographic hardware, code manuals, communications systems, torpedoes and one or more actual ballistic missiles with their thermonuclear warheads. The operation would be scandalously expensive, technically challenging, unprecedentedly complex, extremely risky, probably illegal and not at all certain to succeed. But if it did...

Authors Norman Polmar and Michael White cover the operation in great detail, and a fascinating story it is. Project Azorian cost about as much as an Apollo mission to the moon, and involved equipment and hardware that to this day remain marvels of innovative marine engineering. With cost practically no object, the CIA, through a series of "front" companies, built the huge salvage ship "Hughes Glomar Explorer," a remote-controlled "claw" to pick up the forward part of the K-129 and an enormous covered barge that concealed parts of the operation from prying eyes. The descriptions of the design and operation of the hardware are exceptionally clear and lucid, and several well-done, full-color computer-graphic drawings make everything very clear.

There have been other books about the K-129 salvage operation, such as the harshly criticized (and rightly so) "The Jennifer Project," by Clyde Burleson, published in 1977 ("Jennifer" was actually the administrative security "compartment" in which "Project Azorian" operated). Polmar and White, however, used recently declassified documents and conducted interviews with many former participants in the program, so their work will likely remain the most accurate story of the project until the CIA grudgingly releases more material.

One of the most fascinating things about studying history is that sometimes what you think you know for sure turns out to be dead wrong. Such was the case with many of the earlier accounts of this secret operation that the CIA fervently hoped would be an incredible Cold War intelligence coup. To find out what really happened, read "Project Azorian." I recommend it most highly.

True story of the incredible recovery of a Soviet Submarine, November 18, 2010
Norman Pollmar and Michael White combined forces to give readers the inside story on one of the most incredible engineering feats of the twentieth century. In "Project Azorian: The CIA and the Raisin of the K-129", readers learn of the engineering efforts and the deception plan to recover a Soviet submarine that sank in the depths of the Pacific Ocean. With the real life plot line of a best-seller spy novel, this book was an absolute page turner.

It's been more than ten years since I read "Blind Man's Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage", where I first learned of this incredible feat. With the benefit of declassified CIA and Soviet records, Polmar is able to provide readers with the most accurate depiction of the events that took place in the late 1960's and early 1970s.

The authors introduce the readers to the Soviet crew who set sail on their final voyage in February 1968. The cruel hand of fate intervened, preventing the scheduled submarine from sailing. Soviet leaders decided that K-129 would take its place, despite the opportunity to reconstitute from their last cruise. The authors describe how the United States learned of the death knells of the submarine, and the methods used to triangulate and confirm the location of the tragedy.

After the USS Halibut returned images from the depths of the Pacific, American leaders decided to attempt a recovery of the sub. The prospect of recovering intact Soviet cryptographic equipment and an intact nuclear missile would almost justify any expense. Over the next five years, the United States began overt construction of the unique vessel that would snatch the submarine right as clueless Soviet spy ships watched the recovery.

Using the previously unaccessible Soviet sources, Polmar offers his professional opinion on the credibility of the theories surrounding the initial loss of the submarine.

The writing is supplemented with original black & white photographs, and computer generated graphics to illustrate the recovery phase. Included with the images, is the photo mosaic of the K-129 created from the radar-images captured by USS Halibut.

This was an absolutely fascinating book. I highly recommend it to any reader looking to learn more about Naval History and the United States silent service.

Truly impressive research, and well-written, December 4, 2010
Although the CIA's operation to recover the Soviet missile submarine has not been completely declassified, the authors have done an excellent job of researching the subject. Several years ago I learned about the secret operation to recover a film return vehicle for an American spy satellite using the deep submergence vehicle Trieste II, but I could not publish at the time because of the source of my information. So I was impressed to see that the authors of this book had uncovered that incident (a KH-9 HEXAGON satellite recovery vehicle sunk in 16,400 feet of water and recovered by Trieste II in 1971), which finally allowed me to write about it here: [...] I still have more information on that incident, but I was impressed that these authors uncovered the same story that I did.

Also impressive is the way that they approached their material, being careful to explain why and how other previous works were limited or inaccurate. For example, a short appendix at the back of the book reviews a number of other books that have addressed this topic and provides brief assessments of them. Although I wished that this was a little longer, that literature review is valuable both for people who are very familiar with the subject of submarine espionage as well as those who are new to it. I only wish that they had more information on the spysub USS Halibut, and I'd love to know more about the construction (and operations) of her successors such as the USS Parche. I realize that is not the focus of this book, however.

The book is well illustrated, including a number of artist impressions of the equipment, as well as the first ever published photos of the submarine wreck itself. This is a great piece of research and is well-written.

First Factual Account of Loss and Recovery of Russian Sub - K 129, November 21, 2010
This book is the first factual and comprehensive account of the loss, locating efforts and eventual partial recovery of the Russian ballistic missile submarine, K-129, which sank in the Pacific in 1968. Conspiracy theorists will undoubtedly be disappointed but for anyone interested in the facts surrounding the loss of the GOLF SSB this book is a must read. It clearly will be the final say on the subject until such time as the Russians fill in the final missing pieces. ... Read more

Editorial Review

This gripping history is the definitive account of the battle that shifted the tide of World War II.

Historians and reviewers worldwide have hailed Antony Beevor's magisterial Stalingrad as the definitive account of World War II's most harrowing battle. In August 1942, Hitler's huge Sixth Army reached the city that bore Stalin's name. In the five month siege that followed, the Russians fought to hold Stalingrad at any cost, then caught their Nazi enemy in an astonishing reversal.

As never before, Stalingrad conveys the experience of soldiers on both sides as they fought in inhuman conditions, and of civilians trapped on an urban battlefield. Antony Beevor has interviewed survivors and discovered completely new material in a wide range of German and Soviet archives, including reports of prisoner interrogations, desertions, and executions. The battle of Stalingrad was the psychological turning point of World War II; as Beevor makes clear, it also changed the face of modern warfare. As a story of cruelty, courage, and human suffering, Stalingrad is unprecedented and unforgettable.
"A fantastic and sobering story . . . fully and authoritatively told." -Richard Bernstein, The New York Times ... Read more

Reviews

One of the four best works on Stalingrad ever written, June 28, 2004
This book by noted writer Antony Beevor joins three others that are essential English language "classics" on Stalingrad. These important books are John Erickson's "The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's War with Germany" and Joel Hayward's "Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East 1942-1943" and Earl Ziemke and Magna Bauer's "Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East".

Beevor has used all three and produced a work that is the least academic but arguably most exciting of all. He has also used Manfred Kehrig's "Stalingrad: Analyse und Dokumentation einer Schlacht"which is not available in English --- sadly.

Beevor also uses the latest research on the Soviets, including the books by David Glantz. He paid researchers to translate unpublished Soviet documents, which also enrich his text.

The book is clearly an excellent overview of the efforts put into winning at Stalingrad by both sides. As scholars have noted in learned articles, Beevor ignores airpower and only deals sketchily with strategy, but his narrative of the human experience of warfare is more than compensatory.

World Class History., June 12, 2004
I first read this book during the summer of 1999 and had never heard of the author beforehand. I took to him immediately and experienced considerable difficulty putting Stalingrad down. I usually read three or four books at a time but could not with Stalingrad as it became my sole concern until it was finished. Beevor makes use of outstanding primary source materials and his narrative technique makes one feel as if you have secret access to the innermost recesses of the minds of Chuikov, Paulus, Zhukov, von Manstein, and, of course, Hitler and Stalin. It reminded me of the old PBS documentary,
"Battleground" for the way in which it flowed. Buy it,I guarantee you won't regret it.

Excellent One Volume History, June 28, 1999
This subject has inspired a good deal of writing, including several one volume works. Beevor's is probably the best. Based on an extensive review of the prior literature, original archival research, and interviews, Beevor has produced a very readable overview of the battle of Stalingrad. Beevor is a very good writer who integrates telling anecdotes seamlessly into narrative giving the gist of situations. He sets the stage well with astute chapters on the Eastern Front conflict up to Stalingrad and does an excellent job of describing both the command level decisions and the essential horrors of combat in Stalingrad. Many aspects covered well in this volume, such as the roles of the NKVD and Soviet deserters, are not dealt with well in other volumes. This is not a blow by blow account of the campaign and may disappoint some readers who expect highly traditional detailed military history. Beevor's judgements are dispassionate, humane, and backed by careful consideration of the evidence. My only criticism is that the book would have benefited from more maps with better detail.

Blood, ice, lice, brutality, corpses  and heroism, January 16, 2001
Several months ago, I reviewed (5 stars) a novel entitled WAR OF THE RATS, ostensibly based on the factual battlefield achievements of the real-life, Soviet Army master sniper, Vasily Zaitsev, during the German siege of Stalingrad during World War II. Wishing to learn more about this horrific struggle, I sought out this book, STALINGRAD, a narrative history of the fight authored by Antony Beevor.

STALINGRAD begins, as it must, on June 21, 1941 with the launching of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union by three Army Groups - North, Center and South. Beevor first summarizes from a wide perspective Army Group Center's attack on, and repulse from, Moscow, and Army Group South's surge towards the Volga River and the Caucasus Mountains. Then, the focus is narrowed onto the Sixth Army's and Fourth Panzer Army's drive to Stalingrad and the Volga in the summer of `42. The last three-quarters of the volume then limits itself to the Stalingrad siege, the Soviet counterattack on, and encirclement of, the Sixth and Fourth Panzer armies, their subsequent subjugation, and, finally, the fate of the 91,000 Germans taken prisoner. The main characters of the drama are all brought onto the stage: Hitler, Paulus, Schmidt, von Richthofen, Stalin, Zhukov, Yeremenko, Chuikov, and Rokossovsky.

This is a very reader-friendly account for the simple reason that the author supplies enough information, including maps, to keep the narrative moving along without getting bogged down in the minutiae of minor troop movements and a superabundance of unit designations. He's also included (in the paperback edition) two adequate sections of photographs - always a much appreciated touch. The volume met, if not exceeded, my expectations, and I learned a lot.

During the Siege, there was desperate heroism on both sides. But, it was also war at its most brutal in ways too many to recount. I shall finish with two excerpts, both regarding war prisoners, first from the Russian viewpoint, then the German.

" `When the (German) retreat started on 20 November, we (Soviet POWs) were put instead of horses to drag the carts loaded with ammunition and food. Those prisoners who could not drag the carts as quickly as the Feldwebel wanted were shot on the spot. In this way we were forced to pull the carts for four days, almost without any rest.' "

"Anger at the (prison camp) conditions led to (German) prisoners scraping handfuls of lice off their own bodies and throwing them at their (Soviet) guards. Such protests provoked summary execution."

Fascinating account of a grim battle, July 3, 2005
I've just finished reading Joel Hayward's book on the air war at Stalingrad, so now, having also read Antony Beevor's book, which concentrates on the army side of things, I think I've read the two best books. Beevor's book isn't as good as Hayward's on strategic and operational level matters, but has more on the tactics and low-level experiences. That's why this book is the perfect partner to Hayward's (and Erickson's, of course). Beevor actually deals with civilians at Stalingrad too, and his sections on ordinary peasants and city citizens are very moving. I felt like weeping at their suffering. The book covers both sides, and while the Soviets are always presented more favourably by Beevor than the Germans, he does point out something we must not forget: it was the Germans who were the aggressors at Stalingrad. This is a stunning moving book.

Very solid account of the ordinary soldiers' war., May 23, 2003
If you want to read about higher strategy this is not the book for you. And If you want to learn about the Luftwaffe's failure to win the Battle of Stalingrad and then keep 6th army alive you'll have to look elsewhere. Where should you look? At Joel Hayward's definitive, excellent STOPPED AT STALINGRAD: THE LUFTWAFFE AND HITLER'S DEFEAT IN THE EAST. But if you want to learn about the suffering of ordinary ground troops on both sides THIS IS THE RIGHT BOOK! Read Hayward and Beevor together and you've got the whole picture. It a grim, miserable but poignant picture. Stalingrad is what happens when the poor recruits of two evil tyrants square off and are not allowed to retreat 'even one inch'.

Concise history of the great campaign and its aftermath, December 20, 1999
Having read many works concerning Stalingrad, I suspect that we may be approaching the point where a definitive, detailed, multi-volume history of the great battle could be possible. Indeed, this should probably be attempted before the surviving veterans all pass on. That being said, this is a very acceptable single volume account of the Stalingrad campaign. It compares favorably with Craig's work, _Enemy at the Gates_.

One of the strengths of Beevor's work is his view of the Russian side of the struggle. This is attained through access to now available Soviet archives. It is also attained through the greater willingness of Russian veterans to speak of their experiences without the distorting rhetoric often associated with The Great Patriotic War. The candid discussion of desertion and outright collaboration on the part of some Russian soldiers forms one of the most interesting aspects of this book. Likewise, the fate of approximately 85,000 German soldiers who entered Soviet captivity never to return is treated with even greater detail than that revealed by Craig. Again, I suspect that Beevor enjoyed access to records-- and candor-- that Craig and earlier writers did not.

While I do not completely agree with all of Beevor's conclusions, he makes a convincing case for the primary responsibility of Paulus for the destruction of the Sixth Army through failure to maintain an uncommitted panzer reserve in the late fall of 1942. This failure on the part of a commander is too often ignored in works which blame the destruction of the Sixth Army on Hitler's "stand fast" order and von Manstein's failure to send a "breakout" order.

Students of the campaign should add this volume to their library.

Beevor shows the unbelievable human suffering of war., April 20, 2005
Beevor gives the big picture view of the Battle of Stalingrad. I have read many books of World War II battles, and this is the first that really described the tragedy of what common soldiers go through. It also gave a good look at the Russian and German armies and their commanders. Beevor gives a big picture view of the battle by showing the policies of Stalin and decisions by the generals, but also brings his focus on what the soldiers were going through. Beevor also gives us a look at the brutality of Stalin and Hitler. My only problem is that it would have been nice to have more situation maps detailing the events (military unit maneuvers) in the book. Other than that it is an excellent read.

A Gripping, Well-Told Story, April 6, 2000
I've read several accounts of Stalingrad and for me this was the best. Beevor gives you the necessary strategic events and context, but his main purpose is to present the battle from the grunts' view and he succeeds marvelously. His description, for example, of the first encounter and conversations between Germans and Russians when the latter arrive ostensibly to seek the Sixth Army's surrender was memorable. I was also impressed with his research into the anti-Stalinst Russians who fought with the Germans (the "Hiwis"); this was the most extensive coverage I've seen of that issue. Finally, Beevor completes his work with a account of the sad fate of the German prisoners, most of whom succomb to disease and starvation, while their officers, given something akin to VIP treatment by the Soviets, bicker over trivialities like possession of eating utensils.

In short, I really enjoyed this book (if that's the right word for such a horrendous tragedy as Stalingrad) because of the authors' concentration on the fate of the individuals involved. You can get the strategic and military analysis elsewhere, but for a close look at what it all was like for the soldiers on the ground on each side, I highly recommend this book.

Ideologies to the Death, May 8, 2005
Any WWII history buff will love this book. As many reviews state, it is thoroughly researched, and yet it reads like an action-packed novel. 'Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege' has however affected me more deeply than have many other books on similar subjects. Having lived throughout Germany, Poland and (at the time of writing) Russia - and having loved the people in all these countries - I have never understood how the war on the Eastern Front could have deteriorated as it did into a merciless war of genocide and annihilation. Probably, I never will, but however close I come to gaining such an understanding will surely be largely thanks to Beevor. This book gives an incredible, if horrifying, account of the Nazis' virtual rape of the USSR, and of the Wehrmacht's amoral and cowardly toleration as such devastation went on in their wake. And reading this book gave me a new kind of perspective: People may judge the Red Army's apparently low respect for Soviet lives all they like, but when facing a frightfully powerful and indoctrinated enemy that was bent on nothing less than the complete obliteration of the Slavic peoples, perhaps the only thing for it was to retaliate with greater determination and fundamentalism. Also we may deplore the USSR's later acts of vengeance on the German peoples, but if it doesn't excuse or condone it, Beevor's book convinced me of just how certainly Germany could have expected this after their conduct. It is a tremendous lesson for all off us, not so much to avoid wars (as history almost points to their inevitability), but to avoid the kinds of mass-hatred and ideology that can lead to wars of the worst kind. Antony Beevor gives a highly sensitive account of this most horrible and desperate piece of history, both from a Soviet perspective, as well as from a German / German-Allied perspective. He reminded me of how lucky I am to be able to read about such horrors from the comforts of a warm bed. ... Read more

Editorial Review

A major new history of the Russian conflict immortalized by Tolstoy in War and Peace

Russia's expulsion of Napoleon's Grande Arm�e in 1812 is considered one of the most dramatic events in European history. However, Tolstoyan myth and an imbalance of British and French interpretations have clouded most Westerners' understanding of Russia's role in the defeat of Napoleon.

Based on a fresh examination of Russian military archives, Russia Against Napoleon provides the first-ever history of the period told from the Russian perspective. In Dominic Lieven's account, Russia's victory in 1812 was just the beginning of what would be the longest military campaign in European history, marked by Russia's epic efforts to feed and supply half a million troops as they crossed an entire continent.

Moving from the 1807 treaty signed by Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I through the Russian army's improbable entry into Paris in 1814, Lieven provides suspenseful accounts of events, such as the burning of Moscow and the great battles of Leipzig and Borodino, as well as astute analyses of the great military strategists of the time. The result is a magisterial work sure to be eagerly anticipated by military and history buffs alike. ... Read more

Reviews

MAGNIFICENT AND MONUMENTAL !, April 22, 2010
In this new study about one of the best-known and much-studied periods of history,Dominic Lieven has finally offered us a beautifully-crafted history written from the Russian point of view.It looks like he has combed every possible Russian archive and the result is mesmerizing.
In 1812 Napoleon's army proudly marched and invaded Russia,but only less than two years later,the Russian army was marching into Paris.As the author points out from the very beginning,the personal history of Napoleon during these years,1812-1814,is a "tale of hubris and nemesis".The story contains two of the major battles in European history,Leipzig and Borodino.If at first Napoleon's first army was smashed in the battlefield of Russia, his second was defeated on the battlefields of Germany.To quote,"In the longest campaign in European history,the Russian army pursued the French all the way from Moscow to Paris and led the victorious coalition into the enemy capital on March 21,1814".
Prof.Lieven adds that he is an old-fashioned- historian who has always wanted to tell this story and came to the conclusion that the "story as told in Western Europe and North America was very far from the truth".Thus he set out to correct things and decided that the best way to do it was to write about this era from the Russian perpective.We are also told that three of his direct ancestors were generals in the Battle of Leipzig! The Napoleonic wars occurred at the dawn of modern nationalism and the result is a national bias in the writing of history which exists in all countries especially when it comes to writing about war.
One area of Napoleonic warfare which has attracted too little attention from historians of every nationality is that of logistics,namely the equipment and feeding of armies.One of the key triumphs of the Russian effort was its success in feeding and supplying more than half a million troops outside Russia's borders in 1813-1814.Another factor which is discussed in the book is one greatest hero of the war effort.This was not a human being but an animal:the horse.The horse fulfilled the present-day functions of the tank,the lorry,the aeroplane and motorized artillery."It was the weapon of shock,pursuit,reconnaissance, transport and mobile firepower"(p.7).Napoleon lost almost all the horses with which he invaded Russia.In 1813 he managed to replace the men but finding new horses proved a far more difficult and in the end disastrous problem.It was the lack of cavalry wgich stopped him from winning decisevely in the spring of 1813 campaign and persuaded him to agree to the fatal two-month summer armistice,which contributed so much to his ultimate defeat.The study of the Russian horse industry is discussed here for the first time and is the key part of the present book.How and why Russia overcame the enormous challenge presented by Napoleon is another main feature of this book.Military operations,strategy and diplomacy constitute the core of the book and the basic approach of it is chronological.The author starts with the negotiations at Tilsit 1807 and then commences with the Franco-Russian deal to run Europe until Napoleon's invasion of Russia.In the summer of 1810 the Russians, who were far from trusting Napoleon,sent a number of young and competent officers to Germany in order to gather intelligence.The reasons for this were the words spoken by the French minister of war who boasted that Napoleon's army had never been so well equipped.
The next chapter gives a very long and informative description of Russia's generals and minister of war Aleksei Arakcheev.There are four chapters devoted to 1812 and Borodino and four more chapters on 1813 while the year 1815 gets two chapters.Prof.Lieven discusses in detail the main differences between the two armies.If the Russian army under Alexander the First and Kutuzov was deeply religious and imbued with patriotic themes,the French adversary was
secular and never spoke about patriotism.There was also a partisan warfare in 1812 and the reader is informed that this movement was not the same as the partisan one during the Nazi occupation in 1941-1945.
Another myth dispelled here in the best possible convincing way has to do with the Russian winter-the factor which was regarded so far as responsible for Napoleon's defeat.This was not true and is nonsense, because it was only in December,after the French army had already been destroyed, that the winter became unusually and "ferociously cold"(p.265).However,not only Napoleon's troops suffered tremendous losses.Kutuzov reported to Alexander in December 1812 that the army's losses had been so enormous that he was obliged to hide them not just from the enemy but also from his own officers.A new enemy was at the gates of Russia at the end of 1812:typhus.The disease was rampant among the prisoners of war whom the Russians were capturing in droves and it spread quickly.The main factor which contributed to Napoleon's defeat in 1812-1814 concerns the Russian soldier and officer.The Russian army showed great heroism and suffered immensely in 1812,and the year after the Russian army fought with more skill because of the experience it had gained in 1812.The Russians were skilled and intelligent enough in order to arrive at the conclusion that to remove the enemy threat required taking the war beyond the
country's borders.This was to achieved by recruiting allies.The kudos goes to Alexander, who managed to grab his allies by the scruff of the neck in order to get them to serve their own and Europe's interests.Russian and European security depended on each other.Napoleon's final chance and hope to be the master of Europe by controlling Germany were dashed by the mistakes he and his generals made on the battelfield of Leipzig.Though the allies lost 52000 men at this battle,they fought with more courage and tenacity than their counterparts.Napoleon got back to the Rheine with 85000 men but thousands of them succumbed ,again,to typhus.
How Russia's home front was mobilized against the enemy is discussed in detail.The book also contains sixteen maps-some of them extremely detailed and informative.Although there are many details on each aspect of the Russo-French campaign,the reader never gets bored and has the feeling of actually being on the battlefielld or present during the relevant diplomatic talks. Fresh analysis and insights and a very good and intriguing narrative make this one of the best books written on this fascinating era.

Very Good, May 22, 2010
This very good book is a successful revision of the history of the Napoleonic campaign against Russia in 1812 and the ensuing campaigns that led to Napoleon's expulsion from the throne of France. An expert on the the Russian empire, Lieven's reinterpretation is based on what appears to be considerable research in Russian archives and extensive analysis of Russian secondary literature not used in most prior English language books. In contrast to most prior accounts that focus on Napoleon and tend to view the Russians as relatively passive reactors to French actions, Lieven emphasizes the actions and foresight of the Russian leaders, particularly the emperor Alexander I. Lieven argues well that the 1812 French invasion was the result of deliberate Russian decisions to pursue a war that would eventually allow formation of a Prussian-Austrian-Russian alliance against Napoleonic France and that the Russians anticipated and sought a war of attrition on their own soil.

Lieven is particularly good on the complex role of Russian internal politics, the limits on Alexander's freedom of action, and the considerable limitations of the relatively primitive Russian state. In many ways, the best parts of the book are the accounts of how Alexander and his advisers pursued military reform and the administrative apparatus to logistically support the huge effort required by the decision to pursue war with the French. The descriptions of the remarkable efforts undertaken by the Russian state to defend Russia and then to support a large army that moves across much of Europe provide an outstanding look at the power and limitations of European states in this period. Lieven is also very good on the complex diplomatic history, focusing on the difficulties of coalition building among the Russians, Prussians, and Austrians. Alexander I is presented as an intelligent and relatively farsighted diplomat with firm ideas about his ultimate goals and considerable skill in adapting to circumstances. This is particularly well demonstrated by Alexander's key role in assembling and maintaining the coalition for the 1813-1814 campaigns.

Much of this book is solid narrative of the military campaigns and high level diplomacy. The narrative is generally done well and doesn't overpower the more analytical aspects of the book. The narrative of the 1813-1814 campaigns will be unfamiliar to many readers and is particularly informative. The quality of writing is good.

There are some limitations. Much of the book is campaign history and the maps are simply not adequate to adequately complement Lieven's narrative. Lieven tends to write of the efforts of Alexander and other leaders in the language of a conventional balance of power calculus. As he points out, however, these were not modern nations and this is the beginning of modern nationalism. What does national interest mean in such contexts? How did dynastic figures like Alexander, his fellow monarchs, and Napoleon himself think about such things? Its rather unlikely that the illiterate serfs who comprised the Russian armies, men conscripted for a period of 25 years, thought about the conflicts in anything like the terms employed by Lieven. Lieven's terminology is somewhat anachronistic and renders these events more familiar, and perhaps less interesting, than they should be.

Warning: No Maps in Kindle Edition, June 26, 2010
Good history, providing a different perspective to the "Napoleon defeated by General Winter" view of his Russian campaigns.

Overall, this is a very readable account, explained clearly, but ruined in the Kindle Edition by complete lack of maps. Honestly, how can anyone make sense of military history without maps?

master work, May 16, 2010
Dominic Lieven is perhaps the best, mostly deeply learned historian of imperial Russian politics now practicing in the English-speaking world. This marvelous book offers many insights into Russia's war with Napoleon: it illuminates the personalities of leading Russian statesmen and casts light on the nature of the strategic choices they made between 1812 and 1814 that contributed to Napoleon's defeat; it evaluates fully for the first time the Russian army's tremendous logistical feat in provisioning troops far from Russian borders in 1813 and 1814; above all, it helps us grasp clearly the need to carry the tale of Russia's encounter with Napoleon all the way to his defeat in 1814, rather than stopping the narrative with Napoleon's expulsion from Russia itself in 1812 (as so many previous books have done). Besides all that, Lieven's book is a rollicking good story, told in the style of a master craftsman unafraid to exhibit a sense of humor or to express astonishment over the pivotal events of these bloody years.

Excellent Corrective for Tolstoy, June 12, 2010
As a history buff whose favorite novel is War and Peace, I found this scholarly study, based primarily on recently opened Russian archives, fascinating and enlightening. As the author states several times, our view of the 1812 campaign is heavily influenced by Tolstoy's view of history as a clash of impersonal forces. In fact, as Lieven demonstrates, the Russian conduct of the 1812 campaign was part of a carefully thought out strategy, based on previous experience with Napoleon by Alexander I and Marshall Barclay de Tolly (the leading Russian general at the outset of the campaign, not Kutuzov, who arrived late on the scene). The success of this strategy and the often neglected campaigns of 1813 and 1814 brought about Napoleon's downfall, not the Russian winter.

The author's detailed descriptions of the 1813-1814 campaigns also helps explain the subsequent Vienna settlement. The Congress of Vienna is often described as if the map of Europe were redrawn on a blank sheet of paper. In fact, as Lieven shows, the territorial settlement in Poland, Norway and Germany very much reflected the military situation at the end of the conflict, which resulted from the strategy of Alexander, Barclay and their Prussian, Swedish, and Austrian allies.

The book is very well written and carefully indicates sources without letting the scholarly citations get in the way of the narrative.

After the 1812 Overture, August 10, 2010
For a History buff, there is simply no greater pleasure than to come across a wholly original treatment of subject matter that has heretofore been overlooked, under-researched, or otherwise neglected, and this book is just such a treasure. Author Lieven brings to our party an undisputed reputation as a Russian history scholar and also just happens to possess an enviably direct writing style that perfectly suits the daunting complexities of the story he tells. And what a story. Just about any one of us bookworms could tell fascinated grandkids the tale of Napoleon's invasion of Russian quickly going awry because of supply and communication problems, fatally complicated by Czar Alexander's decision to fight a defensive war and avoid decisive battles by moving further and further East until the Big Guy just gave up. And then, of course, Providence intervened in the form of the Russian Winter, aided and abetted by pursuing Cossacks and vengeful peasants, making the French Army's return journey something less than a victory lap.

All that we know, and it's from that point that Lieven really takes off and delivers a simply fascinating account of how Alexander decided to pursue Napoleon and improbably persuaded both Prussia and Austria to join in the hunt. There are enough thoughtful reviews for me to add only that I was particularly impressed by Lieven's ability to describe the bafflingly complex troop movements and battle scenarios as the allies chased Napoleon across Europe and to present brief but meaningful portraits of the allied generals and others in ranks to as a means to complete his entirely satisfying portrait of the events and their major players.

I have only a couple of quibbles. First, the maps provided are essentially useless because they are just that: maps of the chosen areas on which are displayed no military force deployments or maneuvers. One wonders why they were included at all. Second, at least I would have liked to read more about the difficulties faced by the retreating French Army on their way out of Russia. Perhaps my curiosity is a bit too morbid, but the story of how a 500,000-man army was reduced to a few thousand stragglers never grows old, not only because of the terrible retribution exacted by the Russians, but also the close to utter indifference of Napoleon to the suffering of his men. That he was able to put together another formidable army within a matter of months goes a long way to explaining the almost mystical power he had over ordinary Frenchmen.

Finally, and to me at least, this book has two `heroes,' Czar Alexander and the anonymous, famously long-suffering Russian soldier. Among the many, many things I acquired in this reading was a new-found appreciation for Alexander. It is true, as I've long understood, that his defeat at Austerlitz bred in him an unshakeable reluctance to assume command of his forces at the several times both his generals and the situations at hand suggested it would be appropriate. But it did not prevent him from making key decisions throughout the years 1812-14 which shaped both the military initiatives of the Allies for the better and formed the basis of their cohesion which eventually resulted in Napoleon's all-too-brief Elba vacation.

Author Lieven spends a good deal of time recounting the exploits of the Russian soldiers engaged in these campaigns, as well he might. His unique research confirmed what the Allies and even their enemies commented at the time: no soldier engaged fought more bravely nor endured hardships more resolutely than the Russian recruit. For more on this subject, and if only to confirm that the typical Russian soldier's fighting ability did not diminish over the ensuing near century and a half, I recommend Catherine Merridale's superb, `Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945.' What did change, of course, was the fact that while Czar Alexander and his generals cared very much about the welfare of their troops, Soviet leadership displayed a brutal indifference to their suffering and losses that made Napoleon seem like a mother hen.

All in all, `Russia Against Napoleon' is a book not to be missed by anyone interested in the military history of the period.

A fulsome new account of the war from the Russian perspective, October 24, 2010
Recently, a general discussion I had with a Russian colleague about the history of the War of 1812 turned into a rather heated exchange on the relative roles of Generals Kutuzov and Barclay de Tolly. It reminded me that this war, even though 200 years removed in history, still sits just below the surface of Russian consciousness, a central pillar in the historical argument that Russia has repeatedly been beseiged by hordes, imperialists and racists. And one challenges the Conventional Wisdom only at one's peril.

What Lieven does in this monumental, two-pound tome, subtitled "The True Story of the Campaigns of War and Peace," is take on much of Western Conventional Wisdom (as well, it might be said, as Tolstoyan and Soviet C.W.) about this war. What we know about Napoleon's war against Russia, Lieven asserts, tends to be that written by British and French historians. To counter this, he dove into the Russian military archives and surfaced with a fulsome new account of the war as seen from the Russian perspective.

Most specifically, Lieven seems to want to counter the prevailing notion that somehow Napoleon lost the war, whether due to winter conditions, disease among his troops, and the whims of Fate. Instead, he argues, Russia won it. Not because of some Tolstoyan rising of the people, and not because of the monumental efforts of some singular hero like Kutuzov. Instead, it was because Russian leaders out-thought and out-spied their French counterparts, because Russia's professional military was highly meritorious and better trained, and because Russia was far superior when it came to light cavalry. The horse was key.

Yet Lieven also wants in this history to focus attention away from just 1812, and onto 1813-1814, when Russia really finished off Napoleon, when it achieved the monumental task of securing supply lines all the way to Paris (something Napoleon failed at).

This is a superb history and not just for military historians who revel in battle details. On the contrary, Lieven focuses on the home front and on the wider context in a way that makes his history both readable and essential for understanding this complex and portentious conflict. Includes loads of excellent illustrations and nearly two dozen pages of helpful maps.


As reviewed in Russian Life

No War and Peace, December 17, 2010
I wasn't entering this book expecting "War and Peace II," or writing of the same quality as Tolstoy's classic. But I was looking forward to seeing a more realistic take on the war, and well as a follow-up on what happened in the campaigns of 1813-1814.

Unfortunately, Dominic Lieven has to be one of the least engaging authors I have ever read. He's incapable of giving a feel for the era, or of giving any sort of insight into character. I can't emphasize that second point enough. He constantly describes almost every single Russian in the book as "brave" or "courageous." Really, he uses these adjectives at least three times per page, often to describe the quality of the Russian marching and other activities that wouldn't seem to involve bravery. He very rarely goes into any more details than this. While of course some character do receive some more attention, it's all very poorly written. The most fully realized character was Alexander I, and even he is treated more as an object of blind hero-worship of some kind of father figure, than a fully realized character.

The author does describe battle scene after battle scene in mind-numbing detail, bringing up thousands of names, describing them as brave, stating what they did, and then immediately dropping them. It's all well-researched, and I suppose there's a sort of person for whom these sort of details are the reason they read a military history in the first place. But to me, it all felt like complete trivia.

He does not do a very good job describing the infrastructure or internal challenges of supporting such a far away army, despite the dust-jacket's promise to the contrary.

It's probably fair to bring up "War and Peace" again, considering that "The True Story of the Campaigns of War and Peace" is on the cover. DO NOT READ THIS IF YOU HAVEN'T READ "WAR AND PEACE." Sorry for the all-caps, but I wanted to make it clear. "War and Peace" is probably the greatest novel ever, and will incite one's curiosity in the Russian Army's campaigns against Napoleon. This book will beat the curiosity out of you.

Ground breaking study, August 23, 2010
This book has the potential to be regarded in the future as an epic ground breaking study of the factors that lead to Napoleon's defeat and demise.The traditional western view states that Napoleon was invincible until he made the mistake of invading russia during the winter which destroyed the bulk of his army.It then states that Prussia,Austria ,the other German states bankrolled by Britain and supported by Russia defeared Napoleon leading to his first abdication and on his return it was the courageous actions of Wellington and Blucher that finally got rid of the "Corsican Ogre".
Lieven does a good job of debunking a lot of this by showing that rather than being a fluke and miracle of nature,Napoleon's army was destroyed in Russia through a strategy developed by the Tsar and his generals,very much in a similar manner that Hannibal was worn down in Italy by the srategy developed by Fabius.(Both Generals were brilliant and devised strategies of annhilation whereby they destroyed the armies of their enemies on the battlefield).Lieven demonstrates that the Russians ran intelligence operations in France which discovered Napoleon's preparations for war.This lead to the creation of a plan than rather than playing to napoleon's strengths by facing him in battle ,they decided to withdraw into the vast interior of their country and wage a campaign of attrition .This is comparable to killing a beast not in one big blow but rather a number of pin pricks.It is indeed astonishing that one of the most famous campaigns in history does not have a single decisive battle that it can be remembered by (Some people may ask ,what about Borodino but we should remember that Borodino was bloody and huge but indecisive).
Even more astonishing than Napoleon's rout in Russia was the role that the Empire played in the defeats that lead to his abdication.Here we learn that Alexander through his diplomatic skills played a major role in forging the grand alliance that defeated Napoleon;that it was the russian light cavalry that intercepted messages showing how weak and vulnerable Paris was in the final offensive and that it was the Russian's huge superiority in the cavalry arm that lead to Napoleon's fatal decision to put a temporary halt to the war.Lieven shows that it was the empire 's ability to bring together peoples of different nationalities that also played a major role.For example Bagration was Georgian,Barclay de tolly,the descendant of Scottish Settlers,Kutuzov was Russian,and a lot of the Tsar's senior officials were ethnic German (including the author's ancestors).
In addition to introducing readers to a new view of history ,lieven also brings up some valid points that are useful today
1) All nations have a tendency to distort history for their own nationalist purposes.
2) Russia has and still is an integral part of European security and western politicians ignore this at their own peril.
3) Westerners tend to underestimate Russia because they view it as a backward land.
4) The most powerful armies can be defeated and brought to a standstill using asymmetric warfare techniques that negates that armies strengths and focus on that army's weaknesses.In hannibal's time we saw the use of Fabian Strategy to bring him to a standstill and the Roman offensive in Spain which deprived Carthage of its richest colonies and severly impaired its ability to continue fighting.In Napoelon 's time,we saw that his once invincible army was destroyed through the use of a strategy that neutralized its main strength(mainly its ability to destroy armies in a battle of annhilation like at austerlitz,jena ,austerdat and friedland)and played to its weaknesses (in the fields of cavalry and logistics).Today,we have seen this played out a number of times by guerilla movements (against the French in Vietnam and Algeria,the US in vietnam and the Soviets in Afghanistan) where the guerillas avoided fighting a decisive battle where they could be destroyed and instead foucused on inflicting casualties on the enemy and causing all kinds of headaches until it reached a point where the enemy decided to pack their bags and return home.

All in all,this book is a valuable teaching instrument and i highly recommend it

Czar Alexander's Victory, August 26, 2010
Brisk and fascinating account. Enjoyable read. Strategic in scope. Balances the common view. Better maps needed.

Dominic Lieven balances the historical record with this fascinating perspective (primarily Russian) of the allies victory over Napoleon and France, 1812-1814.. Lieven demonstrates that the well-known role of Russia's geography and winter climate combined with the strategic focus and superior vision of Czar Alexander to present a formidable foe whom Napoleon would bend but never break.

The author provides documentation to show the playing leading roles played by the inspired Czar Alexander who was ably supported by General Mikhail Barclay de Tolly, the cossacks, the Russian rear guards, all of the Russian people and, critically, Georg Kankrin, the logistical mastermind behind the feeding and supplying of the the Russian troops.

In effect, contrary to common belief, Napoleon did not lose. It was Alexander who won.

My only quibble with this account is the poor battle maps; they are mere sketches of roads, terrain and towns with no military dispositions; the author never refers to them. (Was this a last minute addition for American readers who are less familiar with the landscape?) Good maps are critical for military leaders in battle and those reading about battles. I suggest that the publisher may want to take a look at the mapping provided by Pantheon books and Robert B. Strassler whose use of maps for the epic Landmark accounts of/by Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon are first rate.

(FYI to fellow readers: I bought the Kindle edition as well. This increased my opportunities to stay engaged with the story when traveling.) ... Read more

Editorial Review

The Great Game was the epic stand-off between the two superpowers of the nineteenth century--Victorian Britain and Czarist Russia--for the riches of India and the East. Based on meticulous scholarship and on-the-spot research, Peter Hopkirk's immensely readable account covers the history at the core of today's geopolitics. Photos and maps. ... Read more

Reviews

Excellent History of the 'Great Game', June 1, 2001
Peter Hopkirk's book `The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia' is a great historical account and a very enjoyable book to read. It is very rare nowadays to find a book that holds your attention throughout, without finding one boring section, this is one of those books. In over 560 pages (paperback edition) Peter Hopkirk tells the amazing stories of a number of early British and Russian officers and men involved in the great imperial struggle for supremacy in Central Asia.

I found myself reading late into the morning, at times I couldn't put the book down. Most of the time I had heard of the places and people involved but a lot of this story was new to me. The narrative read like a novel, gripping but informative, never boring and full of information, breathing life into history in a way that is hard to find now-a-days.

This is a great book and I fully agree with the quote on the front cover of the book by Jan Morris "Peter Hopkirk is truly the laureate of the Great Game." If you ever wanted to learn something about this large and remote area then this is the book to start with. If you enjoy military history then this book has it, if you enjoy historical accounts of exploration then this book has it, if you just enjoy good history then this book has it all.

The story of Britain and Russia carving out their Empires in India, Afghanistan and the surrounding areas is truly fascinating and I was amazed at the brave and resourceful men who carved their name in history during this period. Most people have heard of the Khyber Pass and places like Chitral however I had never heard of the Pamirs and Karakorams mountain ranges or of the Kerman and Helmund deserts nor of some of the fierce and warlike tribes that lived in these areas.

After reading this book I yearn for more information about this region and I intend to buy the rest of Peter Hopkirk's books. I would rate this book one of the better ones I have read this year and to finish my review I would like to quote Byron Farwell from his review in `The New York Times':

"Those who enjoy vividly told tales of derring-do and seek a clear understanding of the history of the emerging central Asian countries will find this a glorious book."

A Hard Book to Put Down, September 2, 2002
The Great Game, by Peter Hopkirk, is an amazing history of British and Russian imperialism clashing in the Middle East and Asia. Encompassing the time period from the late eighteenth century to the very beginning of the twentieth, the Great Game was much like an enormous game of chess, with Russia seeking to expand its borders and Britain to safeguard its interests in India. Hopkirk reveals both the national policy thoughts of the two nations and the daring moves of each's officers and agents in the regions in question, which include most of Central Asia, Afghanistan, India and the Caucasus. In many cases, the men Hopkirk describes were the first Westerners to set foot in such regions (for example, Bokhara, Khotan and Khokand).

Hopkirk has done incredible research: his bibliography is an impressive 15 pages. And even though he has a wealth of material to cover, he makes sure that the whole presentation is interesting to the reader. He tells a complete story, but expands on issues and events that are both important and interesting. As a result, the exploits of men like Conolly, Stoddart and Burnes come into clear focus against a backdrop of intrigue and, often, duplicitous ness, across a little over 500 pages.

Not unexpectedly, Hopkirk's account tends to be favor the British point of view slightly. Even so, he's quick to point out mistakes and torpedo unjustified accusations on both sides.

I found this book an easy and quick read, completing it in across about four days. While it progresses in roughly chronological sequence, it could easily be read piecemeal if the reader desired. The book kept my interest well, and didn't ever seem to wander aimlessly. I must believe that this is the authoritative account of the subject, and I can recommend it unconditionally, whether this is a subject area of interest for you, or you just want an interesting book to occupy your time.

Interestingly, the end of the Soviet Union has refocused the spotlight on many regions discussed in this book. If you find that you remain interested in the topic after reading it, I recommend following up with Eastern Approaches by Fitzroy MacLean or Journey to Khiva by Phillip Glazebrook.

Great book on the Great Game, August 5, 2005
I came across the term Great Game first while reading Byron Farwell's "Armies of the Raj," and then later in Kipling's "Kim." It was in the appendix of Kim that I first read about Peter Hopkirk's "The Great Game." Hopkirk's account - though biased towards the British point of view - details the events in the Great Game with a flair and style that makes it extremely interesting to read. The voyages of the soldiers and civilians involved in the Great Game, the numerous instances of treachery and cruelty which were a norm with the rulers of the Central Asian khanates of the time, the two wars in Afghanistan that were catastrophic to the British, the two failed expeditions to Khiva that did tremendous damage to the prestige of the Russians, etc., are all described with meticulous details in this wonderful book of almost 550 pages.

The term Great Game was first coined by Arthur Conolly, a captain in the British army, and is used to describe the epic standoff between Russia and Britain for the control of India and Central Asia in the nineteenth century. There were many players in this Great Game from both the sides - brave men who thought nothing of venturing into hostile territories hitherto unknown to westerners to gather valuable political and military information for their countries. Many - including Conolly - perished playing this dangerous game of intrigue and espionage. The British, wary of any move on part of the Russians that would bring them closer to India, did everything in their power to extend their influence over the Central Asian khanates of Khiva, Bokhara, Samarkand, Kashgar, and especially Afghanistan. The Russians, on their part, after suffering some initial setbacks, ended up conquering most of the Central Asian countries around them (these countries were to remain a part of the Soviet Union till its collapse in 1991).

Fortunately, Britain and Russia did not get into a direct confrontation during this whole episode, and the Great Game finally ended after about a century with the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907. There were times, however, when war appeared to be imminent between the two superpowers of the time. Once, even Napoleon Bonaparte had planned to attack India with Russia's help. Things, however, soon went sour between him and Tsar Alexander I, and he ended up invading Russia - a costly mistake which resulted in a humiliating defeat for his army. Apart from the Central Asian countries, many other countries like Turkey, Persia, and China also got sucked into this game because of their proximity to both India and Russia.

These days, when Central Asia is in the limelight again because of recent developments in the world, this book was especially helpful to me in understanding the geography, politics, and culture of that region (before reading this book, I was not even aware of the names of many Central Asian countries). Now I am planning to read the rest of Peter Hopkirk's books to get an even better understanding of that part of the world.

Its a good book, but..., December 24, 2002
It being far easier to find fault than to praise and yours sincerely born lazy, I will tell you all that is wrong with this book. (many others before me have told you all that is right with it, i will skip that part entirely)

Agreed, the subject matter sometimes is dull and needs a dash of drama to make it come to life. In that, PH (author) sometimes shows himself a better historian than novelist. There are many places in which after describing what is a climactic incident, in the last sentence of the paragraph, he will give away what is to happen in the coming chapters. its like a friend telling you the ending of a christie novel - where's the fun in reading it after that?

the book screams for more maps - small half page affairs inserted in the right places so that the reader knows what part of the world he/she is in - i am from india, a place not far removed from the scenes that this "game" unfolds in, and i often found myself lost geographically. to another person for whom this is just another remote corner of the world, it can be oh so confusing. and the one small map at the front does little to make up for this gaping omission.

ph tells his story from a decidely british perspective. the british are always brave, commendable and if ever proven wrong, only so because of the deceit of the untrustworthy russians or the double crossing tribals. british mistakes are either overlooked entirely or condoned without question. if you are not from britian (or america for that matter), the holier than thou attitude of the british can be poignantly ubiquitous in the book. of course, i don't know if this is justified criticism of the narrative for that is probably very close to the truth of those days.

read the book, yes - but only for want of something better and more balanced in perspective and outlook.

Fantastic, October 24, 2001
This is Peter Hopkirk's classic account of the nineteenth century cold war struggle between the British Empire and Imperial Russia. Hopkirk is a devil with the pen and knows how to spin a great story. The end result is a gripping tale, the kind of wild adventure story my grandfather used to tell me when I was a child. Five stars simply isn't enough. This is terrific stuff.

For those who don't know, this is the story of how Central Asia became part of the Russian, and then Soviet Empire. Russian expansion to the southeast caused consternation in British India where military planners became convinced the Russians were out to invade the `Jewel of the Crown'. There followed a century's worth of cold war espionage between the empires that involved all maner of characters and military encounters.

There are invasions and wars in Afghanistan, where the Brits were turfed out twice, Russian conquests of the Emirates of Khiva & Bokhara and legions of adventurers heading off into the wild blue yonder on missions to map the region and foil the enemy. All their stories are here. You'll have to pinch yourself to believe some of them. What an adventure story this is.

Five Stars.

Amazing that it is actually true!, December 14, 2006
This is truly one of the best books I have ever read. It takes the reader from 1814-1914 and walks through the conflict that embroiled central Asia for a century. It looks at how the British tried to defend their empire (notably India) by using proxies in Pakistan and Afghanistan. If you are wondering how the divisions are set up in the Middle East and central Asia today they are born during the Great Game. The book reads like a spy novel and is so well written you will not even notice you are reading history. The story takes you in and you wonder why there has not been a movie yet. It is amazing to see what these people went through and the things that were done in the line of duty for empire on both sides. Highly recommend and note that this is really part one of three of an official trilogy so make sure you see the other great books on the Great Game

History as it should be written, October 23, 2001
"The Great Game" is a well-written and gripping account of the British and Russian machinations in central Asia during the 19th century that reads more like a novel than a dry history book. What's even better is that the story is quite relevant to the geopolitical realities of our century.

Although a few forays are taken into Turkey, the Caucasus and the Far East, most the action takes place in central Asia (including the Pamirs and western China), and much of that was in the buffer region that is now Afghanistan. After having spent centuries subjugated by Mongol invaders, an expansionist imperial Russia began trying to secure its borders by extending its sphere of influence into central Asia. Meanwhile the British had colonized India and were concerned about protecting her northern borders. `The Great Game' was an expression coined by an early participant and later immortalized by Rudyard Kipling to describe the often-shadowy means these two great powers used to pursue these goals.

At the beginning of the 19th century few westerners had gone into central Asia and almost none had seen the great cities of the area. Into this void came a series of British and Russian adventurers seeking information about the terrain, population, and cities, and who in many cases sought to create alliances with the local rulers that could be used to further Britain's and Russia's imperial ambitions and cement their desired security zones.

The book is written around the stories of these adventurers, many of whom, but by no means all, were soldiers. The early explorers had the advantage of entering a region where no westerners had been before and could often pass themselves off as Indian traders. Eventually they were able to penetrate far enough into central Asia to meet local rulers who were so isolated that they understood `Britain' and `Russia' to be simply powerful tribes in their general vicinity. The British and Russian envoys would try to outdo each other in attempting to indicate the sizes of their respective countries (which, in the case of the UK, would include its vast colonial holdings for maximum impact).

Much of the book is devoted to the first and second Afghan wars in which the British tried to install their monarch of choice and were eventually routed as a result of both their incompetence and the fierce Afghan fighters. Some of the accounts of Afghanistan today could almost have been taken directly from `The Great Game'. Life for many in the region appears to have changed very little in the intervening years.

Hopkirk has written this book from an unabashedly pro-western and pro-British perspective, but it is a fascinating story and one that still has great pertinence to world affairs today. I can highly recommend it to anybody who would like a better understanding of both the history and current reality of central Asia.

Reads like a thriller..., December 13, 2006
Yes, I've been reduced to clich�s by Peter Hopkirk's tales of derring-do in the treacherous mountains of Central Asia. The Great Game recounts the 19th and early 20th century exploits of intrepid British and Russian explorers and spies jockeying for influence and information in dangerous tribal lands. The goal: finding ways to defend (the British) or penetrate (the Russians) the overland pathways to British India -- and all the riches therein. The stories here would make a great movie - and no doubt some already have. I found particularly thrilling Hopkirk's recreation of the British assault on the Afghan fortress at Ghazni, the race to relieve a besieged British garrison at Chitral and the campaign against Hunza. Although Hopkirk clearly relishes telling tales of individual adventurers like Francis Younghusband, Henry Pottinger and Nikolai Muraviev, he never loses sight of the big picture: the rivalry between imperial Britain and imperial Russia. I never before realized the scope of Russia's 19th century territorial conquests in Central Asia or the ruthless, indeed shameless, way the czarist governments conducted diplomacy. Even so, Hopkirk is willing to give the Russians their due for bravery, audacity and occasional chivalry. Hopkirk also is very good at something that eludes many authors: describing geography clearly, so the reader can understand where things are happening and why they are happening there. In short: This is fascinating history that unfolds like a novel.

History at its Best, April 29, 1999
Must read for anyone interested in Central Asia or the general theme of British and Russian imperial ambitions. Despite the 500+ page count, Hopkirk's history of Russian and British intrigues in Central Asia from the late 1700s until WWI is a real page-turner. There are boatloads of real-life adventure stories: man against the elements, agents racing against time, bloodthirsty tribes, devious schemers, valiant young officers, continual teetering on the brink of war, etc... Hopkirk does an excellent job explaining how events and people all interrelate, and to what effect. This is history at its best.

History that seems like fiction, October 14, 1999
Central Asia in the 1800s' was a backwards area, full of medieval khanates and maurading bands of slave trading nomads. It became the stage for a great colonial struggle between the Russian and British Empires. Mr. Hopkirk covers the period of time between Napoleon's dreams of an Asian empire, and the end of the race, in the early 1900s'. There is enough tales of adventure in this book to make twenty movies. Though it covers both sides of the story, it does have a certain Anglocentric tendency, probably because the British sources are most readily avaliable (and it seems like every player of "The Great Game" from Britain in the 1800s' wrote several books about their travels.) All in all it is extremely well written, and Hopkirk is able to take over 100 years of history and make it into a flowing narritive. ... Read more

Editorial Review

Featuring an eight-page gallery of full-color illustrations, here is a major new biography of Serge Diaghilev, founder and impresario of the Ballets Russes, who revolutionized ballet by bringing together composers such as Stravinsky and Prokofiev, dancers and choreographers such as Nijinsky and Karsavina, Fokine and Balanchine, and artists such as Picasso, Matisse, Bakst, and Goncharova. An accomplished, flamboyant impresario of all the arts, Diaghilev became a legendary figure. Growing up in a minor noble family in remote Perm, he would become a central figure in the artistic worlds of Paris, London, Berlin, and Madrid during the golden age of modern art. He lived through bankruptcy, war, revolution, and exile. Furthermore he lived openly as a homosexual and his liaisons, most famously with Nijinsky, and his turbulent friendships with Stravinsky, Coco Chanel, Prokofiev, and Jean Cocteau gave his life an exceptionally dramatic quality. Scheijen's magnificent biography, based on extensive research in little known archives, especially in Russia, brings fully to life a complex and powerful personality with boundless creative energy. ... Read more

Reviews

Thorough Biography of Seminal Cultural Figure, September 19, 2010
Sjeng Scheijen, recently cultural attach� at the Dutch embassy in Russia, has written an eminently readable, thorough biography of Sergei Diaghilev, one of the great artistic figures of twentieth century western culture. That Diaghilev was not himself an artist is ironic, though he initially wanted to paint. But in his many enterprises he help set in motion many of the trends that were to be dominant in twentieth century painting, music, and dance. It is somewhat unfortunate that Diaghilev's success with the Ballet Russes has obscured his achievements with the development of the plastic arts, way before he dazzled Parisian audiences with his dance company. It is providential that Mr. Scheijen is not a dance specialist, as he does not let Ballet Russe splendour blind him to the other significant achievements of Diaghilev, all thoroughly discussed in his book. But Dance is central and one of the delights of this biography is that the biographer lets contemporaries do the telling as to descriptions and analysis of the Ballet Russes. Indeed, I have read very few passages as revealing and absorbing as the long paragraph by Bronislava Nijinska quoted by Mr. Scheijen describing in minute detail her brother's fast and concentrated practice technique, his ability to create the illusion of being suspended in air by ending a jump not on the balls of his feet but on his extraordinarily strong toes. This is but a precious detail in a book that is full of many such jewels.

The biography has made use of many Russian sources so that there is much illumination on Diaghilev's early life and career in Russia. Indeed there is much wealth of detail and atmosphere of the initial years of Diaghilev as a disciplined, hard working art scholar, administrator, organizer, and his pivotal role in the artistic life of St. Petersburg and promoter of Russian art. One learns much about the intricacies of Russian cultural politics of the time and the cliquishness that governed official and bureaucratic life notwithstanding nominal absolutism in all budgetary matters by the hapless Tsar. The first forays to Paris, of Russian music and staged opera are thoroughly documented. We go through a very interesting and informative approximate third of the book before the seventeen year old Nijinsky makes an appearance. Mr. Scheijen's text is also a corrective on many traditional interpretations of Diaghilev's personal life that with time have become unquestioned "fact"in all probability because the research has not been thorough. Thus one learns that rather than Diaghilev be the possessive pursuer of Nijinsky, the great dancer himself, unstable, at the core probably heterosexual, but very much a careerist, was the one who originally pursued Diaghilev relentlessly so as to advance his career. In this respect Diaghilev with time, apparently learned to play his empresario role without bashfulness, expecting sexual payback from his young proteg�s. Though it may seem unfair to dwell on this aspect of the biography it being so much more than a listing of salacious detail, however, it is important to mention because, as so much in this book, thanks to Mr. Scheijen, it is revisionist, thoroughly informed, and contrary to what has been "traditional" Ballet Russe caricature of Diaghilev's personality. The fact remains that there has never been before or since a cultural figure such as Diaghilev, a man without fortune who was able to bring together for a while what was best in music, dance, and art, astonish the world and set its artistic course for the better part of a century. The word "impresario" indeed shortchanges the man. Yet that he also was. Mr. Scheijen never lets one forget that bills had to be paid, at least most of the time. Diaghilev struggled always to get the funds together. He also mastered the art of walking out of hotels with great panache, head held high, and leaving the bill unpaid. All told it was a wondrous, full, exciting, tempestuous life. Was there loneliness at the center of so much activity? One can speculate. However, one cannot escape the underlying melancholy of the perpetual Russian exile.

The book has many illustrations throughout the text, and a center section of finely reproduced colored plates of Ballet Russes designs. This book is thoroughly recommended not only to balletomanes but to anyone interested in the cultural history of the twentieth century. It is the best book I have read about Diaghilev.

Great biography of a larger than life impresario, October 24, 2010
This oversized volume appears in a format befitting the impresario that was larger than life. And Scheijen delivers a biography of Diaghilev that reads like fiction for its vivid detail, rich cast of characters and fulsome collection of fascinating historical incidents and vignettes.

Diaghilev's contention with Russian authorities, his hot and cold relationship with Benois, the rise of Mir Iskusstvo, Diaghilev's rise to stardom in France and all the personalities (from Prokofiev and Blok to Nijinsky and Bakst) swirling about these events are brought to life with extraordinary detail. Scheijen made great use of little known archives, unearthing a rich trove of personal correspondences that illuminate the artistic conflicts and personal affairs that shaped the world of art in the early twentieth century.

As reviewed in Russian Life

The best!, December 15, 2010
I own most of Ballet Russes-connected books; this is the most insightful volume yet...correcting much erroneous information about the history of the important man responsible for the riches still evident in the ballet world. ... Read more

Editorial Review

Both witness to and victim of Stalin’s reign of terror, a courageous woman tells the story of her harrowing eighteen-year odyssey through Russia’s prisons and labor camps. Translated by Paul Stevenson and Max Hayward. A Helen and Kurt Wolff Book
... Read more

Reviews

They Have Sown the Wind and They Shall Reap the Whirlwind., February 4, 2005
"The Humanity of men and women is inversely proportional to their Numbers. A Crowd is no more human than an Avalanche or a Whirlwind. A rabble of men and women stands lower in the scale of moral and intellectual being than a herd of Swine or of Jackals." So wrote Aldous Huxley. Evgenia (Eugenia) Ginzburg's Journey Into the Whirlwind is a powerful memoir of one woman's descent, along with hundreds of thousands of others, to the rabble of men and women that were arrested, brutally interrogated and send to the Gulag in the Soviet Union during the great purges of the 1930s.

Sergei Kirov's assassination in 1934 provided one of the pretexts for the great Soviet purges of the 1930s. The purges and great show trials began in earnest in 1937. Eugenia Ginzburg was a loyal party member, a teacher, and the editor of her local newspaper in Kazan, about 500 miles southeast of Moscow. When she first heard of the mass arrests and imprisonments of loyal party members she was astonished that criminal elements had made their way into her party. This astonishment increased when she (and her husband) was arrested. As with thousands of other victims, Ginzburg was taken to jail, subjected to repeated interrogations and, over the course of the next year or so, traveled from prison to prison where the process of interrogation and mistreatment was continued. Ginzburg's memoirs in this volume continue through this initial imprisonment and her eventual transfer in cattle cars and a cargo ship to the frozen wasteland of Siberia. The second volume covers her years in exile, her Siberian reunion with her sole remaining son Vasily Aksyonov (a tremendous writer in his own right), and her eventual `rehabilitation'.

There is a certain ineffable sadness to memoirs of the madness of the purges and the horrors of the Gulag. There is a numbing similarity in the descriptions of the deprivations, horrors, and, yes, stunning acts of grace and kindness experienced by those who lived to tell these tales. As Stalin once said, one death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic. So I think it may be difficult for a reader to become emotionally invested in a book of this sort once he or she acquires more than a passing knowledge of the purges and the Gulag. A certain protective detachment evolved for me after reading time and time again of life in the Gulag. Yet Eugenia Ginzburg's words were so compelling, so insightful, and so moving that this detachment was lifted. Reading this book became an emotional experience. One example. During the initial months of her imprisonment, prisoners were allowed to read only or two books a week. Ginzburg, loved both poetry and prose would take her allotted book and devour it, soaking up every word. She and her fellow prisoners would memorize and recite whole chapters of their favorite books. She tells us that this provided her with a level of reading comprehension that she never experienced before. Silly though it may seem, this heightened comprehension made me wish to revisit books I had already read just to see if it could gain more from them.

Ginzburg writes with clarity and captures the lives and characters of her fellow prisoners and her captors with equal insight. Her look back at her years of imprisonment is not filled with bitterness. Her observations are more acute for their lack of self-pity. At one point Ginzburg explains that what kept her alive was not just fate but a will to survive "to live, to live no matter what." Reading Journey into the Whirlwind is both a humbling and ennobling experience.

This is a wonderful book and I urge anyone with an interest in this subject or simply looking to see a person's life come to light via her memoirs to read Journey into the Whirlwind and the successor volume Within the Whirlwind.

In addition, if Ginzburg's books leave you with a desire to read more accounts of life in the Soviet Union and the Gulag in the 1930s I recommend Kolyma Tales (Classic, 20th-Century, Penguin) and Man Is Wolf to Man: Surviving the Gulag. Each book complements Ginzburg's exquisite memoirs.

A Courageous Woman Who Remained Loyal To Her Party, January 10, 2003
In her work Journey into the Whirlwind, Eugenia Ginzburg gives a personal account of the first three years of her eighteen-year ordeal during the Stalin purges of the 1930s. Teacher and editor of the Communist paper "Red Tartary," Ginzburg was accused of being a Trotskyist counter-revolutionary by a colleague and was thrown in jail, interrogated, dragged from prison to prison, kept in solitary confinement, and finally sent to a labor camp in the Siberian taiga. Ginzburg's position reveals the fact that party members (especially of high rank) were the first victims of the purges. Also, her past camaraderie with such people as the daughter of the notorious Soviet jurist Andrey Vyshinsky allows Ginzburg to offer the reader information about the important players of the purges that other victims may not have been able to provide.

Politically, it must be noted that this is not an anti-Communist book. The author remained loyal to her party. If anything, this book reveals how very strong party loyalties were to the men and women who were victimized as "enemies of the people." Throughout the book, Ginzburg refers to her cell mates by their party affiliation. Old party rivalries even persisted in the prisons. Communists often refused to believe that their government was arresting loyal party members and would never question the "conspirator" accounts in the Soviet newspapers. Ginzburg's husband, for example, remarked after seeing such a report: "Have you heard? Petrov has turned out to be an enemy of the people! How cunning he must have been to get away with it for so long." Out of this loyalty to the party came a loyalty to Stalin. One inmate still exhibited hope asserting "We must all of us write to Stalin so that he knows the truth, and when he does, how can he let such things happen to the people?"

Historically, Ginzburg's book is a document of the Soviet tactics to extract confessions and force accusations to incriminate others. The book does not contain descriptions of overly heinous crimes. Most of the abuse Ginzburg received was psychological. She did not, for example, experience the "standing cell" at black Lake where prisoners were placed in a dark room so narrow as to permit the prisoner only to stand with his arms at his sides. What Ginzburg describes is the social and psychological adjustment of the prisoners. For example, the inmates learned to communicate be tapping messages on their cell walls. Socially speaking, Ginzburg reveals that prison life "developed the better sides of my personality." No, this is not an apologist's work, but this book is also not a condemnation of the Communist party.

I am surprized beyond words!, February 5, 2001
I have read this book many years ago in Russian, and now I wanted my husband, who doesn't speak Russian, to read it too. Nobody would be able to describe how upset I was when I actually received the book and found out that this was only the first part of it. Having looked through your site I realized that there is no second part sold here,and I am wondering who took the liberty of deciding how much of the original book is acceptable for the English speaking public to read.Can somebody enlighten me on that? This book is too precious to be cut!I'd rather think that it would be better not to sell it at all, then to offer a cut version of a misterpiece.

"No luck today, my lady Death...", September 17, 2006
Eugenia "Genie" Semyonovna Ginzburg spent seventeen years in the Soviet prison system, escaping death, unlike millions of others. She never again saw her husband after being imprisoned. The Gulag Archipelago by Solzhenitsyn, Man is Wolf to Man by Bardach, Kolyma Tales by Shalamov and Journey into the Whirlwind all include overlapping and similar information, but differ in format and style (although hers is most similar to Man is Wolf to Man in its telling). Her memoir of life in the Gulag is one of few written by women and so provides a unique and interesting perspective. All are fantastic books, well-written, often unbelievable and mesmerizing, but there is a noticeable difference between the multi-volume The Gulag Archipelago and Journey into the Whirlwind (seemingly short at just over 400 pages).

Genie is first brought in for questioning in 1934. With her young children in the other room and her husband away on business, she takes the call. Her beliefs at that time are such that she would willingly die for the party. Soon thereafter, she is incarcerated at Black Lake and is eventually sentenced to ten years of solitary confinement for not denouncing a coworker who had written an article offensive to the party.

During her interrogation sessions, in which she repeatedly refuses to "denounce" that is, lie, about the activities of acquaintances facing the same fate, she comes face to face with people who she thought were friends, but who have willingly denounced her in hopes of receiving special treatment, or lighter sentences. She herself never caves. Some of the interesting and different information found in her telling of life in the prison system during Stalin's rule, she is able to provide information about life within prison and receive information about the outside world using (coded) "Aesopian Language." Prisoners also use a system of knocks to communicate messages to one another and keep track of goings on within the prison and the status of their prison mates. Although it's a boring, lonely, (she has one cell mate most of the time), damp, horrible, hungry life, she survives long enough to be sent to Kolyma, where she realizes just how "good" she'd had it in solitary confinement. What she recounts from Kolyma is similar in many instances to the recollections of other Gulag prisoners, except for anecdotes referring specifically to life among the women.

Readers who enjoyed the aforementioned books should include Gulag: A History by Anne Applebaum, which provides a general overview of the prison system, in their list of companion reads.

An Outstanding Testament, December 10, 1999
As we draw to the close of the 20th century we still have so much to learn from the century's greatest 'experiment' - Soviet Communism. Although I have read many excellent histories of the Stalin period, this book was the most personal and gripping testament of those dreadful years I have come across. What Shostakovitch did in music (especially the third movement of the fifth symphony), Ginzburg has done in prose. The sequel, by the way, is of nothing like the same stature.

Incredible. Just Incredible., February 1, 2006

I've read both Journey into the Whirlwind and Within the Whirlwind. I've also read most of Solzhenitsyn's work and this is different and all the more horrible because it is a memoir.

Imagine yourself, an up and coming professional, married to an up and coming professional, two kids, nice apartment, all the benefits of being successful. But there is something in the air, people are disappearing, and the government is denouncing traitors and conspiracies at a fever pitch.

People you know, professionals like yourself, start to disappear. The fear is palpable. To talk about it, it is believed, is to bring the same fate down on your own head. Everybody just carries on. But you can feel it coming. Your friends no longer contact you. Are they afraid of you? Is this your imagination? Do they know something you don't? You reflect back. Who could have denounced you? Did you make an ill considered remark? Were you friends with the wrong person?

When the authorities finally come it is not a surprise.

You enter into the maw of the gulag, slowly pass into its guts and there, utterly alone, isolated, you exist and time drips slowly by....

Engaging Narrative, May 4, 2001
Eugenia Ginzburg chronicles the first three years of her eighteen years of misery (1937-1955) in Soviet prisons as a result of Stalin's purges. During these three years she was transferred to six prisons spanning thousands of miles. Each prison successively became more life-threatening and depraved (due to the increasingly changing subjectivity and, hence, tyranny of the "law"), and each year her crime became defined more differently. Ginzburg, a university teacher and loyal party member, was "convicted" as an "enemy of the people"--more particularly as a Trotsky sympathizer in 1937--but by the end of the book she was better known as an "international terrorist." I was struck by Ginzburg's naivete. Even to the bitter end she remained committed to the communist system, despite the great suffering she endured from the consistent outworkings of this philosophy. To her nothing was wrong with Communism, just the man Stalin. But Stalin was consistent: "If the State is god, and I am the ruler of the State, then my will be done on earth." (If God is removed from the picture, then anything goes, and those holding the power dictate the "anything"--see "Brave New World of the Enlightenment" by Louis I. Bredvold). Even the fact that her very accuser and judge, a high party official, would later suffer inside the same prison had no effect upon her loyalty to the party. She frequently ran across as prisoners the very people who had previously guarded her, transported her, fed her, etc. Ginzburg reveals a few parallels between Soviet Communism and German Fascism, one being that both "law" systems executed people for telling political jokes (see my book review on "In the Name of the Volk"). She details several frightful sufferings along with many interesting stories of prison friendship and techniques for prisoner communication in solitary confinement. Her account of prisoner transfers by cargo trains is very similar to what the Jews experienced during Hitler's "Final Solution." She includes a nice testimony to a group of women prisoners who outperformed everyone else in tree-felling and always succeeded in making their quota without cheating. These admirable women even refused to cut trees on the Sabbath, no matter how harsh was their punishment. When they refused to cut trees on Easter, they were forced to strip to complete nakedness and stand on the ice (in Siberia!) until their feet became frostbitten. They sang praises while enduring this treatment. The other women, after having come to their defense and consequentially punished for it, debated whether or not these women should be labeled virtuous or fanatical. Sadly, after being freed, Ginzburg heaps praises on the seeming restoration of "the great Leninist truths" (417). If the evils of Stalin's purges interest you, then I recommend the book.

Humorous quote of the book from her tree-felling days in Elgen (Siberia): "Our overseer was a criminal called Kostik, nicknamed the Actor, and a man of some education. At one period of his hectic career he had worked as a stage hand in a provincial theater, and this had added to his vocabulary such words as 'mise-en-scene,' 'farce,' and 'travesty,' which added a distinctive quality to his obscene language" (p.403). (Competing with this was the attempted seduction by an Islamic Turk (one of her overseers) who attempted to woo her by lying on a bed holding a necklace made of plastic beads!)

An Analysis of "Journey into the Whirlwind", August 3, 2008
The mindset and belief system of the early Soviet Union, as defined by the Bolsheviks' neurotic obsession with the ideals of perpetual revolution and the existence of nigh-infinite capitalist and ideological foes that constantly threatened the continued subsistence of the Soviet entity, cannot realistically be classed as rational or conducive to internal stability; with nervous eyes turned forever to the capitalist West, it was only a matter of time before terror of internal enemies gripped the Soviet hierarchy. When, in 1934, Sergey Kirov, a top Party official in Leningrad, was assassinated under dubious and mysterious circumstances, Josef Stalin, then leader of the Soviet Union, took advantage of the killing in order to brew an intense horror in the hearts of the Russian people; no longer simply assailed by their external Capitalist foes, Stalin led the people to believe that they were also threatened by more dangerous enemies with the Communist Party itself. Using the killing of Kirov and the ideal of internal foes, Stalin was able to launch a brutal and hideous campaign to eliminate dissenters with the Party, while numerous innocent Party members found their lives obliterated as they were caught in what has become known as the "Great Purge." First thrown out of the Party on charges most often both false and ludicrous, these unfortunate souls then found themselves jailed under horrific circumstances, many being sent to perish in labor camps in remote Siberia; by the time of Stalin's death, roughly 5 million Party members had been detained in such a way. Eugenia Ginzburg, an editor for a newspaper in Kazan, was one such victim of Stalin's senseless purges; arrested in 1937 following years of police harassment, Ginzburg was sent to numerous prisons where she endured abysmal treatment before finally being detained in Siberia until 1953. In documenting her horrific ordeal, Ginzburg amply addressed not only the confusion of the purges and the inhumanity of the prisons, but also explored the sheer motivating power of fear in the actions of all classes and ranks; irrational fear, it is shown, was what ultimately fueled the escalating madness and accusations, and destroyed forever the lives of so many.
At the time of Kirov's assassination, Eugenia Ginzburg was leading a successful life as a member of the Communist Party, even marrying a top Communist official of Kazan. As she so eloquently and persistently notes throughout the account of her struggles, Ginzburg was nothing save a loyal and dedicated Communist, adhering to and accepting the Party's line of policy. Such an upstanding member of society surely could not have been dragged into the insanity of the purges, yet she was; although she amply demonstrates her loyalty to the Party and complies fully with her early accusers, vying to convince them of her ideological orthodoxy, she is nonetheless made the recipient of increasingly outlandish charges. This is pivotal, as the reader begins to understand all along that the purges were not, as popular rhetoric espoused, an attack upon dissenting and criminal elements within the party, but a monstrous, all-consuming, bloodletting of the entire Party in which any and all could become victims; even the officials that prosecuted the accused and the guards who abused them often found themselves becoming victims themselves and sharing prisons with those they had wrongly imprisoned. Even the wife who, out of blind loyalty to the Party, denounces her husband when he is arrested as a traitor is herself later accused and jailed. Similarly disturbing is the fact that mere association, however indirect, with anyone suspected of being a traitor was enough to end one's life and lead to one's arrest; Ginzburg's brief association with Elvov, who was himself wrongly accused of treachery, was the key factor in her expulsion from the Party and subsequent sufferings. As such accusations by association continued, the purges assumed the heir and hysteria of a witch hunt, with friend turning against friend in desperate self-preservation; Ginzburg is herself forced to endure the treachery of one of her greatest friends, who under pressure and in looking after her own interests validates the charges leveled against Ginzburg. It is perhaps one of Ginzburg's most admirable qualities to never herself accuse any innocents in the way she was denounced. Gripped by such extreme levels of terror and paranoia, the Communist Party simply turned its aggressions upon itself, fueling a terrible madness that only grew in intensity and senselessness the longer it continued. Indeed, these purges served only to weaken the Communist party, greatly harm the economy and agriculture, and, more vitally, to drive away potential members who were horrified at the thought of being caught in the killings. Far from strengthening the Party by eliminating its enemies, Stalins purges only weakened it and left it with a cloying odor of death and suspicion. The pervasive influence of fear is evident throughout the account, and it is quite apparent the even the most vile interrogators or guards likely act as they do out of fear for their own lives, often to no avail. So it was that Stalin's terrorism against his own people drove those within his own government to new heights of irrationality, cruelty, and falseness.
In detailing her early troubles before her arrest, Ginzburg, despite her continued assertions of loyalty and railings against the absurdity of the suspicion laid upon her, is accused of increasingly severe charges ranging from "lack of vigilance" to a later accusation of being the ringleader of a terrorist network; yet all the while Ginzburg remains devoted to the Party, refusing the advice of her mother and friends to flee, desperately believing that she could clear her name through the legal practice. This naivety, or refusal to recognize the reality of the situation or to see fault with the Party, led ultimately to Ginzburg's travails; most commonly, those wrongly accused believed their case merely to be a correctable mistake, while the innumerable others locked away must surely have been truly guilty. In her continued astonishment at the absurdity and irrationality of the process of the purges, Gunzburg vividly illustrates the clash of a ration mind with an inherently irrational and violent system. The level of ignorance toward the intent of the purges is perhaps best illustrated when Ginzburg learns that the vans she sees throughout city do not carry milk as he had believed, but instead contained prisoners; the unwillingness to see or believe in impending doom led many to their demise in this period. Even Ginzburg's disdain for Stalin, the worship of whom by the persons around him genuinely disturbing her, was not enough to overcome her deadly faith in the Party.
Of particular note throughout Ginzburg's account is the juxtaposition of the illegal and immoral force, coercion, and violence of the purges with the absurd pursuit of legality by the interrogators. Although the interrogators and other accusers know the charges leveled again those such as Ginzburg are false, or that their "confessions" are similarly falsified, they nonetheless insist upon obtaining real signatures for said false documents. When the prisoners refuse, they are subjected to various forms of physical and mental abuse, ranging from extended periods of intense interrogation with food or rest to more wrenching mentions of the prisoners' families. Many interrogators work themselves into murderous rages in pursuit of signatures for their false confessions, perhaps out of fear of not obtaining them or out of sheer contradictory nature. One cannot but be amazed at the level of bureaucratization of the purges, an essentially illogical and illegal proceeding; like the Holocaust, it is disturbingly evident that the central government held no reservations for their actions, nor any desire to bury them away. It is the ability to carry on such an open and grand persecution that perhaps best illustrates Stalin's immense dominion at the time, a dominion he gained through overt terror such as that which Ginzburg encounters.
Although Ginzburg wrote her account of her imprisonment and travails, during which she learned that relationships formed in such horrific circumstances often proved closer than any others and that when reduced to such a state all people must be accepted, her memory of complex events and names astounds the reader; names of those that Ginzburg only ephemerally interacted with decades ago are still fresh in her mind, as are conversations and poems. One may deduce that such extreme and trying events as those experienced by Ginzburg indelibly imprint themselves upon the mind forever, as evidenced the Ginzburg's ability to produce entire sections of books from her mind at command; one could simply never forget such vivid suffering or trial. That, then, is the most important aspect of Ginzburg's account. The Soviet purges, a terrible period of internal destruction and death on a massive scale, is here presented in all its horror and grittiness from the perspective of one who endured them personally; in this way, such a monstrous and massive event becomes personal, thus far more moving and instructional.

A very well written, intense autobiorgaphy., July 5, 2004
The moment I opened this book I was immersed within it. Eugenia Ginzberg is a superb writer who uses her skill to deeply communicate the horror that the political prisoners in the Stalin years experienced. The story reflects the extremes of the human spirit: evil and love. It's not possible to read this book without being emotionally effected. It gave me a deeper appreciation for many of the freedoms, rights, and simple pleasures I have in my life. The book ends rather abruptly, though it apparently picks up in another book, "Within the Whirlwind." I will be getting my hands on that because I really want to know what happened to Ms. Ginzberg. After reading this book, I feel like I know her in some way.

A Brutal Account of One Woman in the GULAG, November 21, 2001
Ginzburg account of the Soviet GULAG during the 1930?s is one of the most descriptive accounts we have. Originally published in Italy in 1967 one can only wonder how politics affected this work. Ginzburg herself was a devout communist and was later ?rehabilitated? after serving her sentence. What is surprising in this book is not so much the torture and terrible circumstances that Ginzburg suffered both in solitary confinement and the labor camp, but the differences between the prisoners themselves. After being wrongfully accused, many communists were still fiercely loyal to their party refusing to talk to Mensheviks and even turning in their fellow prisoners for speaking against the great Stalin. This book is a brilliant insight in both the Gulag and the communist mind set. ... Read more

Editorial Review

Reviews

flat out fantastic, October 2, 2010

The Waiting Game, August 5, 2010

How quickly we forget the suffering of Soviet Jews, October 21, 2010

brilliant opening of otherwise closed chapter of history, December 22, 2010

When They Come For Us, December 14, 2010
I definitely enjoyed the book--Beckerman is a very good writer. It must be difficult to write objectively/historically about people who are still alive, but he's done it. I read this book continually thinking "THAT was happening while I was in high school?". Puts your own life in perspective.

A vivid account of a 30-year struggle, September 29, 2010
In this enthralling narrative of the Jewish struggle for emigration from the Soviet Union, Gal Beckerman shows how, in his words, "a small number of willful individuals on both sides of the iron curtain took on the superpowers." And won.

Through scores of interviews, Beckerman is able to recount this 30-year struggle for human rights with novelistic detail, starting his tale in the forests outside Riga in the 1960s, where future refusenik Yosef Mendelevich found his heritage, and culminating in the release of Natan Sharansky and the opening of the floodgates. But there is also the drama played out in the U.S., especially in New York, where the "Soviet Jewry" issue, Beckerman shows, was hugely important in forming modern Jewish-American identity.

It is easy to forget at this remove that there was a time when Russians could not vacation in Turkey, could not worship as they pleased, could not emigrate. Beckerman brings that era vividly back to life, reminding us of one of the most significant human rights struggles of the post-war era. A must read.

As reviewed in Russian Life

Compulsive reading, September 12, 2010
A great history book. Meticulously researched and highly readable - reminded me of books by William Manchester.

an excellent overview, August 23, 2010

A well-written, comprehensive account, August 5, 2010

Editorial Review

Massie offers a moving, tragic, and unforgettable account of the extraordinary Imperial dynasty of Tsar Nicholas II, his doomed empire, and a revolution that would inexorably change the world forever. "A larger than life drama."--Saturday Review. Photo insert. ... Read more

Reviews

Fascinating look at a bygone era., April 22, 2001
This is generally considered to be the definitive biography of Tsar Nicholas II and his wife, Alexandra. Massie's expert storytelling is well-suited to the compelling story of the last Russian tsar and his consort. The history of Russia was no doubt changed by the deliberate myopia and general inadquacies of these two people. Nevertheless, Massie manages to uncover a more sympathetic side to the ill-fated duo. Massie's writing is as good as that of any acclaimed novelist - there's a fascinating and fastpaced plot, finely nuanced lead characters, an intriguing supporting cast, all against a beautiful background of a majestic bygone era.

This book was researched and written before the fall of the Soviet empire when the state archives were opened and new information about the Romanovs was revealed. Consequently, this book is necessarily incomplete, especially as concerns the execution of the royal family. Massie has since written another text called "The Romanovs: The Last Chapter" which devels deeply into the newly available data and the forensic studies that followed. Consider it an essential volume II to "Nicholas and Alexandra".

A true masterpiece..., October 12, 2004
I started a love affair with European royalty while in junior high, and as luck or fate would have it, Robert Massie's Nicholas and Alexandra was published during this time. I was bitten by the Romanov bug and have suffered from this malady ever since.

Nicholas and Alexandra, the last Tsar and Tsarina of Imperial Russia, came from a distinguished royal pedigree. Nicholas was the son of Tsar Alexander III, and his aunt was Princess Alexandra of Wales. Alexandra was a Hessian princess and granddaughter of Queen Victoria. As youngsters, they fell in love and "Nicky" knew that "Alix" was fated to be his bride. Theirs was a true love match at a time when royal marriages were arranged for any reason but love.

Two events conspired to cause the Romanov tragedy. First, Nicholas was not a very strong-willed man. He let others dominate him (including his wife). When his father died suddenly at the age of 49, the young Nicholas was totally unprepared and untrained to be Ruler of all the Russia's. Second, Nicholas and Alexandra were very family oriented, and it was a crushing blow when their 5th child and only son was born with hemophilia. In desperation, they alienated much of Russia (to protect this secret) and fell under the harmful influence of Rasputin. Russia was ripe for revolution, and Nicholas and Alexandra were too blind to see what was happening in their own country until it was too late.

Massie does a stellar job of bringing Russian history to life in a way that reads like a novel. He also writes with a passion born of experience. When his son was born with hemophilia, Massie started researching how hemophilia affected the royal houses of Europe-especially the Romanov's. He details not just Russian history, but the history of this dreaded disease including various types of hemophilia, treatments, new advances, etc. The only negative about this book is in the timing. Massie wrote what was known in the late 1960's. But since the fall of communism and perestroika, we now know so much more about what happened to the Imperial family. Massie took this new information and finished the story in The Romanov's: The Final Chapter. One book should not be read without the other.

Nicholas and Alexandra is one of my favorite nonfiction books, and I find myself rereading it every five to six years or so. I enjoy it just as much with each subsequent reading. My original paperback was in such tatters that I finally treated myself to a new hardback copy. Even after all these years, the tragic fate of the Romanov's continues to haunt us.

very readable account of the life of the last Tsar, January 22, 1999
Massie's work is very readable; more like a novel than a biography. There were times I couldn't believe some of the intimate details could be real, for how would Massie know? But at the back of the book he has extensive notes indicating the sources for all the details including diaries and memoirs. I thought Massie did an excellent job illustrating the roots of World War I, especially the relationship between Nicholas and Kaiser William II. Also excellent was the way he makes the enigma of Rasputin understandable and how he reconciles the public disfavor and lack of understanding of the tsar and his wife with their noble intentions with the good of Russia in mind. In reading history it is easy to imagine that the participants were ignorant or oblivious to larger trends that would envelop them, especially in light of subsequent historical events. Massie's story brilliantly sheds light on the story of the last tsar such that the reader can genuinely understand the motivations of most of the participants. Very enlightening reading. I strongly recommend the book for anyone interested in Russian history or just looking for a readable story.

History doesn't get much better than this!, April 8, 1998
Most book lovers have a little list of super-favorites that they turn to year after year, and this classic by Robert Massie has been on my list for more than two decades. Massie brings the last years of the Russian Imperial court to astounding life, turning meticulously researched detail into a tapestry more compelling than fiction. You feel you've been there and met the Romanovs and the people around them, walked their halls, ridden in their trains, even faced their final terrors. Its as good as stepping into a time machine. How many times have I looked up from this paperback (I've gone through several copies over the years) and found that I've lost track of time. Recently, several lavishly illustrated books have come out with long-hidden photos of what NICHOLAS & ALEXANDRA describes -- gorgeous though those photo books are, they do not give you as powerful a sense of time and place as Massie's exceptionally readable prose. Details of Russian history, which could be ponderous for most readers, become lively and engrossing here. I love history, and no book in the genre pulls me back as often (or with as much satisfaction) as Massie's NICHOLAS & ALEXANDRA.

A Fine Book, December 22, 1999
When this book first appeared in 1967, nothing anything like it had ever existed before. There were the original emigr� accounts, most of them written in the 1920's and 1930's, which contained personal memories of the last tsar and his family from many points of view. There were the other historical sources which gave, for example, descriptions of Russian and European society in the time of Nicholas II, along with depictions of the cataclysmic events of war, revolution and regicide. The real brilliance of Robert Massie's "Nicholas and Alexandra" lies in the fact that he was able to weave these far-flung historical narratives into an intensely readable and informative whole, in the process resurrecting the last tsar and his family from the murky mists of time which had made them all but vanish from the attention of the world. A whole Romanov industry exists today, producing several new books on this tragic family every year. The public's fascination with this field, however, must surely be traced back to Massie's astonishing "Nicholas and Alexandra." It is a work of nearly faultless scholarship, fidelity to historical sources, and deeply moving human interest. It is unthinkable that one should let one's life pass by and leave this book unread. Get yourself a copy, loan it if you must, but don't ever let it stray forever from your shelves. It's that good.

A GREAT READ!, January 4, 2006
Like a number of other reviewers, this is one that I set down and read about every three or four years. It is that delightful! I normally like my history a little more "hard core" but this work is an exception. It reads more like a novel than most biographies, yet is simply loaded with facts concerning the last Russian Tsar and his family. The book was of course written several years ago and new facts concerning this royal family and their country during this time period have come to light since that time. This is not a distraction in the least. A good story, well told, is still a good story and the author did quite well with in information available to him at that time. This work did, like other reviewers, strike a spark and interest in Russian history that has lead to much good reading since I first read it. For that I am grateful. Highly recommend this to any one who is not only interested in history, but for anyone interested in just a good human story.

Don Blankenship
The Ozarks

A delightful account of Russia's last Imperial Family, October 18, 1999
Robert K. Massie's account of the last days of tsarist Russia is intelligently written. Even if one is not historically inclined, one will automatically find onself drawn to this tragic tale. The book is so desciptive that one is almost lead to believe that Massie himself witnessed every event. If I must add any criticism of the book, it would be that Massie overestimates the the influence that Rasputin had on the fall of the Imperial government. It is true that Rasputin helped hasten the government's downfall , but it would have fell nonetheless due its subjection to a weak ruler and his neurotic wife. In all fairness, I must say that this minor point is not enough to dissuade me from giving it five stars. It is a must read for all those who love history, especially Russian history!

Brilliant!!, July 12, 2003
"Nicholas and Alexandra" was truly captivating. The vivid imagery sweeps one back to the final days of Imperial Russia; of balls, galas, war, revolution, an finally murder. Massie takes the stand, and with his words we relive one of the most mysterious, yet emotional struggles of early 20th century Russian history.

The way the book is written gives both the perspectives of a government in decay, complete with the political circumstances and key political figures of the time. However, the book often drifts off through the snow covered capital of St. Petersburg, to the ice cold walls of the Alexander Palace, where Nicholas II and Empress Alexandra became simply Nicky and Alix. In their private world at Tsarskoe Selo, the titles of "Their Imperial Majesties the Grand Duchess" and the Tsaravich simply became those names of children, from Olga to Alexis.

From these days at the Alexander Palace, Massie brought us up close to not only the Tsaravich's struggle with hemophilia, but also the struggle of a mother, Alexandra, whom had to bare it all, side by her son. In this came in the, in my opinion, intolerable abomination of a man the world knows as Rasputin.

The way Massie wrote of the influence of Rasputin on her Majesty the Empress Alexandra, and hence the influence on government, which led to the collapse of Imperial Russia, one clearly sees the faults that are shown within the Empress and her ineptitude to run an empire. However, at the same time, one feels for her and pays special attention to her religious beliefs, which influence much of the final outcome of her greatest mistake.

Finally, Massie depicts the final collapse of Imperial Russia on a swift day. This eventually leads to the imprisonment and final execution of the last Tsar, Autocrat of All the Russians, and his family. The breathtaking detail and account of their murder is extremely unsettling. One may think that reading of simply a murder, one of many, is not so great a shock, yet, as one has read this book from the very beginning, one has gotten to know, personally, the Imperial family, and cannot help but pity them.

This book is a great resource for one that has just become interested in this tragic episode of European History, or simply for one who wishes to learn more of this "Love that Ended an Empire".

The Boy behind the Throne, August 2, 2000
This is a sensitive narration of the life and death of Russia's last Tsar and his tragic familly. Massie writes clearly and eloquently and succeeds in bringing his characters to life and developing a genuine empathy with them.

Massie's Nicholas and Alexandra emerge as rather sad and pathetic characters, out of touch with reality and hopelessly unqualified for the role thrust upon them. Massie's fascinating thesis is that the Russian revolution may have been brought about by a haemophilia gene passed along from queen Victoria. That is probably an extremely romanticised view of history. A more likely truth is that the tragic end of Tsarist Holy Russia was an accident waiting to happen. A fragile system built on fragile people. That fragility more than anything else is what comes across from reading these pages.

This is the book that got me interested in the Romanovs, September 7, 2001
I first read this book many years ago. Mr. Massie manages to bring Nicholas, Alexandra, their family, and court back to life. The book reads almost like a novel at times and is very hard to put down. The author tells a very vivid story of a very tragic couple and their family, and the time in which they lived. The author is able to help the reader understand the series of events that lead to the fall of the monarchy and the murder of the royal family. ... Read more

Editorial Review

Who were the three men the American and Soviet superpowers exchanged at Berlin's Glienicke Bridge and Checkpoint Charlie in the first and most legendary prisoner exchange between East and West? Bridge of Spies vividly traces their paths to that exchange on February 10, 1962, when their fate helped to define the conflicts and lethal undercurrents of the most dangerous years of the Cold War.

Bridge of Spies is the true story of three extraordinary characters – William Fisher, alias Rudolf Abel, a British born KGB agent arrested by the FBI in New York City and jailed as a Soviet superspy for trying to steal America’s most precious nuclear secrets; Gary Powers, the American U-2 pilot who was captured when his plane was shot down while flying a reconnaissance mission over the closed cities of central Russia; and Frederic Pryor, a young American graduate student in Berlin mistakenly identified as a spy, arrested and held without charge by the Stasi, East Germany’s secret police. 
 
By weaving the three strands of this story together for the first time, Giles Whittell masterfully portrays the intense political tensions and nuclear brinkmanship that brought the United States and Soviet Union so close to a hot war in the early 1960s. He reveals the dramatic lives of men drawn into the nadir of the Cold War by duty and curiosity, and the tragicomedy of errors that eventually induced Khrushchev to send missiles to Castro. Two of his subjects — the spy and the pilot — were the original seekers of weapons of mass destruction. The third, an intellectual, fluent in German, unencumbered by dependents, and researching a Ph.D. thesis on the foreign trade system of the Soviet bloc, seemed to the Stasi precisely the sort of person the CIA should have been recruiting. He was not. In over his head in the world capital of spying, he was wrongly charged with espionage and thus came to the Agency’s notice by a more roundabout route. The three men were rescued against daunting odds by fate and by their families, and then all but forgotten. Yet they laid bare the pathological mistrust that fueled the arms race for the next 30 years.
 
Drawing on new interviews conducted in the United States, Europe and Russia with key players in the exchange and the events leading to it, among them Frederic Pryor himself and the man who shot down Gary Powers, Bridge of Spies captures a time when the fate of the world really did depend on coded messages on microdots and brave young men in pressure suits. The exchange that frigid day at two of the most sensitive points along the Iron Curtain represented the first step back from where the superpowers had stood since the building of the Berlin Wall the previous summer – on the brink of World War III. ... Read more

Reviews

A must-read for spy buffs, November 11, 2010
Utterly fascinating. This book is important for anyone with an interest in why the arms race dragged on so long, but it's a must if you have a secret thing for spy planes. Considering its impact on world events, the story of Gary Powers' final flight over Russia in 1960 is surely one of the most neglected of the Cold War. It has been told before, but to my knowledge this is the first time a western writer has tracked down the Russians who actually brought Powers down. Whittell has put together the final hours leading up to the shoot-down in a way that finally lays to rest the theory that Powers somehow brought it on himself by flying too low. He also claims that but for the shoot-down there would have been no Cuban missile crisis and Nixon might have beaten Kennedy in 1960. What is not in doubt is that the collapse of the superpower summit two weeks after Powers was taken prisoner set the scene for the Berlin spy swap on the bridge in the book's title. There were supposed to be no civilian witnesses to the exchange, but one of those involved was an American post-grad falsely accused of working for the CIA, and one of those who saw the tail-end of the swap on the bridge was a young Reuters correspondent who never got a byline for her story. The author interviews them both, and many more. Brilliantly written, this is an essential addition to any Cold War buff's collection.

Spooks and U2s, November 14, 2010
Giles Whittell is a natural-born reporter, a writer with an eye for detail and for the dramatic. Bridge of Spies is not just his version of the famous story of the U2 pilot who was shot down over the Soviet Union and his swap with a legendary Russian spy. It's a thriller in its own right, with all the ingredients of an exceptionally well told and observed story. Whittell is a reporter in his element, writing on a subject he clearly finds fascinating and portraying Francis Gary Powers in a sympathetic light, unlike his CIA masters who appear to have resented the fact that he survived his traumatic shoot-down at 70,000ft and was imprisoned by the KGB, poviding the Russians with a propaganda trophy with which to berate the Americans.

What makes this book such a good read are the characters. They bring this story to life and provide the reader with an insight into an historical event which was not just about the politics of the Cold War but a personal account of people who were embroiled in some of the most daring and exciting exploits of that past era; and as we know from the more recent exposure of the Russian spy ring in the United States which included a beautiful and shapely female spy, Anna Chapman, espionage is not a dying profession. The Cold War, in a different disguise, goes on.

The secrecy of the U2 programme - the elegant silver (then black) aircraft which were supposedly part of the Weather Reconnaissance Squadron Number Two - the sheer endurance of the pilots like Powers, strapped for hours in space suits as they flew over the forbidden territory of the Soviet Union; the machinations of William Fisher, alias Rudolf Abel, who achieved very little despite a reputation for being a masterspy; and Frederic Pryor, the spy who never was a spy. All the components required for a thriller. I also loved the bravado of the American lawyer, James Donovan, Fisher's lawyer, and the woman who briefly stars in the story whose scoop was read around the world - Annette von Broecker, the Reuters "editorial assistant" (not even a reporter) who predicted that the spy swap between Powers and Fisher would take place at Berlin's Glienicke Bridge and while every other reporter was waiting at the more famous Checkpoint Charlie, she rushed off to the lesser known bridge and was in time to witness the handover. But she didn't even get her byline on the story - just a cup of hot chocolate from her colleagues by way of thanks! Another personal ingredient in a wonderful book.

Nothing new here, November 10, 2010
The story of Rudolf Abel,one of the most famous Communist spies to have ever worked on American soil,is not new.The KGB spy who was arrested by the FBI and was jailed after being charged with spying in order to get America's nuclear secrets in well documented,and so is his exchange on the famous Glienecke Bridge in Berlin with Francis Gary Powers,the pilot who was shot down while flying over Central Russia. The third person described in detail in this book,Frederic Pryor,was an intellectual who was falsely charged with spying for the Americans. Indeed,some new interviews conducted by the author elaborate a bit on this espionage episode of the Cold War,however one feels that nothing new can be added that was not said before. Vin Arthey's book,"Like Father,Like Son" should be read instead because it offers a much better view on this whole affair. The book discussed here does not have any endnotes or footnotes,which is a shame because one cannot check or verify the various sources cited at the end of the book. ... Read more

Editorial Review

The truth of the enduring mystery of Anastasia's fate-and the life of her most convincing impostor The passage of more than ninety years and the publication of hundreds of books in dozens of languages has not extinguished an enduring interest in the mysteries surrounding the 1918 execution of the last Russian Tsar Nicholas II and his family. The Resurrection of the Romanovs draws on a wealth of new information from previously unpublished materials and unexplored sources to probe the most enduring Romanov mystery of all: the fate of the Tsar's youngest daughter, Anastasia, whose remains were not buried with those of her family, and her identification with Anna Anderson, the woman who claimed to be the missing Grand Duchess.

• Penetrates the intriguing mysteries surrounding the execution of Tsar Nicholas II and the true fate of his daughter, Anastasia
• Reveals previously unknown details of Anderson's life as Franziska Schanzkowska
• Explains how Anderson acquired her knowledge, why people believed her claim, and how it transformed Anastasia into a cultural phenomenon
• Draws on unpublished materials including Schanzkowska family memoirs, legal papers, and exclusive access to private documents of the British and Hessian Royal Families
• Includes 75 photographs, dozens published here for the first time
• Written by the authors of The Fate of the Romanovs

Refuting long-accepted evidence in the Anderson case, The Resurrection of the Romanovs finally explodes the greatest royal mystery of the twentieth-century. ... Read more

Reviews

Anna Anderson & The Myth of Anastasia's Survival, December 19, 2010
King and Wilson lead their readers through the complex maze of truth, lies, expectations, and trauma that made up the legend of Anastasia. Starting with the actual Anastasia, the least wanted of the last tsar's five children, the readers learn the scant facts about the 17 year old teenager who was murdered by the Bolshevik secret police along with her family in 1918. Nearly instantly, rumors of her survival start fermenting in Siberia, making their way throughout Europe. Less than three years later, a woman is pulled from a canal in Berlin. That woman's story, Anna Anderson, makes up the second and largest part of The Resurrection of the Romanovs. Although much of this has been presented before, it has frequently appeared either as evidence for Anderson's being the Grand Duchess or an imposter. By presenting Anderson's story objectively, the authors are able to show how Anderson was able to slowly learn her "part", which started simply as a desire for attention by pretending to be Anastasia without an intention to continue the impersonation for the rest of her life. Recognition of t her claim or the lack thereof became a royal litmus test for nearly 40 years. Anderson finally died in 1984 without ever proving or disproving her identity as Grand Duchess Anastasia. By far the strongest part of the book is the final section of the book, revealing Anna Anderson's true identity as Franziska Schanzkowska. King and Wilson show how class prejudices prevented even well educated royals and historians from comprehending how a "Polish peasant" who was in fact a Kashubian of minor nobile descent was able to impersonate the dead Russian Grand Duchess for most of her life. It turns out Schanzkowska wasn't the adventuress many imagined but rather was a complex and damaged individual rejected by her own mother. A fascinating read, solidly researched and eloquently told, this is a must have for anyone who wants to know the truth about the legend of the lost grand duchess.

Answers many questions, December 25, 2010
Too many books on this topic since Kurth's 1983 biography of "Anna Anderson" have simply recycled previously published material. Once again, King and Wilson have done a huge amount of original research, uncovered much that is new, and tried to reconcile conflicting data from different sources. There are still at least two sources which remain inaccessible to all authors and researchers in 2010. One is the investigation carried out by Helmut Zahle and now held in a Danish Royal Family Archive. The second is material compiled by Grand Duke Andrei Vladimirovich and apparently now in the hands of claimant to the Russian throne (Grand Duchess) Maria Vladimirovna.

Even if all this material were available, the conclusion about "Anna Anderson" by the authors and by informed readers would be the same. Disappointments are minor, such as the lack of any further pre-1920 photographs of Franziska Schanzkowska. Anyone who is interested in a mystery, or the fall of the Russian Empire, and appreciates the detective work and writing skills of King and Wilson should go out and buy this book, which is compelling reading.

Very Interesting Book, December 28, 2010
When the grave was found in Pig's Meadow was found and two bodies was missing I was expecti8ng a book to wrap up the missing grand duchess and try to say she was the Polish gil. Anatasia was very short an FS was 5'7. There is no way she could be Anna Anderson. I loved the book but Anna Andeson was Anastasia. The height, eye color, scars, memories etc it goes on and on. Gleb Bokin knew her at once as his childhood frend, Olga her aunt knew her ss her nice and Goddaughter untill she told hr about the bank accounts. It is a sin that that poor girl survived the tradegy of her family's assisination only to have her relitives turn against her. Only one tnth of DNA us different in indiviuals and I stil think the
test was mishandled becausee if it was proved tht she was the Russian GD, Engand would have to give her all the jewwls they took from the Dowager when she died in England. Her story was sad because it proves that money is more inportant than family. I ofteen wonder what her family will say to her in heaven when they meet.
I hope they beg her forgivness. ... Read more

Editorial Review

Beginning in the eighteenth century with the building of St. Petersburg and culminating with the Soviet regime, Figes examines how writers, artists, and musicians grappled with the idea of Russia itself--its character, spiritual essence, and destiny. Skillfully interweaving the great works--by Dostoevsky, Stravinsky, and Chagall--with folk embroidery, peasant songs, religious icons, and all the customs of daily life, Figes reveals the spirit of "Russianness" as rich and uplifting, complex and contradictory--and more lasting than any Russian ruler or state.
... Read more

Reviews

Best Book I Read In 2002, December 4, 2002
I usually like to give my reviews catchy little titles. I was going to call this one "Fabulous Figes". I finally decided it was more important to just come right out and say this is the best book I read this year. Of course, if we were in January or February, that statement wouldn't mean too much! (Kind of like movie reviews that come out early in the year..."Best Darn Romantic Comedy I've Seen...So Far!) Since we're in December, and considering I've read about 70 books this year, that makes the statement a little more impressive. Okay, so now I've got to "put my money where my mouth is" and tell you what makes "Natasha's Dance" so good. First, the book is beautifully written. It is lyrical, poignant, funny, thoughtful, etc. Like all good popular historians, Mr. Figes has a novelist's flair. Second, the book is wonderfully structured. The author decided to give each chapter a particular theme. So, despite the daunting task Mr. Figes has assigned himself (a cultural history of Russia!), the book doesn't ramble. It has a tight focus. On the other hand, there are enough themes covered that you don't feel anything relevant has been left out. Some of the themes that are covered: how Russian culture was influenced by both Asia and Western Europe; peasant life- the reality vs. how the urban intellectuals imagined it to be; Moscow vs. St. Petersburg (i.e.- their competition with each other, and changing fortunes as cultural centers); the search for the Russian soul- the religious beliefs of some of the famous Russian authors (Pushkin, Tolstoy, Gogol, Turgenev, Dostoevsky, Chekhov, etc.); the distortion and manipulation of culture by the Bolsheviks; and, finally, the effect that emigration from "Mother Russia" had on various cultural figures- such as Prokofiev, Rachmaninov, Stravinsky, Gorky and Nabokov. Mr. Figes also makes sure not to neglect those who chose to stay- people such as the poet Anna Akhmatova, the film director Sergei Eisenstein and the composer Dmitry Shostakovich. Some of these people hated the Revolution and pined for the past. Others welcomed the Revolution and later on became disillusioned. All of them either suffered (materially and/or spiritually) or lived in fear during the nightmare years under Stalin. Third, besides each chapter having an interesting theme, within each chapter Mr. Figes gives details concerning what was going on in the lives of various artists within a particular creative field. So, you get lots of interesting biographical material concerning novelists, poets, composers, etc. The threads of their lives intersect in interesting ways: Tolstoy, who had a lifelong fear of his own death, going to visit Chekhov- Tolstoy thought Chekhov was on his deathbed and wanted to see how Chekhov would "handle" his own mortality! Tolstoy was amazed that Chekhov could still laugh and joke and put on "a brave face". (Chekhov was amused. He knew Tolstoy and suspected the reason for his visit.). Another interesting "artistic intersection" was when Prokofiev decided to leave America because he didn't want to play "second fiddle" (or maybe I should say "second piano!) to Rachmaninov. Prokofiev apparently had quite a large ego, and when he saw how popular Rachmaninov was in the United States (Rachmaninov had emigrated first) he decided to return to Europe (part of this was style- Prokofiev felt that he was too "modern"- that Americans preferred Rachmaninov's more "traditional" and "romantic" music). Regarding Prokofiev, there is the touching footnote that he had the misfortune to die on the same day that Stalin did, March 5, 1953. As Mr. Figes writes, "(Prokofiev's) funeral (was) a sad affair that was scarcely noticed by the Soviet public...There were no flowers left to buy, so a single pine branch was placed on the composer's grave." I hope I have been able to convey some idea of the richness of this book. It is a remarkable achievement by Mr. Figes. If you have any interest whatsoever in Russian cultural history, you will definitely love this book. And, as sort of a wonderful dessert after a gourmet meal, the author has provided a section called "A Guide To Further Reading". This section is almost 30 pages long. Mr. Figes lists many books in this section but also indicates his particular favorites. I've already found at least half-a-dozen titles I want to buy. We bibliophiles should have a "universal tattoo"- "So many books, so little time!"

Why Rachel Polonsky is wrong, February 23, 2003
I disagree with the reviewer who finds this not quite "heavyweight" enough. It is not an academic book - and thank God for that - but a superb introduction to the history and the culture of Russia.

Figes starts with a wonderful account of the building of St Petersburg in the 1700s, and goes on to discuss the meaning of Europe to Russian culture in the eighteenth century. Europe caused a split in the Russian national identity - and much of Russian culture in the nineteenth century was concerned with how to reconcile the two almost contradictory halves of the Russian character: the native Russian (or Muscovite) and the European (or Petrine).

The next chapter takes up the story of 1812, when Russia's writers and artist first began to think about the ways of developing a distinctively "Russian style" in contrast to the West. This is when the Slavophiles were born. There are lots of fascinating details here - on the Russian customs of child-rearing, on interior design and Russian fashions.

The next three chapters explore various facets of Russian culture in the nineteenth century: the Moscow tradition; the romantic fascination with the Russian peasants (which Figes explores as a search for nationhood); and the influence of the Orthodox tradition on Russian literature and art.

Then there is a speculative chapetr on the cultural influence of the Asiatic steppe/ For me, this was the most original and the most interesting chapter in the book (Rachel Polonsky, in her hatchet-job review in the TLS doesn;t even mention it). In this chapter Figes digs down deep into peasant culture and folklore, showing how the shamanic beliefs of the steppeland nomads (the "Decsendants of Genghiz Khan") left their trace on the Russians/

Finally there are two long chapterson the twentieth century when Russian culture was divided into two: the first on Soviet culture and the last on the emigration to the West. I didn't quite agree with Figes's argument - that in the end Soviet culture was peripheral and failed to change the underlying Russian cultural traditions (represented by Akhmatova). But I was moved by the tremendous emotional impact of these final chapters, which (more than anything I've ever read before) assert triumphantly the endurance of the Russian people and their culture over politics.

I am not surprised that Figes has his critics. He writes too well, too flamboyantly;he tackles bigger themes than most academics dare. But for the general reader Natasha's Dance is a rich delight. On every page there is something new and fascinating. There are sumptuous illustrations. And for those who want to read more "heavyweight" volumes there is a comprehensive guide to further reading at the end.

In sum- this is a wonderful, enriching book, for anybody with a psssing interest in Russia, its history and culture.

Natasha's Song and Dance, January 2, 2003
In light of other rave reviews I feel absolutely churlish submitting less than five stars for this book. However, I must review this book, in part, on whether it achieved its stated objective, which was to provide a comprehensive overview of all of Russian culture.

The answer is no. Let's not confuse "long" with "comprehensive."

In fairness to Figes, this book has a lot of strengths, particularly his discussion of the relationship between nineteenth century Russian operas and the texts from which their libretti were drawn, his emphasis on the Old Believer schism, and his treatment of Vassily Grossman, still relatively unknown in the West. However, it has some glaring omissions for a work which wants to be comprehensive.

First, Figes basically ignores all literature, architecture, and applied art prior to the period around the founding of St. Petersburg. This means that he fails to address, among other things, the _Tale of Igor_, the literary impact of Slavonic hagiography, icons and their influence on secular painting (other than a lick and a promise to Andrei Rublev's work), and any of Ivan IV a/k/a the Terrible's perorations. This omits a necessary context for the Westernizers (such as Peter I a/k/a "The Great") and the Slavophiles.

Second, I think his treatment of _Oblomov_ would not communicate the importance of this work in the public imagination to anyone who was not familiar with this work, and Figes doesn't even mention _The Precipice_, which Goncharov regarded as his true masterpiece. He also doesn't discuss the rift between Goncharov and Turgenev as a result of the similar themes in _The Precipice_ and _Fathers and Children_. This really was an unfortunate omission. This was big news in the nineteenth century.

Third, I thought that Figes did not devote sufficient attention to the nineteenth-century anarchists, particularly those of the upper-classes, and slighted Yurij Dombrosky, though I grant you that these might be quibbles.

Fourth, given his emphasis on Dostoevsky, Tolstoy, and emigre and returnee literature, I was expecting to see more discussion of Solzhenitsyn, who rates only a cursory mention. Solzhenitsyn's work neatly demonstrates and extends virtually all the points that Figes is making, which is why his failure to discuss him at greater length is so odd.

Fifth, there were occasional odd minor lapses in scholarship. For example, at one point Figes notes that the word "robot" is "not coincidentally" similar to the Russian verb _rabotat'_, or "to work". However, a few minutes with the Oxford English dictionary told me that the first reported use of the word "robot" was by a Czech playwright, Karel Capek, in the play "R.U.R." released circa 1921, and that "rabota" means forced labor in Czech. In fact, In the days when Czechoslovakia was a feudal society, "robota" referred to the two or three days of the week that peasants were obliged to leave their own fields to work without remuneration on the lands of noblemen. However, that fact does not fit with Fige's theory. It makes me fret about what Figes did in the course of assembling his book with other facts (and artists, such as ones noted above) that do not fit his theory.

Finally, his offering of Natasha's dance at the end of _War and Peace_ as the central image of the authentic pure Russian soul revealing itself beneath the veneer of European culture really bothers me. It bothers me because an equally central image of Natasha Rostova and her reaction to Art is Natasha at the opera earlier in the book, suffering _ostranenie_, or a sense of estrangement, from the opera's artifice. Moreover, the final image of Natasha in _War and Peace_ that Tolstoy creates for us is to show her stout, jealous, with a faint mustache, which has always stuck me as cruel both to poor Natasha and to the patient reader. It begs the question to say, as Figes does, that Tolstoy's view is simply that Natasha is "estranged" from Western art, therefore it is bad, and that she responds "naturally" to Russian art, therefore it is good. As Figes admits elsewhere in this book, Tolstoy was far more complex in his personal beliefs than this, and his writing improved when he could abandon his didacticism. Natasha's dance and her reaction to the opera are both examples of a Tolstoyan rigidity into which Figes periodically slips.

Conclusion: read it together with _The Icon and the Axe._

Like Chichikov's carriage, a wild ride through Russia., November 6, 2003
Although Figes takes the title from Natasha's dance in "War and Peace," he could have just as easily used Chichikov from "Dead Souls" as his vehicle, as he takes the reader along on a wild ride through Russia's rich cultural history. Figes explores his chapters thematically, exploring a compelling set of Russian ideas that revolve around the East-West duality that is so apparent in the works of great Russian artists, writers and musicians. Figes seems to be more at home when exploring the themes found in the great classical compositions, providing wonderful character sketches of composers such as Stravinsky, Prokofiev and Tchaikovsky.

He also takes on virtually all of the major Russian novels of the past two centuries, starting with "Eugene Onegin," noting the inspirations and the thoughts that pervaded these works. He notes that it was Pushkin who gave Russia a literary voice, which it would never forsake, as each writer that succeeded him built on the language he had to a large part invented. Ultimately, we get Nabokov's thoughts on the subject as Figes covers the emigres in the concluding chapter. Nabokov imagined himself as a latter-day Pushkin, devoting a considerable amount of time to a translation and analysis of Pushkin's great literary work, before embarking on his own major works.

Figes captures the mood and energy of the time, the tumultuous reign of the Tsars, their Tatar origins, their identification with Byzantine, the Decembrist revolt and the Bolshevik Revolution. He casts a light on some of the major figures of the time, such as Volkhonsky who defied the Tsar and was sentenced to Siberia. Rather than submit to the elements, Volkhonsky rose to become a people's hero, greatly inspiring the works of Pushkin and Tolstoy.

He also takes in the artistic movement in Russia and how it was reflected through the writings of Tolstoy and others. How the social realism and symbolist painting of the 19th century transformed into a dynamic abstract art of the 20th century, richly inspired by folk images as seen in the work of Kandinsky and Chagall.

Figes also treats the influence of the church on writers such as Gogol and Dostoevsky, and how they struggled to find salvation not only for themselves but for the nation through their writings. Figes states that Gogol imagined "Dead Souls" as a divine comedy, but the only part he ever finished was the first part, which has haunted Russian authors and scholars ever since in assessing the genius of Gogol. Chichikov and his carriage ride through the Russian countryside remains one of the most enduring images in Russian literature.

Is the "true Russia" to be found in Europe or in Asia?, September 14, 2005
Figes's expansive discussion of cultural influences and trends in Russian history opens with the reign of Peter the Great and runs through the first half of the twentieth century. He makes only brief forays into the era before 1700 (e.g., the lingering effects of the Mongol invasion), and he scans the years after Stalin sketchily in a final chapter on exiles from the Soviet Union (Nabokov, but not Brodsky--although he follows Stravinsky through the early 1960s).

Still, that's over 250 years in 600 pages, and his focus allows him to analyze what are surely the most formative years of the Russian empire. Although he occasionally examines the visual arts, architecture, politics, and scholarship, Figes primarily discusses music, performance art, and--above all--literature. Even then, there's a lot to absorb, yet remarkably the book is a refreshing survey that will not only motivate many readers (including yours truly) to run out and buy some of the novels and orchestral works he mentions but also provides a framework for appreciating all those newly purchased books and CDs.

It's not easy to summarize the themes that, according to Figes, pervade most of Russia's culture (and politics). At the risk of oversimplification, one could say that "Natasha's Dance" views the last three centuries as a clash of dualities. Peter the Great opened Russia to European exchanges, and, by the end of his reign, society in St. Petersburg was emulating Parisian trends to the point of caricature: "the aristocracy had become so bilingual that they slipped quite easily and impercitibly from Russian into French and back again. Letters of a page or so could switch a dozen times, sometimes in the middle of a sentence."

During the nineteenth century, however, many writers and artists longed to pull Russia back to its roots, and they found their "lost" heritage reflected in the eyes of the peasantry. (The war with Napoleon only hastened this retrenchment.) Thus, for example, one sees the unintentionally comical specter of Tolstoy trying to be like his serfs: "he idealized the peasants and loved to be with them, but for many years he could not bring himself to break from the conventions of society and become one himself." More seriously, by the beginning of the twentieth century, fine art was influenced less by European expectations and more by folk art and peasant dances (compare, for example, Tchaikovsky's "Swan Lake" with Stravinksy's "Firebird"). Nevertheless, the aristocracy continued to remain aloof from the "more Russian" customs of the peasantry--for many, the folk traditions never rose above a trendy curiosity--and this dissonance contributed to the tensions that led to the Russian Revolution.

In many ways, Russia's history has been a search for the answer to a number of parallel questions. Is Russia part of Europe or part of Asia? Is the nation's center in St. Petersburg or in Moscow? Is its essence to be found in the cities or in the countryside? These are questions that inform Russian culture (and politics) to this day, and Figes helps the lay enthusiast understand their lasting effects.

Informative and entertaining - a "must buy", January 10, 2003
This is a really fascinating book. Figes explores the development of the Russian national identity and the extraordinary role of literature and all the other arts in Russian history.

It is not meant to be a "comprehensive history" of all the Russian arts but an interpretation of the Russian tradition. Figes makes this clear in the Introduction - so it is quite unfair to criticize his book for omissions.

Natasha's Dance is a wonderfully rich and entertaining read. Figes writes quite beautifully. As in A People's Tragedy (his brilliant history of the Russian Revolution), Figes develops his analysis through mini-narratives which bring his "cultural history" to life. The book starts for example with a rivetting account of the building of St Petersburg in the early eighteenth century, which leads him to the theme of the first chapter - the elusive and ambiguous ideal of European civilization. The chapters are thematically arranged but the chapters follow in a sort of sequence - from the 18th to the 20th centuries - which gives the book a grander narrative.

All the major themes of Russian culture are discussed: the tension between the ("high") European culture of the aristocracy and the native ("low") culture of the peasantry; the contrast between Moscow and St Petersburg; the religious searching for the "Russian soul" (developed beautifully through the biographies of Gogol, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy); and the influence of Asia (fascinating stuff!). There are also chapters on Soviet culture and the emigres.

At 700 pages this is a long book . But don't let that put you off. It reads like a novel. And there are some wonderful pictures. Overall a bargain - and a "must buy".

Brilliant!, February 21, 2003
I thought this was one of the best books I have ever read on Russia. In 500 beautifully written pages, it manages to say an awful lot - not just about the Russian arts and literature, nor simply about Russia as a place, its history, its customs, its religious traditions - but about that thing we call "culture". Figes shows how the arts were intertwined with politics, religion, folklore and beliefs, to create a "national consciousness". His main argument - that Russian culture was defined by a dialogue between the high culture of the aristocracy and the folk culture of the peasantry - is brilliantly developed - and original.

No doubt there are minor points where academic critics may pronounce that there is more to say - or something to be said in a more complex way. This is not an academic book (thank God for that!) though Figes does provide a comprehensive guide to academic works on what seems like almost everything...

But for the general reader this book is unparalleled. It is more exciting, and a better read, than The Icon and the Axe by James Billington, which is a more traditional cultural history of Russia.

In sum - the highest recommendation.

An Excellent, Creative interpretation to Russian history, September 1, 2004
My obsession with wanting a people's history of Russia started with a collection of letters left to me from correspondence between my grandparents in the USA and their families in the Minsk area of Russia. Everything of my heritage is gone except what I hold in my heart from the stories and emotions coming thru in the letters. Using NATASHA'S DANCE as a guide, I have been able to piece together the story of a land torn apart by war but held together by the culture and spirit of the people. Figes takes writers', artists', and musicians' great works and weaves them into a tapestry of daily life giving the reader a window into a fascinating land. This is a history book that rings with facts, creatively written in a style you don't have to be a scholar of history to appreciate. If you have ancestors from Russia or Poland who came through Ellis Island, this book will open your eyes to your roots. If you are a student of history or someone interested in Russia as it was, then this is a book you MUST read.

Why Rachel Polonsky is right, February 17, 2003
Here are some interesting facts. Russia was so backward in 1682 that the Moscow printing press has published exactly three non-religious works in the past 120 years. And there was no Russian translation of the Bible until the 1870s. One of Isaiah Berlin's uncles was tortured as part of "the Doctor's plot." After surviving that horrible experience he saw one of his torturers on the street and dropped dead of a heart attack. When Tolstoy was excommunicated by the Orthodox Church, the bishop of Kronstadt wrote a prayer hoping for Tolstoy's death, and the prayer was widely reprinted in conservative newspapers. Count Karl Nesselrode, an aristocrat of Baltic German descent, could not neither write nor speak Russian. Notwithstanding that minor problem he was Russia's foreign minister for four decades. Russian dolls are not an ancestral Russian toy, but in fact were first developed in the 1890s. One Russian aristocrat kept his crayfish, not in water, but in cream and parmesan. Stalin and Prokofiev died on the same day, so the former's death ensured that there would be no flowers for the latter's funeral.

Welcome to Orlando Figes' "Natasha's Dance," a history of Russian culture more or less dating from Peter the Great. Clearly his talent for anecdote is the most enjoyable thing about this book. Figes account starts off with the building of Saint Petersburg, and then goes on to discuss the Decembrists, and the mystical "Oriental" nature of Moscow. Then there is a chapter on literary and romanticized views of the peasantry, a chapter on the nature of Russian Orthodoxy, and the Asiatic influence. Finally there is a chapter on the Soviet experience, and a complementary chapter on the emigre one. Many readers will find this book fascinating and informative. Yet a closer look reveals several problems. First off, this is definitely a cultural history from the top down. There is much concentration on the aristocratic elite that most of Russia's great artists came from before 1917. There are many pages on the love and exile of the Decembrist Volkonsky. There is much Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Turgenev and Chekov. There is much about the incredibly lavish and wealthy lifestyle of the Sheremetev family. Indeed there is much about the incredibly lavish and wealthy lifestyle of the aristocracy as a whole.

On the other hand, one would be forgiven the view that the aristocracy was almost entirely responsible for this culture. Figes discusses the peasantry in some detail, but when one reads his discussion of the pessimistic views of Chekov, Gorky and Bunin, one might well get the impression that the vast majority of Russians did not deserve the culture they were given. And while Figes discusses the Tatar influence on Russia, he does not discuss the influence of non-Russians who made up the majority of the Empire and nearly half of the Soviet Union. This is particularly striking in his discussion of Orthodoxy, which to Figes defines the Russian character. This leads him to make several fatuous comments ("The entire spirit of the Russian people, and much of their best art and music, has been poured into the Church..." "As Gogol once remarked, the Russians have a special interest in celebrating Easter--for theirs is a religion based on hope."--as opposed to other Christianities, which supposedly aren't). It also causes Figes to downplay those artists, such as Chagall and Mandelstam, who clearly did not define themselves by Orthodoxy.

Even more distressing is Figes' fundamentally conventional views. Saint Petersburg is Russia's European city, Dostoevsky is spiritual, Tolstoy is foolish, Chekov is sensible, Stalin is cruel. We get journalistic pseudo-observations such as Figes' comment on "The Rite of Spring": "In these explosive rhythms it is possible to hear the terrifying beat of the Great War and the Revolution of 1917." Really? What we do not have is any particular insight into these works. To learn that Chekov visited prostitutes or that Nabakov was unforgiveably snotty about Akhamatova is not a substitute for a sustained critical examination of their work. One cannot learn why Tolstoy is the exemplar of modern prose by poring over his weaknesses.

There is a middlebrow exoticism in Figes' book, as he emphasizes Russia's non-European character and the anti-rational side of Orthodoxy. Although Russian Orthodoxy is hegemonic, Figes also emphasizes that aristocrats wore their religion lightly, which does not explain how Orthodoxy managed to enforce its hold on Russia. There is a problem with Figes' emphasis on the basic paganism of Russian peasants. He is unaware that at the time that Kandinsky and Stravinsky were looking for "pagan" elements in Russian cultures, a similar search for pagan elements can be seen across Europe. More important, historians such as Peter Brown and Ronald Hutton have argued that much of this continuity was spurious. Figes' arguments for a greater pagan influence are not much better; common superstitions such as fortune telling and fear of death, as well as Gorky's conversation with a peasant who cannot understand the Incarnation is not sufficient. Moreover, as the book goes on there is a tendency of padding, with large excerpts from Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Akhamatova and Tsvetaeva. There is an interesting discussion of how Russian musicians used folk influences, as well as invented folk influences by borrowing from European musicians, but it is based mostly on the work of Richard Taruskin. And the emphasis on the difference of "Russia" from "Europe" is made easier by more or less ignoring the last few decades of mass urbanization and mass literacy. Figes' last major work "A People's Tragedy" was judged, correctly, to be superior to Simon Schama's "Citizens." By contrast, this work is clearly not on the level of Schama's "The Embarrassment of Riches."

A fabulous technicolour story unfolds, December 11, 2002
This book is bewitching. One of those rare reads where you just cannot put it down. Even when you hit " bits" that perhaps aren't your usual interest you are compelled to just carry on reading.

From the foundations of St Petersburg through the " loss" of their language and the compulsion to speak French, the scenes of the palaces, ball rooms, serf artists, the influences of Asia, Persia and then back to Russia itself this is a fabulous book.

Orlando Figes maintains our interest even those of us with a purely " lay interest", with enchanting vignettes, stories, almost unbelievable accounts of excess with wealth, food,jewels elicit liasons, and entices you into a World where you dsicover how the music, the plays, the poetry, cinema, ballet, people from all strata of life, all start to link together.

Whether Cinema or architecture is your interest or passion this is just amazing.

Wonderful. An engrossing and fantastic adventure. ... Read more

Editorial Review

Napoleon is marching through Russia leading an army that has conquered most of Europe. War and Peace tells the story of the people whose lives are changed forever by the attack on their world. Considered on of the all time master pieces War and Peace tells the story of five Russian aristocratic families and the entanglements of their personal lives during Napoleon's invasion of Russian in 1812. ... Read more

Reviews

The Eye of God, December 22, 1999
Ever since I was a teen (I'm 51) I tried reading War and Peace. The furthest I ever got was something like Page 80. Six summers ago, I thought, what the heck, give it another shot. After Page 100 or so, the book picked up steam, and I was absolutely awed as I've seldom been by all the great books I've read in my life. That's what I want to share with potential readers of this great book. Stick with it. It's like a trickling stream that grows and grows from many tributaries into a grand wide raging river. It's got everything in it, as if it were written by God. Tolstoy saw everything. There are so many, many unforgettable scenes in it. My favorite two are the costume party at the country estate (pure magic!) and the great wolf-hunting scene in which the wolf actually takes on a personality under the all-knowing skill of Tolstoy's great pen. In just a line or two, Tolstoy could actually get inside the "soul" of even an animal! I can only imagine how great this book is in the original Russian. After War and Peace, I devoured Anna Karenina, which is in many ways an even greater book. I'd recommend people read War and Peace with Cliff's Notes, as I did, because you get a sense of the historical background and it helps you from getting the hundreds of characters mixed up. War and Peace is more than a novel. It's an Everest of creation. Please stick with it!

Simply one of the best books ever written, December 1, 1999
I first tried to read War and Peace in High School. A teacher, who had carried the book all through the Pacific campaign in WWII recommended it as a book that had changed his life. I tried three times and couldn't get past a few hundred pages because of the numerous characters - each with multiple names. The fourth time I stuck with it and was rewarded with a reading experience that has seldom been equaled. Since that time I have reread the book every two or three years, so I must have been through it 15 or more times, and each time I find things I haven't noticed before.

This is such a grand book in terms of number of characters in all levels of Russian society, historical scope, period detail, philosophical implications, romance, drama, tragedy, action etc, etc, etc. There is just no way to enumerate all that is appealing about Tolstoy's masterpiece. The main characters are as humanly complex and interesting as real people. I feel that I know them like friends. The plot(s) are involving and get more tight and interconnected as the book progresses, so that there is a great satisfaction as various threads come together, and never with the jarring coincidences that propel a typical Dickins novel.

If I had to pick only one novel that I would ever be able to read again, it would have to be War and Peace. There is so much of interest going on in this book that it would be hard to wear it out in a lifetime.

Brilliant novel, superb translation, nicely bound, January 4, 2008
"War and Peace," by Leo Tolstoy, � 2007,
translation by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky
Alfred A. Knopf, publisher

This review is broken down into two segments, a Descriptive Summary and an Evaluative Summary. If you're already very familiar with the story of "War and Peace," you may wish to skip directly to the latter facet of my review which is essentially the critique of this particular volume.

DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY:

In 1805, Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Austria to expand his European empire. Russia, being an ally of Austria, stood with their brethren against the infamous Emperor. Napoleon prevailed and a treaty was ultimately signed at Tilsit. In 1812, Napoleon invaded Russia, again in an effort to expand his empire. The end result of this tragic war was that Napoleon's army of about 600,000 soldiers was reduced to roughly 60,000 men as the defamed Emperor raced from Moscow (which he had taken), back across the frozen Russian tundra in his carriage (leaving his troops behind to fend for themselves) for Paris. That encapsulizes the military aspect of this work.

But the more intricate story involves both the activities and the peccadillos of, primarily, three Russian families of nobility: The Rostovs, the Bolkonskys, and the Bezukovs. The continual thorn of "The Antichrist," Napoleon, really just provides the wallpaper for this story of romance, riches, desolation, love, jealousy, hatred, retribution, joy, naiivety, stupidity and so much more. Tolstoy has woven an incredibly intricate web that interconnects these noble families, the wars, and the common Russian people to a degree that would seem incomprehensible to achieve - but Tolstoy perseveres with superb clarity and great insight to the human psyche. His characters are timeless and the reader who has any social experience whatever will immediately connect with them all.

"War and Peace" is a fictional, lengthy novel, based upon historical fact.

In his Epilogue, Tolstoy yields us a shrewd dissertation on the behavior of large organizations, much of it by way of analogy. It's actually an oblique, often sarcastic, commentary on the lunacy of government activities and the madness of their wars.


EVALUATIVE SUMMARY:

I feel compelled at the outset to offer a brief paragraph in response to certain reviews which I've seen listed here on Amazon. In regard to "ungrammatical" and "poor syntax" instances, it is prominently and clearly stated in Pevear's/Volokhonsky's introduction that a primary objective of this translation (paraphrasing) is to empower the reader with a real sense of Tolstoy's writing style - and that goal they achieved quite nicely; however, this caveat hardly rendered the work ungrammatical in any sense whatever. To the contrary, I found this rendering to read notably more fluidly than the renowned Maude edition, (which I have read twice), and much easier to initially digest (syntax) than the works, of say, William Faulkner or John O'Hara, both of whom also employed a unique, but brilliant writing style. As I didn't see any actual citations of poor grammar in the instant reviews I'll close my case regarding this topic on that particular note.

Here are some particularly positive points of this translation of "War and Peace":

1. Here we have a smooth and fluid read. Tolstoy's style yields some repetition but never redundancy - he does this in a clever manner and the translators have shrewdly served it up. We have not seen this before in prior translations.

2. This translation allows the reader to think for himself/herself. One of the best examples is actually discussed in the introduction: (P/V) "The school children in their chairs drove to Moscow." Another translation has it this way: "The School children played in their chairs as if they were driving to Moscow." See what I mean?

3. The names of the principals are conveyed more appropriately, "Andrei" instead of "Andrew," "Marya" instead of "Mary".

4. The language is more modern and the syntax less stilted than previous translations.

5. I felt, in a real sense, "the soul" of each of the principals, as well as that of Tolstoy himself, which I had not previously experienced. This is especially true in regard to characters Pierre Bezukov and Andrei Bolkonsky.

6. Two percent of the book's text was written in French and it is maintained that way, with a clear English translation in respective footnotes on the very pages in which the French passages appear. This makes for very convenient reading.

7. Brief endnotes exist where appropriate and the translators did not go overboard with lengthy passages which can be distracting in other versions of the work. They give you what you need to know to pursue these topics further, on your own, if you wish.

8. There is a fine map of The Battle of Borodino grounds (page 856) which is really about all one needs in order to understand the primary battle details (Borodino) within this work.

9. The character descriptions/identifications at the front of the book are spot-on and the Introduction adequately prepares the English reader to understand such Russian nuances as "patronymic" names.

10. Just past the endnotes, you'll find a very informative "Historical Index" which lists all the actual primary officers, European leaders, and nobility mentioned in "War and Peace".

11. This volume is nicely bound (sturdy red cardboard binding) with an equally high-quality, attractive dust cover. It will look nice on your bookshelf, either with or without the dustcover.


I have few criticisms of this tremendous work and of the appurtenant translation, but here they are:

1. I chuckled aloud when I read Pevear's and Volokhonsky's attempt to mimic the speech (dialogue) of the very likable character, Denisov - it wasn't very good. Denisov was clearly tongue-tied. The translators, for the most part, inserted a "gh" where I would have inserted a "w" (in regard to pronouncing "Rs and Ls"). I got the general feeling that neither of the translators had ever actually encountered a person plagued with this somewhat tragic speech impediment! To counter this gaff, as I read along where Denisov was engaged in dialogue, I simply mentally inserted my own "Ws" wherever I came across the egregious "GHs".

2. I encountered VERY FEW typographical errors, those occurring on pages 3, 355, and 484, respectively. I've already reported them directly to the publisher for correction in subsequent editions.

3. There is one error that will befuddle many readers. It's in regard to Pierre's numerology on page 665. If you add up the numbers as stated in the book, it adds up to 661, and not 666 (The Biblical Mark of the Beast), as the manuscript states. This caveat is noted in the Maude translation of "War and Peace" but not in this one. To correct the problem, one has to account for the implied letter "e" in "l'(e)empereur Napol�on," which has a numerical value of 5, making the formula work correctly, totaling 666 as stated in the manuscript. It's complicated... you'll probably have to read a page or two and work it out for yourself to grasp the problem. In any case, the P/V translation needs either a footnote or an endnote.

4. I encountered one strange incongruity which was initially a little disturbing to me and which appears on page 687. In the second to the last paragraph, it says, "...instead of Mademoiselle Bourienne, the boy Petrushka read to him..." In the Maude translation of "War and Peace," it reads, "...instead of Mademoiselle Bourienne -- a serf-boy read to him."

Now THAT is a significant difference in that it sounds like either Pevear and Volokhonsky actually added a character to Tolstoy's masterpiece, or, Maude ignored one! I could think of only two legitimate reasons for how this might ethically occur:

a. the two translations were derived from different source documents, one mentioning Petrushka, the other not, or,

b. the publisher may have made an "intentional error" that would likely not be noticed by anyone in an effort to enable the documentation of an unauthorized publication of copyrighted text by unscrupulous publishers at a later date.

In any case, I'm really curious about this and would love to hear the reason for the difference in translations. In the end, of course, actually adding a character would go far beyond the ethical purview of a translator (as would ignoring/omitting one).



To finalize, the newly published (10-07) Pevear and Volokhonsky translation of "War and Peace" is nothing short of superb. It clearly transcends the previous translations of Garnett and Maude. If you plan to read Tolstoy's masterpiece for the first time, this is the translation that you want.


02-29-'08 REVISION/EDIT: "Some comments about the 2005 BRIGGS and other translations"

I just received (02-28-'08) my new BRIGGS translation (Viking/Penguin) yesterday and it has a lovely binding, "sewn". Of course, it was originally priced at $40 bucks, ($56 Canadian) (!!!), initially way more pricey than the P/V translation. But now it's a steal because you can get a brand new copy for under $15 or pick up a very good used one for $10 here on Amazon, (mine was supposed to be used, at $10, but it looked brand new to me).

I would speculate that the Briggs translation was somewhat financially doomed at the outset, (hence, the heavily discounted 2008 price), just BECAUSE folks anticipated the near arrival of the P/V translation which came out just a year following Briggs' "War and Peace," in addition to the negative impacts of the latter's initial $40 price tag.

I just got started on Briggs last night and, so far, I'm VERY pleased with the smooth, modern-language translation, (but absent of any anachronistic/modern "buzzwords"), and, I'm even more copasetic with the book's straightforward layout. The main text is nicely supplemented with 5 or 6 detailed maps, a list of principals (both fictional and non-fictional), and 2 commentaries, all at the rear of the text. There is NO introduction by the translator and it's a direct read -- rendered entirely in English with almost no footnotes to bother with. There are historically-oriented endnotes but, as they are at the finale of the work, I find them useful and yet not distracting. The book is almost exactly the same size and weight as the P/V translation, with a beautiful white cover and dust jacket.

The few early complaints I hear on Briggs is that he "British-izes" the dialogue, using words like "mate" as soldiers address one another... so it's not written in "American" English. This fact, too, probably doomed him a bit in pecuniary terms, at least in the USA. But that is a very small caveat and I don't personally mind it at all. As Briggs pointed out in his commentary (paraphrasing), he had to choose an English dialect to translate it TO and, since he himself was English, that is the vernacular which he chose to utilize. Makes sense to me.

Briggs' credentials are well up to par as a former Professor of Russian at the University of Birmingham, (Edgbaston, 26,000 students), coupled with the fact that he has previously translated many other literary works from their original Russian language.

In any case, I'll do a full review when I've finished this alternative "War and Peace" English translation.

In addition to the Pevear/Volokhonsky (2007) and Briggs (2005) translations, "War and Peace" has also been translated by the following people: Clara Ball, (1886, from a French translation source document by "Une Russe," an unknown woman); N.H. Dole, (1889); Leo Weiner, (1904); Constance Garnett, (1904); Louise and Aylmer Maude, (1923... the Maudes, who lived in Russia, had actually consulted with Tolstoy himself during their work on the project); Rosemary Edmonds, (1957, updated version, 1978), and; Ann Dunnigan, (1968, which is lauded as "...a sound American version").

pat

Life., July 9, 2002
Over the 4-week period it took me to read "War and Peace", I was asked several times by friends and co-workers who saw me with the book why it was so long. At first, I really didn't have a good answer although I felt I knew why. Having finished it, I would tell them that its length is due to its being a very thorough novel covering almost every aspect of life in general. This could be said about several books obviously, but in "War and Peace", Tolstoy covers human life more thoroughly than, although maybe not as well as, any other book I've encountered.

"War and Peace" lets us follow along in the daily lives of several land-owning class characters from early 19th Century Russia. The Bolkonsky and Rostov families comprise most of these figures, but their friends and acquaintances take up nearly as much of the focus of Tolstoy's classic novel. These characters cover a wide range of personalities from the devoutly religious Maria Bolkonsky and her close and conflicted friend Natasha Rostov to the independent Pierre Bezuhov and his miserable wife Helene Kuragin. Tolstoy is able to go in and out of his creations' lives with simplicity and without exaggeration, whether its in relating the most common moments of their daily lives or the climaxes of their earthly existences. The range of emotions, feelings, and actions that Tolstoy is able to relate is easily done through his genius in setting the story in the midst of Russia's War of 1812 (the history of which he knew very well), one of the worst in its long history. It's through such a life-shattering event that people can be seen everywhere from their best to their very worst, and Tolstoy, through a compelling story line and the novel's famous length, displays the entire spectrum.

I still love Dostoevsky's writing more, mostly because of the difference in the conclusions his characters come to in their cathartic moments, but "War and Peace" gave me a much greater respect for Tolstoy than I had previously held (having read Anna Karenina, among others). I definitely recommend taking the time to read this classic.

Engaging rendition, November 15, 2007
I have tried to read different translations of War and Peace, including Garnett's and Edmonds'. One thing that has always annoyed me - especially with Garnett's translation - is the tendency to use Western or Roman Catholic terms whenever something related to Christianity is involved (Edmonds does not make this mistake). Instead of using the language of Orthodoxy, we often get "holy images," attended Mass," the Virgin Mary," etc, instead of "icon," "attended Liturgy," or "the Theotokos." While invisible to most readers, to Orthodox ears it is grating. The Pevears get this right by avoiding Western terminology in speaking about things religious. And, as other reviewers have noted, it is nice to see the French broken out. As far as the quality of the language, it doesn't seem any less awkward than other translations I have read. Garnett may have turned a phrase with a bit more flare but at the expense of making Tolstoy sound like Tolstoy and more like a Victorian. I agree, too, that this version would have been nice had it been published as a three volume set. You can't really tote it around to read at work or on the bus.

The Best Translation Available, June 5, 2003
"War and Peace" is one of those mammoth behemoths of a novel that everyone aspires to read and few manage to finish. This is a shame, because its reputation as the Ultimate Big Massive Tome has, unfortunately, obscured the fact that it tells a very gripping story and is infinitely rewarding and re-readable.

I'm in a position to say this because I've read this book anywhere from half-a-dozen to a dozen times (to be honest I've lost count). For many years I would read one of Tolstoy's big novels every year, alternating between "War and Peace" and "Anna Karenina." Along the way I've read three of the four major translations of the book multiple times.

The four translations, in order of appearance, are:

1) Constance Garnett
2) Louise and Alymer Maude
3) Rosemary Edmonds
4) Ann Dunnigan

Of these four translations, I would recommend either Edmonds or Dunnigan. Here's why. The Garnett and Maude translations date from the first three decades of the 20th Century. Edmonds' translation was originally published in 1957, and Dunnigan's in 1968 (for some reason, no one has tried to come up with a new translation of "War and Peace" in the past 35 years). The definitive (to date) Russian text of the novel was published in the early 1960s: Edmonds revised her translation in 1978 to take into account the new version.

In general, unless you're reading an older translation, not for the sake of its putative author but for the translator (which is the only reason to read, for example, the Urquhart-Motteux Rabelais or Chapman's Homer), you're almost always better off sticking with a modern translation. And that's the case with "War and Peace." It's either Edmonds or Dunnigan.

It's a close call. You really won't go wrong with either one of them. If I prefer Dunnigan, it's because Edmonds' translation is a wee bit too English for my taste. Having Russian peasants sound like Cockneys just doesn't work for me.

Can you really read such a lengthy book? Keep in mind that it's not all that long -- it's only around 800,000 words and both Proust and Gibbon are much longer. Plus, when you get past all of Tolstoy's interpolated essays on History (which you can easily skip the first time around, although they are interesting), what you're left with is a stirring story about a few Russian families struggling for survival during Napoleon's invasion of Russia. Tolstoy put into the book thinly veiled versions of his parents and relatives (and they are very thinly veiled -- the Volkonskys become the Bolkonskys), and there are quite a few inside jokes that will go sailing over your head the first time you read it.

(I'll only give away one -- when Princess Maria sticks her head out of her room while the Little Princess is about to give birth to Prince Andrei's son, she sees some servants carrying a leather sofa into the Little Princess's room. Tolstoy never says anything else about it, and never explains it. The fact is that Tolstoy himself was born on a leather sofa, and he insisted that his wife give birth to all of his many children on the same sofa.)

So don't be afraid of this very long novel, which Henry James once unwisely referred to as a "loose baggy monster." In fact it is nothing of the sort. It takes quite a few readings of "War and Peace" before you realize how brilliantly structured it is -- how something that seems at first glance as natural and casual as water flowing downstream is really meticulously and artfully plotted.

I hope I've talked you into at least taking a crack at this book. Unlike Proust, who has to be read incredibly slowly if you're going to get anything at all from him, "War and Peace" can be taken at a gallop. And its a lot of fun -- not at all the grim heavy tome it's made out to be.

So what are you waiting for?

One of most misleading stunts in the history of publishing, October 29, 2007
This is one of the worst abominations in the history of publishing. As multiple Tolstoy scholars and translators have already pointed out, this is NOT a translation of a "version" of WAR AND PEACE, let alone the "original" version. It is a translation of a draft and very definitely not anything that was intended as a final draft. Tolstoy definitely never intended it to be published.

The only thing I can figure is that the publisher Ecco is cynically milking a public that suffers from mass attention deficit disorder. This is pandering of the worst possible kind. If they were marketing it as a translation of a draft this would be a different matter, but they are marketing it as the "original" version, which it most assured is not. It is simply an unfinished draft.

An anecdote seems apt here. For many years Henry James sent his older and more talented brother William copies of his novels. Henry suffered from an inferiority complex and was always anxious to hear what William's reaction would be. When William didn't respond to one such novel, Henry wrote him asking what he thought. "It's not WAR AND PEACE," re replied. Who knew that the same could be said of a "translation" of WAR AND PEACE itself?

My recommendation: read WAR AND PEACE. I read this original in the famous Maude translation and later in the Rosemary Edmonds translation. I plan on reading this again. This time I will turn to the new translation by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky. They have produced many great translations of Tolstoy, Gogol, Chekhov, and Dostoevsky. Turn to any of these translations instead. I think this particular edition should be of concern ONLY for those who are interested in the history of the production of the text. And no one else.

Yes, It's Worth the Trouble, August 25, 1999
Although my blind urge to read the Great Classics has (thankfully) faded somewhat over the years in favor of reading whatever I damn please, I finally decided it was time to give War and Peace a try. After all, how can anyone who enjoys novels resist the lure of "the greatest novel of all time"? And Tolstoy himself was an unusually interesting man -- not a screwed-up genius but one who seemed to eventually figure it all out. It took me maybe a hundred pages to get into the rhythm of the book and figure out who all those characters with multisyllabic Russian names were. After that, it was totally engrossing and surprisingly easy reading. There's no point giving you a book report on what happens -- you're supposed to read it yourself -- but I do disagree with some of the other reviewers who didn't care for the sections describing Tolstoy's philosophy of history. I found those sections (a very small proportion of the book) fascinating, albeit a change of pace. This is part of what makes the book great. War and Peace is not just a story of what happens to a bunch of made-up people, but a major work of art expressing the wisdom of a great man.

The latest in a very rewarding trend, February 20, 2006
This excellent new translation continues the trend to retranslate the monuments of fiction. From Magic Mountain to Man without Qualities, from Don Quixote to Madame Bovary, this movement proves again that great art is timeless, but interpretaion changes. In this way translation can be likened to the way two conductors can approach say, Mozart. It is still Mozart. It is always Mozart. But these are two interpretations.

Further, just as Mozart sounds better on a state of the art stereo system (or at concert), the binding, layout, and paper selection can enhance the reading experience. In this case Viking has done a superb job. The paper even smells great!

There is, finally, amother interpretation: that of age, and experience. I first read all of these books in my 'teens and 'twenties. I loved them then, but what did I know of life, or art? I am now sixty. The new translations give me an excuse, really a mandate, to reread them, and I am better for it.

You will be too. Spending an evening with this marvelous translation of War and Peace is vastly more rewarding than reading anything on the bestseller lists, or, dare I say it, watching American Idol.

As for me, I will wrap up Tolstoy this week, and move to book two of In Search of Lost Time (new translation.) Maybe I will finish Proust before I am seventy!

Note to Amazon: perhaps you could develop a section on your web site for these new translations, so we know what is available and what is coming.

Wait for the Pevear translation, if you can!, July 2, 2006
I am about one quarter through the Briggs version and I have had it! It would not be possible for a translation to be more parochially (even jingoistically) British. It has kept me running to my dictionaries, only to find that the words are not even listed in my Merriam-Webster. Only the Oxford has been somewhat helpful with the "Britishisms". Briggs claims the Maude translation was archaic. But when was the last time you said "o'er yonder" as he does? A Russian-speaking acquaintance assures me that the translation of the narrative sections is generally accurate. But the dialogue! Wretched cockney slang for the troops ("matey", "bloke", "'av at im" and such). And Tolstoy's French is translated without any notation. So we have no idea when or why a character slips into French. And yet, French and German characters spik wis zee accent. I wonder that he didn't have all the main characters speak with a Russian accent. A literally intolerable read. I can only think that the other reviewers here just skimmed a few pages.

I will be switching to the corrected Maude translation as published by Norton. Richard Peaver has informed me that the translation he is working on with his wife will be published by Knopf, hopefully in October of 2007. Based on their previous work (never less than HIGHLY respectable), that should be the version to read.

A note on the actual book: This huge tome weighs at least four pounds and the pages are rigidly bound in glue. It's a struggle to deal with, even in your most comfortable armchair. The British edition is half the size and yet has quite a readable typeface. Best in this respect is the Everyman's Library edition. The original Maude translation is divided into three separate, portable volumes. The sewn bindings open flat for easy reading.
... Read more

Editorial Review

The "dean of Cold War historians" (The New York Times) now presents the definitive account of the global confrontation that dominated the last half of the twentieth century. Drawing on newly opened archives and the reminiscences of the major players, John Lewis Gaddis explains not just what happened but why—from the months in 1945 when the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. went from alliance to antagonism to the barely averted holocaust of the Cuban Missile Crisis to the maneuvers of Nixon and Mao, Reagan and Gorbachev. Brilliant, accessible, almost Shakespearean in its drama, The Cold War stands as a triumphant summation of the era that, more than any other, shaped our own. ... Read more

Reviews

A collection of thematic insights rather than a comprehensive history, March 16, 2006
I bought this book with the expectation that it would provide a comprehensive overview of the events, episodes, personalities, motivations, and results of the Cold War. A reader looking for something similar might be disappointed. This book does not really attempt to be a comprehensive history of the Cold War, but is rather a collection of chapters, each devoted to a particular thematic aspect of the war. It reads as though Gaddis has a particular thesis about the Cold War that he wants to flesh out in each chapter, rather than telling the whole story in an orderly narrative.

As examples: there is a chapter about the "logic" of Mutual Assured Destruction, and how mankind's survival depended on two superpowers maneuvering their way through that system's pitfalls. There is another chapter contrasting the Leninist vision of authoritarianism with the Wilsonian vision of self-determination. There is a chapter about how the superpowers' respective allies eventually refused to do their bidding. There is a chapter about the moral paradoxes at the heart of American Cold War international policy. There is another about the key individual actors who forced the Cold War to a successful resolution. And there is one, sort of a "people power" chapter, about how the Cold War ended (Gaddis argues) largely because the internal contradictions of communism, the gap between its promises and its reality, would no longer be tolerated by its subjects.

I found many of these chapters to be thought-provoking, and often found them persuasive. At first, I resisted Gaddis's thesis about the spillover of amorality from the international sphere to the American domestic sphere, and how this precipitated the fall of Richard Nixon. It seemed a weak thesis to me at first, but upon reflection, I agree with Gaddis that there was a fundamental discomfort, a paradox, in how America waged the Cold War. We cozied up to various dictators who violated American values re individual rights, so long as they sided with us in the conflict. And we countenanced actions abroad that we would not have at home. Eventually, Gaddis argues, the roof fell in on those contradictions, when President Nixon started to practice the sort of statecraft domestically that had previously only been tolerated internationally. Gaddis seems to suggest that it was only a matter of time before something like this happened, that this inconsistency was unsustainable.

In other places, though, I found Gaddis to be less convincing. Certainly the demonstrations of "people power" that brought down the communist regimes were courageous and consequential. But it is equally true that it could have come out quite differently, if a Stalin had still been in power. Gaddis argues that the people in the communist regimes had finally come to fully appreciate the vast gulf between communism's promises and its reality, and while that is no doubt true, many a similarly-cognizant subject of these regimes was crushed by them in earlier decades. Many other factors coalesced to bring down the governments behind the Iron Curtain, including the steady economic and military pressure brought to bear by a more prosperous west.

Perhaps the best chapter in the Gaddis book is the one that is devoted to "actors" -- the singular figures whose insights and vision succeeded in changing the world. Gaddis is clearly an admirer of John Paul II, and he also credits Ronald Reagan with a lofty vision beyond what most other statesmen of his time could see. Reagan, according to Gaddis, was critical to ending the uneasy, dangerous "peace" of Mutual Assured Destruction.

Another of Gaddis's finer chapters is one wherein he details the events in Hungary and East Germany that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Gaddis presents more details and insights than I have found in other histories of those wondrous events of 1989.

Some of Gaddis's pronouncements struck me as simply curious. He states in one chapter that never so much misery and suffering has been borne from good intentions as under the communist regimes. Whose good intentions, I wondered? Stalin? Lenin? Marx? Mao? It really stretches the definition of "good intentions" to ascribe such to the architects of 20th century authoritarian communism. By this malleable definition, most any dictator could be said to have "good intentions."

Gaddis also provides a much loftier portrait of Woodrow Wilson than I believe most historians would share. Gaddis indicates that Wilson is highly respected today, but I would suggest that at least as many historians regard Wilson as an impractical romantic, in the arena of international relations.

I would recommend Gaddis's book as a second or third book on the Cold War, but not the first source. It is not the best source as to the "what," though Gaddis's pronouncements on "why" are often convincing.

The Cold War in the Rearview Mirror, February 7, 2006
Yale history professor John Lewis Gaddis is America's foremost historian of the Cold War. Since the publication of "The United States and the Origins of the Cold War" in 1972, he has written a half dozen more books on the subject, each time finding a new perspective on the superpower standoff that took place between 1946 and 1991.

Prior to the 1970's, American historians, for the most part, put the blame of the origins of the Cold War on the Soviet system in general and on Josef Stalin in particular. Gaddis' early work was original insofar as it gave a more balanced perspective on the American/Soviet confrontation. After World War II, both superpowers acted rationally to protect their interests, having sacrificed many lives in hard-fought battles. Each side was protecting a way of life they thought morally superior.

In the current work under review, Gaddis' views seem to be evolving. Looking back at the Cold War in light of events since 1991, he concludes that it was primarily the power of ideas that won, since nuclear weapons had made military confrontation unthinkable. The liberal democracies and market economies of the West were better able to provide for their citizens than the command economies of the totalitarian system. The West offered their citizens hope while the Soviets instilled theirs with fear. Gaddis now believes it was the Soviets who were primarily responsible for starting the Cold War.

But why did the Cold War last so many years? Why didn't people rise up earlier? One reason, of course, was nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons prolonged the Cold War. The West had few options other than detente and containment. Gaddis has few kind words for the Nixon-Kissinger detente that left hundreds of thousands of disillusioned people behind the Iron Curtain without hope. He recounts in this book how certain key individuals facilitated change. Among these "saboteurs of the status quo" were Ronald Reagan, Margret Thatcher, Pope John Paul II, and Lech Walesa. According to Gaddis, when Pope John Paul II went to Poland and kissed the ground, it marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War. Also, when Ronald Reagan sought to exploit the weaknesses of the Soviet Union by building an antimissle shield that he knew the Soviets couldn't match, he helped bring about the demise of the system. Also, adding to the slipstream of the demise was the unwitting assistance of Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev was different from previous Soviet leaders - and the world is forever in his debt - in that he realized the arms race could not continue and that the Soviet Union could no longer maintain control over the populations of Eastern Europe.

Although Gaddis' work has been used by the Bush Administration as an endorsement of spreading democracy in the Middle East, it should be noted that the saboteurs of the status quo - and Bush sees himself as such - can only facilitate change. The real change, Gaddis argues, must come from the bottom up. Ronald Reagan did not end the Cold War - though he contributed greatly to its conclusion. The Hungarians, the Poles, and the East Germans ended the Cold War as they faced down the repressive Soviet system. This is all very illuminating with our present involvement in the Middle East.

This is an excellent, well-written and well-argued one-volume history of the Cold War, written by one of its most diligent historians. I highly recommend this book.

Snapshot of History, March 16, 2006
This book is a sweeping summary of what the author believes to be the principal events of the over forty year long confrontation between Communism and Capitalism called the Cold War. Gaddis is in every sense of the word an expert on the Cold War phenomenon and has used his expertise to write a concise, readable, and accurate summary of it. He correctly gives the late George F. Kennan credit for crafting the confrontation strategy of dynamic containment that in end allowed the Capitalist West to prevail over the Soviet Union and its client states. He also provides fascinating glimpses of how American Presidents from Truman to George H. W. Bush applied this strategy and how the Soviet leadership reacted to its application. Not all historians agree that Gaddis has interpreted many aspects of this period correctly, but most would acknowledge his knowledge of the period.
So is this the definitive book on the Cold War? The short answer is, no it is not. It is an excellent summary and introduction to the complex political, diplomatic, and military activity that produced, perpetuated, and ended the Cold War. It is an invitation to the reader to make a serious study of the Cold War era and discover in detail what a unique period it was in the history of the world.

Excellent Overview of the Central Themes of the Cold War, December 29, 2005
John Lewis Gaddis, arguably the preeminent Cold War historian, provides a very readable and lucid account of the central issues, themes and events of the Cold War. Synthesizing the vast scholarship he conducted over the year into a single volume, Gaddis tries to provide an introduction to this defining conflict - especially to those who know little of it. While the book doesn't often go into the interesting details and intricacies as much as I would have liked, it does a superb job at outlining and analyzing the central issues of the Cold War. Only someone with such a tremendous understanding of the conflict as Gaddis would be able to do it properly with such a discerning eye.
Even for those who have read extensively on the Cold War, this book puts the important currents of the war into a compelling framework. It not only reinforces one's own knowledge but provides an amazing focus on what is most important for proper understanding and analysis of the war.

..., January 11, 2006
The Good:
- Gaddis' 'Cold War' more than fulfills that basic requirement of all good books: style. The author never dwells on trifles, the book never gets dull, and you are more likely than not to be left wanting more when you finish it.
- More importantly though, the analysis is simply brilliant. Gaddis seems to have made it his purpose in this text to tackle the big 'whys' of the cold war: why the major events played out the way they did, why the major actors did what they did, why it all started, and why it ended.
- Another strong point is the author's encyclopedic knowledge of his sources. Gaddis is able to deploy the 'perfect quote' with unerring skill, and his evident familiarity with recently opened archives gives this book a distinct edge over older works on the same topic.

The Bad:
- The flip side of my second point above is that with so much analysis in a book which is so short to begin with, there is fairly little of the traditional historical narrative in this book. While that is probably a good thing for those who are already familiar with the major events of the conflict, it does detract somewhat from the ability of this book to function as an introduction to the cold war (which is the purpose Gaddis states in the preface).
- Otherwise, my only actual complaint about the book (and really, it's more of a quibble) is that the commendable objectivity which the author uses to describe the opening and middle events of the cold war seems to fade somewhat as we draw near to its close. Descriptions of Reagan, for example, are positively fawning, while those of Thatcher are only somewhat less exuberant.

In Summary:
-This is one of the most gripping works of non-fiction of any kind, and far and away the best single book about the cold war I have yet read. Highly recommended to anyone with an interest in the history of the 20th century.

An Overview, But Short on Detail, April 4, 2006
Given that this is a rather slim book (266 pages) to cover the Soviet/American rivalry that defined the world from 1945 to 1989, I suppose one could expect that it skims the surface rather than covers any aspect of the Cold War in depth.

I just finished it, and I feel like I read the Cliffs Notes version of a larger, more complex book. Gaddis is reported to be working on a biography of George Kennan. Perhaps his energies are being put into that book. This certainly is not the definitive history of the Cold War. We're still waiting on that, and the time for it may be about right.

Several other reviewers commented on the truly wierd section in Chapter II where the book veers off into alternative history and I was certainly stunned and puzzled by it, because it was so out of character with the rest of the book. But I wonder if more of that approach, if it were better labeled, would have actually helped. After all, what was remarkable about the Cold War was what did NOT happen.

Excellent thematic overview of the Cold War -- does not pretend to be a comprehensive history, May 16, 2006
When reading a work of history, one should always read the author's preface. With luck, the author has done more than merely thank the dozens of vital souls who helped make the book possible but do not share in the royalties. The author will tell you the purpose behind the book's writing -- "this is the book I wanted to write."

John Lewis Gaddis's preface to "The Cold War: A New History" does just that. Gaddis, a professor of Cold War history at Yale, wrote this book because he now has students who were 4 years old when the Berlin Wall came down. No longer are his students intimately familiar with Cold Warriors or with its unusual jargon (MAD, SALT I, "the Breznev Doctrine," etc.). His students had asked him point blank for an introduction to the Cold War that "didn't use so many words."

Based on this experience, Gaddis set out to write a thematic introduction to the Cold War, and a brief one at that. In this goal, he succeeded admirably. The text to "Cold War" is less than 270 pages, with dozens of pages of endnotes. The book tracks more or less in chronological order, but is organized by broad themes and ideas. As a result, "Cold War" does not delve deeply into either events or ideas -- this is pure "broad strokes" history.

Gaddis' over-arching theme is that the Cold War represents a failure of dizzying proportions, but the men and women who dominated the Cold War successfully avoided a much worse fate - the breakout of a "hot war" that would have destroyed human civilization. Gaddis notes that historians have calculated that approximately 21 million people, both civilian and military, died as the result of military conflicts during the decades of the Cold War. While not denying that is a tragedy, Gaddis points out that over 80 million people died in the shorter period from 1914 to 1945, and that was largely a pre-nuclear age. Early on, Gaddis writes a chilling passage about how easily world history could have been forever altered if the Korean War had gone nuclear. Based on this yardstick, Gaddis writes, we should judge (some of) our former leaders bit more gently.

If you want a Cold War version of Winston Churchill's multi-volume World War II series, look elsewhere. If you want an entertaining, comprehensive, brief overview of the Cold War -- backed with undeniable scholarship and judiciousness -- Gaddis's latest work is for you. Highly recommended.

First rate historical narrative, February 23, 2007
Gaddis is a noted scholar who has written an extraordinarily concise and compelling history of the Cold War. His writing is brilliant. The prologue about Orwell and Reagan provides just the right touch, and his ability to weave it into his ultimate thesis is remarkable.

Gaddis is able to answer some old questions by digging through the recently available Soviet sources. I would have liked to have seen more detail in this regard. Also missing is any discussion of the revisionists' critique of the Cold War and why Gaddis does or does not (presumably the latter) agree with the Williams/Kolko/Gardner/LaFeber school of thought. I don't think those criticisms can be breezily dismissed, and any history of the Cold War should grapple with them.

It's difficult to stomach anything positive written about Reagan, though Gaddis' portrayal of Reagan as providing a useful rejection of Detente policy is quite compelling and persuasive.

Nobody writes history this short anymore, and the beauty and conciseness of the writing is to be admired.

A Well Considered History of the Cold War, July 16, 2009
John Lewis Gaddis' book "The Cold War, A New History" accomplishes what it sets out to do very nicely- provide a general overview of the events, personalities, and issues at stake in the US-USSR confrontation. Gaddis expertly traces the evolution of relations between the two powers, their allies, and neutral nations during the period in which nuclear annihilation was an ever present fact of life.

One of the final chapters, which Lewis dubbed 'Actors' deals with those personalities who, whether intentionally or not, contributed to the Soviet Union's demise. These figures obviously include Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, but Gaddis provides wonderful insights into the roles of Pope John Paul II, Lech Wasa, Deng Xiaoping, and others whose actions helped to topple the "Dark and Evil Empire" of the USSR.

The virtue of this work, its brevity, is also its greatest weakness. Certain events are glossed over rather quickly leaving the reader not fully appreciating their effects upon the larger stage of the Cold War. Watergate, the Suez Crisis, the Bay of Pigs, and even the Cuban Missile Crisis to name a few, simply don't get the time and consideration that they require for a truly thorough history. Gaddis uses just under 270 pages of text to tell an international history of over 45 years.

That said, if you are new to studying this era you will find a good overview here. Also, serious students will still be amazed at Gaddis' analysis of key points in the conflict, and his take on the Cold War as whole. I enjoyed and learned a lot from this book, I only wish it had been longer.

good audio book despite distractions, November 28, 2007
Gaddis is brilliant on the Cold War, and his ability to tie things together is masterful. But this review is on the audio book. Overall, the reading is fine. The main reader, however, didn't seem to bother to find out how certain Russian and other foreign names are pronounced. OK, so Sverdlovsk with an "SH" beginning isn't too bad, but putting the "SH" in Gorbachev (Gohr-bah-SHOFF) is an obvious and manifestly avoidable mistake. Ceausescu's name is pronounced correctly in some instances, bungled in others (Chee-ow-ess-koo). Distracting stuff, but ultimately it doesn't mar the genius of Gaddis's achievement. ... Read more

Editorial Review

"Enthralling...As fascinating as any novel and more so than most!"
THE NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW
Against the monumental canvas of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe and Russia, unfolds the magnificent story of Peter the Great. He brought Russia from the darkness of its own Middle Ages into the Enlightenment and transformed it into the power that has its legacy in the Russia of our own century.
... Read more

Reviews

A classic work on a fascinating man, February 13, 2000
I am working on a doctorate in Russian history, and, consequently, have read many, many, books on Russia. This book is by far the best book on Russian history. Robert Massie's Peter the Great is an elegantly-written work which not only provides abundant and overflowing information about the "great" man, but which, like no other book, transports the reader into the world of late 17th century and early 18th century Russia. I know that many "serious historians" pooh-pooh this work and others because it is not "serious history." This attitude is tragic. If you are interested at all in good history and good story-telling, this is the book for you, even if your interest is not specifically in Russian history. The author presents his subject, Peter the Great, as a "real person"--one with both inspiring qualities and with not so inspiring qualities. Yes, there are alot of details about the military, however, these details all illustrate Peter's great attention to the creation of a navy from scratch and of the development of an army that went on to rival the greatest in the world. I cannot say enough good things about this book, and cannot thank the author enough for having written it and having inspired me to continue my own studies.

Massie the Great, January 30, 2000
Wow! Massie's Peter The Great is a fascinating study; an enjoyable read and a spectacular trip back through Russian history in the early 1700's. Even if you are not a history buff, you will enjoy Peter's thirst for knowledge, personal hands-on development of the Russian Navy, his massive economic, architectural and social reforms, ingenious manner of self-education by traveling incognito throughout Western Europe, his unique personality displayed through a mock Tsar who promotes Peter to Vice-Admiral, all-night drinking binges with his mock court and Peter's personal heroics.

Peter certainly earned his title and likewise I feel Massie can add "The Great" to his name. The best compliment I can give to Massie is I now have a tremendous thirst to study Peter's archenemy, Charles Xll, and learn Charles's perspective of Peter The Great.

Buy the book

A fascinating book that you won't be able to put down, July 6, 2002
I thoroughly enjoyed this book that Robert K. Massie wrote about the life and personality of Peter the Great and the challenges he faced in trying to make Russia a major power on the European stage of the 18th century. Although Peter is accurately described as being a driven, uncompromising, and oftentimes ruthless man, this book also presents his softer, warmer side that usually opened up only to his second wife Catherine and to his inner group of trusted friends.

In reading the biography of Peter, a great deal of insight is also gained into the society and politics of 17th-18th century Russia and Europe, which in the hands of any other historian might be written in a dry and abstract manner. With Massie, however, he has such an engaging narrative style that the book reads like an action novel at times (such as in describing the Battle of Poltava).

Each personality of monarchs that Peter dealt with in Europe and the Middle East is given an ample introduction in "Peter the Great", which is entertaining reading in its own right. For example, we learn that Augustus II, King of Poland and useless ally of Peter in the Great Northern War, was a sexual philanderer of extreme proportions and that Frederick Wilhelm I, King of Prussia, had his famous collection of giants and suffered from pains that almost drove him to insanity.

Of course, a major portion of the book is devoted to the conflict between Peter and his archnemesis Charles XII in the Great Northern War. Massie recounts how Charles' fanaticism and his legendary aura of invincibility eventually brought the Swedish empire to its knees.

All in all, this is a book that would appeal to the general interest reader, as well as to the Russophile and to the person interested in European history. If you do get this book, try to get the hardcover edition, because a 915+ page book in paperback starts to fall apart after awhile. And you definitely want to have a nice-looking copy of this book to grace your bookshelf for a long time.

They do not come better, October 10, 2000
Recuperating from illness at the house of an American friend in New Delhi. I discovered this book tucked away in his library. My bedridden days flew by as I became engrossed in one of the best biographies I have read in a long time What a magnificent attempt at describing the life and time of a truly remarkable individual like Peter the Great.

Mr Massie presents the historical fact in a clear and concise manner without sacrificing detail. The work is both rewarding for serious history students as well as those of us after a good read. Indeed the charm of this book is that it reads like a real page turning novel. The reader get a wonderful insight right trough the book of what life in Russia was like in the 17th century not just for a Tsar but for the common people as well Loads of little anecdotes and commentaries colour the story without obscuring it.

This is a story of awakening ,will to power and courage - Of a man and a nation - par excellance .

The book starts with the context that Peter was born into. A Russia still very much steeped in the deep middle ages of superstition and religious fundamentalism. His father Tsar Alexis and the his mother Tsaritsa Natalya doted on him as well as his sickly half brother Ivan ( his later co Tsar until he died at age 29) and from the very beginning the young prince showed that he was made of special stuff. The untimely death of his father, his days at Preobrazhenskoe playing soldier as a boy( the Preobrazhenskoe regiment was the automatic regiment that all Tsars belonged to until 1917 following in the tradition started by Peter) as well as the Strelsky revolt that nearly saw him and his mother slaughtered by the palace guards gets illuminated as the main formative events in the young princes life.

Peters contact with Dutch ship builders in Russia ( he initially thought they were German - all foreigners were Germans to Russians in those days) set the course for possibly his greatest achievement - The setting up of the Russian navy from literally nothing at all to a force rivalling Sweden and Denmark in the Baltic Sea. This chance meeting on the Russian steppes that had such enormous repercussion for Russia finally gets the historical attention it deserves in this book.

The Great Embassy to the West and especially Peters time in Amsterdam is described in detail. There he not just perfected his shipbuilding but also came into contact with Renaissance scientists and philosophers as well as an enlightened monarchy. This changed the man and the course of Russia forever.

His lifelong duel with Charles XII from Sweden is a fascinating read right down to the latter's final defeat at Poltava.

Peters death and it's consequences also receives attention from the author. A biography is as much about a person legacy in Death as in Life and Mr Massie understands that very well

Very important is that this book represents Peter as he was. A violent man at times and when circumstance demanded even brutal but always purposeful, never the wasteful madness of Ivan IV. He achieved remarkable things in a short space of time but he was also guilty of actions that were effective in its results but with methods most decent people in our time can only condemn. (torture was an effective political instrument in Peters eyes) Luckily he is not judged by the author according to 20th century Anglo Saxon morals as often happens in these type of books . Can we really honestly look at the splendour of St Petersburg and blame him for the thousands of Swedish prisoners of war he worked to death to build a Jewel on a swamp. Again the troubling recognition that history cares more for results than the moral modes of a given time confronts us in these pages.

For almost a half a century the story of Russia is the story of Peter Alexeivich. - read it, I cannot recommend it more than five stars allow.

Two Bios for the price of one, March 19, 2003
The words "definitive" and "magisterial" are often thrown about by reviewers, but I can not think of any better way to describe this work. Here is a rare book that actually deserves its Pulitzer.

Not only do we get the life of Peter, but Massie spends plenty of time with King Charles XII of Sweden, the man whose life would become so intertwined with Peter's. The subtitle, "His Life and World" is very accurate. We really do get to learn all about Peter's world, from the life of the average Russian peasant to the role of the Holy Roman Empire in European politics. Massie also provides us with capsule biographies of all the major and minor players, including Louis XIV of France and William III of England.

If you are interested in the life of Peter the Great, read this book. If you an interested in seeing proof of how one man can change the course of history, read this book. If you are interested in European diplomatic and military history, read this book. If you simply enjoy a well-told yarn, read this book.

I've read a lot of history books and this is one of the best. I literally never wanted to put it down. Check it out.

Peter the Great, November 7, 2006
This is well written and carries the reader along. It is not just about Peter the Great, but tells a lot about what was happening in Europe at the same time. I was a little frustrated that we didn't learn more about what was happening in Russia during all those years when Peter was off learning shipbuilding, making war, laying siege....I wanted to know how the Russian people were faring during all that time. I would have been willing to sacrifice one or two of the detailed descriptions of military campaigns (each wall scaled) to have this. Still, I enjoyed the book, learned a lot, and would recommend this book to anyone who had time to read 880 pages!

THE Source on All Matters Petrine, December 17, 2001
This is THE book on Peter the Great. It will continue to be read when our grandchildren are very old, and probably beyond that. Not only does Massie take us through every facet of Peter's life, his tortured family background, his foreign friends and mistresses; Massie also immerses us in the world affairs of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Thus it is that we meet the Dutch/English monarch, William of Orange, the boy king of France, Louis XV, the doomed genius Charles XII of Sweden, the Polish ruler Augustus, the strict King Frederick Wilhelm of Prussia (Fritz the great's dad) and the Habsburg Holy Roman Emperor.

Voltaire wrote that Peter the Great and Charles XII of Sweden were the most remarkable men to walk the earth since antiquity. Massie makes a persuasive case for Peter to retain that title. A relentless improver, innovator, experimentor, architect and strategist, he is one of the most ingenious and hyperactive leaders in history. He was not, as Massie points out, an utterly gentle soul, nor a humanitarian by any stretch, but he did within a matter of decades transform his country as radically a country has ever been changed. If ever a biography deserved unqualified praise, this is the one.

Incredible Literature, September 18, 2002
Peter the Great was a larger than life figure and Massie does a fabulous job describing him and his world in this book. Massie, who is one of the most readable historians I've ever come across, incorporates incredible research and a flair for storytelling to make this both academic and exciting. I began reading the book hoping to learn more about Russia and Peter the Great, but Massie is much more ambitious than that and describes the socio-political climate throughout Europe during Peter's era. It provides a wonderful history lesson and is certainly as thorough as most semester long European history classes. I cannot recommend this book enough to anyone interested in history or enjoys exciting stories about heroic emperors, wars, politics, and foreign cultures. Do not let the length scare you off, this will be one of the best historical books you ever read.

The best of the Romanovs, February 15, 2007
I read this book about a year ago, and in the year since i have read about 20 or so other historical biographies, and i can say without a doubt this is by far the best of the bunch. From the stories of the Peter's drunken debauches, to his trials as a dentist on his subjects, to the transformation of Russia from a backward backwater ready to be picked apart by the rest of Europe to a first class power. Whether Massie has one of the most fascinating figures in all history to work with or he's just an amazing writer, either way this book is one of the if not the best biography I have ever read, and certianly the most entertaining.

Engrossing & Intimate, January 28, 2005
To popularize the history surrounding Peter I of Russia is no mean feat. In fact, to popularize history at all leaves most historians at a loss. What is meant by "popularizing" in this instance is the accomplishment of mutating true history (with the attention to accuracy and research that is necessary) into a dramatic format that appeals to those outside the sphere of the scholarly historian. The author succeeds in this endeavor beyond all expectations.

Massie, who studied modern European history at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar and has published three best-selling books on Russian history, has captured the "triple crown" with this work: (1) he provides accurate, even-handed, and exhaustive detail (2) about a compelling historical figure (3) in a suspenseful and enjoyable writing-style.

The book opens with a stunning description of Moscow at the time that Peter's father, Alexis, ascends the throne. Adequately placed in this rich setting, the author takes us through Peter's childhood. Massie argues that the future Peter was brought into existence by the fortuitous fact that he was not the first in line for the throne, and therefore was not leashed by the upbringing expected of a future Tsar during his minority. Peter was free to eschew the religious and scholarly training that was given to his older half-brother Ivan V in favor of the practical trades and skills that became his (and therefore, his country's) life-long interests.

There are many examples within the work that illustrate Massie's balanced handling of historical contradictions. One example that is indicative of this is the description of Peter's half-sister and regent Sophia. Conventional wisdom labels Sophia as ambitious, ruthless, and more like a man than a woman in both temperament and appearance. In his memoirs, a French ambassador calls Sophia ugly and fat, with hairs on her face and tumors on her legs. Massie reasons how this was probably not an accurate portrait of the woman. First, the French ambassador visited Moscow during the end of Sophia's reign, when Russia had aligned itself with Austria, France's enemy during that time. Secondly, the author is skeptical that the French ambassador would have ever seen Sophia's legs to make such an observation. And lastly, Massie argues, if Sophia had been so hideous, other visitors to her court would have certainly said so, and there is no other account in existence that describes Sophia in such a way. This is an illustrative example of the even-handed manner in which Massie handles all people inhabiting Peter's world, with an exhaustive examination of the evidence, but also with a firm grasp on how primary sources can be skewed for other purposes besides historical accuracy.

The "meat" of this 900-page epic centers around The Great Northern War, as it should, since the majority of Peter's reign was spent overseeing this monumental conflict. The middle-third of the book is by far the most entertaining, as Massie expertly builds a slow crescendo of suspense that explodes at the Battle of Poltava, perhaps the single-most important event in Peter's reign, both for Russia as well as for Sweden. Massie gives a sizeable helping of information concerning Peter's counterpart Charles XII, as equally compelling a figure as Peter himself. In fact, the work bounces back and forth between the Russian and Swedish camps during this conflict as effectively as any Tom Clancy novel.

But it is not just the generous treatment of Peter and Russia that makes this such an excellent work. We meet all of Peter's contemporaries, including Leopold I of Austria, Louis XIV of France, William of Orange, Augustus I of Poland, Frederick William I of Prussia, and the many sultans (and their viziers) that ruled the Ottoman Empire. These personages are introduced within their historical contexts, with a concise exposition of their countries and recent histories. (Massie spends eight pages describing Louis XIV and Versailles for the reader, even though Peter never actually meets the Sun King and does not travel to Paris until the reign of the boy-king Louis XV.) These peripheral details make the work entertaining to the casual reader and, at the same time, invaluable to the novice historian.

The most moving episode comes toward the end of the book with the description of Peter's relationship with his son and heir Alexis. Massie leans just a bit in the direction of Alexis as the sympathetic figure in this drama, but refuses to speculate about the mysterious circumstances surrounding Alexis' death in prison after he had been sentenced to die for treason. (Some believe that Alexis was killed in private to spare Peter the infamy of publicly executing his own son.) This is another example of Massie's even-handedness; the evidence either way is not there, and Massie does not invent it nor does he extrapolate false conclusions.

In the last paragraph of the book, Massie furnishes his conclusion concerning his subject: "[Peter] has been idealized, condemned, analyzed again and again, and still ... he remains essentially mysterious. One quality which no one disputes [however] is his phenomenal energy. He was a force of nature, and perhaps for this reason no final judgment will ever be delivered." The judgment made here, however, is that those wishing to learn more about Peter and his world could hardly begin in a better place than with this enjoyable epic. ... Read more

Editorial Review

Reviews

Mesmerizing and chilling, May 3, 2005
This book is a translation of interviews with survivors 10 years after Chernobyl. The first-person descriptions of living in the "Zone" after the disaster, and the implications of living in radioactivity is chilling and compelling. The book is full of heartbreaking stories of Russian people who survived WWII but then were confronted with another disaster of unbelievable magnitude. I absolutely couldn't put this book down, and feel that it should be promoted as one of the best books of the year. As we are now approaching the 20th anniversary of this event, I keep wondering how many of those people interviewed in 1996 are still alive. This book deserves a huge audience!

Deeply disturbing, November 30, 2006
Occasionally I'll read first-hand accounts about human catastrophes in the modern world, such as Sudan or Rwanda or Katrina, because it offers a window into what I as a middle class American normally would never see or experience, hopefully making me a better and wiser person without becoming numb or a "dark tourist". Books are more subtle and rich than film and more rewarding in the end.

As an oral history this is a frightening experience (the term "experience" emphasized). Chernobyl has been largely hushed up and kept quiet, the scope of it is worse than most know or understand (occasionally we hear a few hundred or thousand people died and certain cancers are slightly up, don't believe it, much worse). Only about %5 of the nuclear material escaped so it was a minor accident on the scale of things. There is a %50 chance of another meltdown happening elsewhere in the world over the next 40 years (sourced in book). Had Chernobyl been a full meltdown much of Europe would be dieing off as we speak. 16 more Chernobyl-type reactors are still in operation (14 in Russia). As Alexievich says in her epitaph: "These people had already seen what for everyone else is still unknown. I felt like I was recording the future."

The disaster of Chernobyl is still going today, it never ended, it is like AIDS - it just keeps getting worse, there is no cure for radiation which lasts 100s of 1000s of years. The radiated material is finding its way outside of the "Zone" and spreading slowly around the world. Down the rivers into the seas, blown on dust, carried out by hand by bandits in the form of trucks and TV's and scrap metal sold to Asian scrap metal firms which build the goods we buy, grown in food and sold on the world market. I put this book down thinking two things: where can I buy a gieger counter and where can I buy iodine.

Alexievic is a fascinating person her books published around the world in over 19 languages; translated authors don't get big billing in the USA but she is a world-class author and pretty well known in Europe. The Stalinst-Soviet style government of Belorussia (her home country) is not sympathetic to independent journalists (they end up dead). She has a fairly detailed personal website (I can't post links on Amazon but Google search on her name).

No Nukes, July 1, 2005
READ THIS BOOK! First, I am a retired career military officer and veteran combat fighter pilot who once flew aircraft armed with nuclear weapons. This compilation of personal histories is heart-wrenching and soul-searching. The mostly free and honest recitations are emotionally searing. The first chapter brought tears to my eyes before I was half-through. These histories are also an indictment of the cover-your-tail, follow the party line, system of government and a stern warning that nuclear power must be under the closest of controls - forever. I finished the book about 1100PM but was unable to fall asleep until after 0130AM. I am, after reading this book, totally against the commercial use of atomic energy since the drive for profit must inevitably result in lowering of standards in maintenance and operational control as has already been manifested in, say, Three-Mile Island. I only wish I had the funds to send a copy of this book to every Congressperson. George Soros, are you there?
Walter E. Bjorneby, Lt/Col, USAF (Ret)

Profound and important, September 9, 2007
This book is a punch in the gut. There's no nicer way to say it. It's downright devastating. It's something that every single person should read. Even if you only know Chernobyl vaguely, two things are made painfully apparent by this book: whatever you've read about Chernobyl in the past has probably grossly underestimated the magnitude of the disaster; and the death and injury toll from the accident hasn't stopped yet. Not by a long shot.

In her quest to expose the human cost of Chernobyl, journalist Svetlana Alexievich presents three years' worth of interviews with a wide cross-section of individuals. Unlike most books about Chernobyl, the focus is on the people of Belarus, who were not evacuated as quickly as their southern neighbors in Ukraine. The breadth of the author's research is astounding. The reader meets the widow of one of the first responders to the Chernobyl accident, a young firefighter who arrived at the nuclear plant clad only in his street clothes and ended up suffering an agonizing death in a Moscow radiation ward only 14 days later. There are children who were evacuated from surrounding cities and parents of children who have died from radiation-related illnesses. There's a respected scientist who, learning of the Chernobyl disaster, made frantic calls to all the Soviet brass in Minsk he could think of, only to be ignored. There are elderly men and women who have returned to the Exclusion Zone to live in solitude, eating radioactive crops. There are liquidators who toiled for months shoring up the reactor's ruins, only to receive a medal, a certificate and a serious or terminal illness as thanks. There's even an ex-Soviet official who tries to justify the cover-ups surrounding the Chernobyl crisis.

No angle is ignored, and no detail, no matter how horrifying, is politely edited out. Alexievich allows her subjects to tell their stories honestly and frankly. Voices from Chernobyl presents a profound moment of truth for a situation that, for 20 years, has been seeped in denial and secrecy. Very highly recommended.

Voices from Chernobyl., April 1, 2007
This was not the book I was looking for but it was the book I read. Far from an historical recreation of the disaster, Voices from Chernobyl is a personal confessional, a lyric documentation of intense human emotions. Svetlana Alexiech presents each story without comment or judgement. It is a stream of conscoiusness, profoundly moving in the face of this 1986 nuclear disaster, the gross incompetence of the Soviet Government and failure to contain the radioactive contamination. The stories are of those who stayed, those who came to help, those who died and those who survived. Haunting, moving, emotional, revealing, shocking, sad and inspirational. This book will stay with you long after the last page is turned.

20 Years Later and People Don't Understand The Human Impact., February 1, 2006
Mankind can promote technology and advancement in the name of science and at the same time treat his fellow humans with contempt and dishonesty in this way. How is that possible? It can only be described as Satanic. Mankind dominating man to his own injury. The stories from these innocent bystanders have touched my heart. I have never cried after reading a book before this one. The first hand accounts of this terrible accident transports you to the towns, villages and families, like our own, which were and are still effected. The "Voices From Chernobyl" will echo in my head as I think of the place I live and look ahead to the future of my family. These people have touched my soul and only amplify the fact in my mind that the desire to live peaceful and happy lives belongs to everyone and no one has the right to foolishly remove that by disturbing the simple silent harmonies that are so fragile and exist within our world. I understand what these people really had to go through now. Thank you Svetlana Alexievich. An excellent book!

EXCELLENT, May 23, 2006
This is a must read for anyone and everyone. It brings to life the realities of a horrible disaster. It shows us that the rest of world has bigger problems than we do. Yet, it shows that the rest of the world has the same souls as we do. they love, they hurt, they cry, they live their lives and just try to get by. GET THIS BOOK.

We didn't know that death could be so beautiful..., September 24, 2006
says an evacuee in Voices of Chernobyl, an absolutely riveting collection of oral histories of people from all walks of life, affected for eternity by the nuclear accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Reactor on April 26, 1986. "A Solitary Human Voice," the prologue, recounted by a woman whose husband was one of the first on the scene as a firefighter, will lure you in and, once there, you'll feel compelled to continue to the end, painful as it may be. She's pregnant, newly married and very much in love when she hears the news. The doctors and nurses and try to no avail to keep her away from her husband once he's done his duty at the plant and then sent to a special hospital in Moscow for victims of radiation poisoning, along with six other firemen. Her baby dies. Her husband dies, horribly, the last of the seven of his crew.

These stories of "Chernobylites," the stigmatized and disdained victims of the accident, share a common theme. The government was neither truthful nor forthcoming about the level of danger that those living near the area of the Chernobyl plant experienced. They did not provide the victims with information on treatment in a timely manner, because it would have meant admitting that a horrible accident had actually occurred. Those who tried to warn others of the danger were silenced or mocked. Men were sent to clean up the site and were given extra pay in exchange, ultimately, for their lives. Because people could not see the radiation, they kept on eating contaminated food, breathing contaminated air, using contaminated clothing and living (approximately 2.1 million people) on contaminated land. Immediately afterwards, men were sent to kill the domestic animals, evacuate the people and, using shovels and minimal protective gear, remove the contaminated soil. Although precautions were recommended, like minimizing time spent in contaminated areas, tracking and limiting the amount of radiation a person was exposed to, and lining pits dug to dump the contaminated soil to prevent contamination of the groundwater, radiation detectors, even when used, rarely worked and, if they did, improperly, and liners were not typically used, almost ensuring that aquifers would become contaminated. People were encouraged not to have children, thus thousands of abortions were performed. Even those children born without birth defects spent much of their shortened lives in hospitals, suffering from radiation exposure-related diseases. Yet, thousands returned home and, willingly ate, drank, lived and live a life of everlasting contamination.

Outstanding first-person accounts but lacks elsewhere, September 2, 2009
This latter part of this book is a gut-wrenching, incredible oral history of the victims and survivors and family members of the Chernobyl nuclear meltdown in 1986, and the "author" deserves credit for a tremendous amount of work over three years gathering and recording these important personal stories for history.

However, the book needed some background about the disaster and some explanation of what actually occurred in the disaster to put all the stories into perspective. It also could benefit from some brief paragraphs explaining some of the things the survivors mention -- I was confused about times and dates and some of the terminology.

And the first few sections are very confusing because the dialog makes no sense. It would have been better paraphrased. I almost gave up reading this book but I'm glad I didn't because the second half stories are much more coherent and compelling.

I also would have appreciated having the ages of the narrators along with their names and affiliation before each story, not at the end.

The Victims Speak, January 4, 2008
I purchased this book as part of my collection in order to do research for my novel Chernobyl Murders. The book turned out to be more than research. It is a moving account from people who were actually there. Svetlana's interviews, in which she simply allows the victims to tell their stories, are marvelous. I know nuclear power is being promoted again. However, I used to work in the nuclear energy field and there is still much to consider, especially when you go inside any power plant and look at the spent fuel rods simply submerged in pools of water. ... Read more

Editorial Review

It is history on an epic yet human scale. Vast in scope, exhaustive in original research, written with passion, narrative skill, and human sympathy, A People's Tragedy is a profound account of the Russian Revolution for a new generation.Many consider the Russian Revolution to be the most significant event of the twentieth century. Distinguished scholar Orlando Figes presents a panorama of Russian society on the eve of that revolution, and then narrates the story of how these social forces were violently erased. Within the broad stokes of war and revolution are miniature histories of individuals, in which Figes follows the main players' fortunes as they saw their hopes die and their world crash into ruins.Unlike previous accounts that trace the origins of the revolution to overreaching political forces and ideals, Figes argues that the failure of democracy in 1917 was deeply rooted in Russian culture and social history and that what had started as a people's revolution contained the seeds of its degeneration into violence and dictatorship.A People's Tragedy is a masterful and original synthesis by a mature scholar, presented in a compelling and accessibly human narrative. ... Read more

Reviews

A Brilliant and Unforgettable History, September 25, 2006
Rarely, one stumbles across a book that is of such surpassing excellence, and whose scholarship is worn so lightly, that you know, reading it, that you will never be able to forget it, and what you learn from it. Figes' A People's Tragedy is this rarity. I have read many books about the Russian Revolution, but no book has the sweep, the clarity, the balance, and the heartbreak of this. I literally had to put it down every so often because the sheer tragedy of what I was reading was more than I could bear.

First, Figes briskly deals with all those things you thought you knew about the Russian Revolution, Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, Kerensky - the liberals, the Bolsheviks, the Tsar. Again and again, I realized I had picked up myths either promoted by those who lost, or those who consolidated, the Revolution. The mythmaking machine was going full tilt from 1917 onwards (particularly during the Stalinist and Cold War Years) and this book would be irreplaceable if only for stripping away so much that you thought you knew - which was wrong.

Second, by starting the book in 1891 (with a famine which revealed the incompetence of the Tsarist beaurocracy) and ending with the death of Lenin in 1924, Figes permits himself a sweep of events that makes what actually happened even more dramatic than it was. Again and again, you not only read about, but hear from the survivors of, mistakes, errors, misconceptions - indolence, arrogance, foolishness, well-meaning idiocy - in a way that, as a human being, is more than heartbreaking. Again and again, the Revolution might never have happened, a democracy might have developed, steps taken could have been taken back - but they weren't. Instead, one of the great mass tragedies of history occurred, and you feel like a helpless bystander, watching it happen.

This is remarkable history and it is an extraordinary achievement. It is bound to upset those with fixed ideologies on both the left and the right. If you ever read only one book on the Russian Revolution, make it this one.

What a Deal!!, January 18, 2002
I picked up this book by Orlando Figes on a whim. The Russian Revolution is an interesting topic so I figured that one day I'd get around to reading this massive book. I finally read it over Christmas break, and I must say that this is an excellent history book. One of the best I've ever read, actually. It is a real page turner, something very rare for a scholarly book of this size and scope. Figes certainly has the education to pull off this type of history: he was educated at Oxford and has written other works concerning Russia.

Figes goes against the grain with this book. In opposition to such scholars as Richard Pipes (author of another huge tome I own but have yet to read), Figes believes that the Russian Revolution was in fact a "bottom up" revolution. Figes proves that the peasantry in Russia were sick to high heaven of a system that degraded them to a status of barely human. To the peasant, the most important thing was land and freedom from the state. All government forms, from the tsarist state to the Bolsheviks, were judged by how much autonomy the peasants earned under them. Figes actually seems to measure the success and failure of each government according to how the peasants received them. Not surprisingly, the tsarist system was a dismal failure. It's easy to be a Monday morning quarterback with history, but the tsarist regime was pathetic. The list of the problems confronting Tsar Nicholas is too numerous to list here, but what is important to note is that this regime failed them all. Land reforms were desperately wanted, but the Tsar denied them. Nationalism in the peripheral states around Russia was not only denied, but a program of Russification was instituted that caused more problems than were necessary. The list could go on and on. The problem was power. The tsarist state refused to give any ground on the autocratic principles that the Russian tsars loved so much. Figes spends a good portion of his book discussing the failures of the tsarist system and shows how that system could have averted problems and maintained the throne (although as a constitutional monarchy akin to England).

The other elements of government, the Bolsheviks, the Provisionals and the Whites, failed just as badly. The Provisionals were forced to tread the line between extremists and failed to reconcile both. The White regimes failed because the conservative elements that made up the bulk of the movement refused to budge on principles they enjoyed under the Tsar. Even the Bolsheviks failed, but their failure wasn't as pronounced because they were able to retain at least some semblance to the revolutionary principles that the peasants loved so much. Even here, the Bolsheviks had to make some concessions to retain power. The examination of the Communist regime is probably the most interesting aspect of this book.

The Communists are given heavy treatment in this text. Not only do we see how they came to power, we get huge doses of their philosophy. Figes gives a detailed examination of the intellectual currents that gave rise to the Communist movement, as well as their actions once they attained power. What emerges is a bleak picture. Communism is death to all it touches. The Bolsheviks sought to not only rule by dictatorship, but to change the very essence of man into an automaton subservient to the state. Figes shows the reader the Red Terror and some of the other methods the Bolsheviks used to try and bring about this subservience. It is a horrifying picture made worse, of course, under the rule of Stalin.

Figes states in his introduction that it took six years to do the research for this book. It is beautifully done and, I should mention, done by Figes himself without research assistants. I am amazed at how much information I have retained from this book, something that can't be said about many history books. I'd love to take a class from this scholar. His insights are fresh and his writing is erudite. Buy this book!

Amazingly broad coverage of the Revolution; very impressive, March 25, 2005
As a person only familiar with the basic outline of the Russian Revolution, I found this book simply entrancing. I have long intended to read a work on this crucial event and period in world history; I am glad this was the volume I selected.

While the length and subject matter of this book is somewhat daunting, Figes presents this history in a highly readable fashion without skimping on fascinating detail. Part of how he does this is by interspersing historical detail with personal histories of both famous and everyday Russians. Figes foes beyond just describing the key events but analyzes why they happened and how it impacted the Russian people at all levels of society. Importanty, Figes also stresses how the history of Russia formed its people and how these people formed the Revolution and the resulting disaster of Bolshevism. He goes into great detail concerning the other key political groups of this era. Figes scope and knowledge of his subject matter is amazing. I feel much wiser for having spent a couple weeks plowing through this important tome.

I would say if you read only one book on the Russian Revolution, this is the one. However, this is the only book I have read on the subject. So, with that qualification, I will say that--in my opinion--this is a darn good book for someone looking to better understand one of the most important events of the twentieth century.

Finest all-around history of the Revolution, June 30, 2004
One of the difficulties in selecting books on Russia, is that so many come with a built-in perspective and ideology. Facts which support a thesis are included, those which do not are conveniently ignored.
Of all the histories of Russia for the period prior to and during the Revolution, in my view this is the finest. From Figes we certainly get the big picture, and not only the key events, but also insight into Russian culture and the personality of its people, from the peasant through the professionals and the nobility.
But Figes has an eye for telling detail. The book spans a half-century, and as the text develops, he follows the lives of ordinary and extraordinary Russians during this time, in little insets within text body. As the major events unfold, we see the lives of individual humans unfold, and their thoughts and feelings evolve.
If I could only read one book on the Russian Revolution, this would be the one.

Great historical primer - gets complex later on, December 14, 2000
I live and work in Russia, and have been studying the place for 12 years or so. In all that time, because I focus on the here and now, I have always felt that I lacked a real grasp of the history, which I try to fill in from time to time. This book is brilliant on the forty years or so that lead up to 1917. Figes brings you into the two worlds of the revolutionaries and the aristocracy.

He is not starry-eyed about any of the participants. He is very clear about how the monarchy failed to reform in time, failed to listen to good advice, and basically brought about its own downfall. He also describes how the Tsarist secret police was just as nasty as its Bolshevik equivalent. All of Russia's totalitarian machinery was in place long before the revolution.

He also describes how Russia's peasant culture usurped the Marxist ideals of the revolutionaries. This was a crude egalitarian culture, that punished people who became rich, by stealing or confiscating their property, that tolerated drunken layabouts, and that was generally happy to see no improvement in its standard of living over the course of the 19th century. These Russian peasants deeply distrusted the Bolshevik Jews, especially those who came from the cities to "educate" them.

The accounts of the revolution are breathtaking, and all those famous events, like the Cruiser Avrora, are put in their place, as well as descriptions of how the military was mobilised to the side of the Bolsheviks. Figes' history of the First World War, and how it fit into the revolution, was also first-rate.

So I would recommend this as a starter to anyone looking to get a grasp of the detailed history of the Bolshevik revolution. It becomes heavy going, as it details the factional fighting of the Bolsheviks post-revolution and post-civil war, and I lost track of who was on who's side. But this is only the last quarter of the book, and the fact is that these events are a lot less exciting than what happened in the first part.

I am not a big expert, so I cannot compare this with, say, Pipes' book, which was the standard text when I was a student. My godfather, who taught Russian history at Oxford for forty years, thinks that Figes' book is the best that he has read. I certainly loved it, and strongly recommend it to anyone thinking about learning about Russia and its history. It's amazing how so much of what happened then is still happening today.

An Extraordinary Read..., February 16, 2003
As a professor mostly of Middle East and Latin American politics, with just one graduate course on Soviet/Russian politics under my belt (including Pipes, etc.), I was repeatedly confronting my own lack of familiarity with the Bolshevik Revolution. Finding this book at a conference, I took it home for bedtime reading... and lost hours of sleep every night. A stunning read, so beautifully written that it carried me along on a great wave of vivid detail and epic historical sweep. Figes brings to life not just the major events (told in vivid drama) but the complex interweaving of decaying autocracy: the early socialist movements and factions, Russian intellectual spinnings, internal socialist party conspiracies, leftist intellectual conceats, democratic flailings, Lenin's machinations -- in short, the multiple historical threads of unfolding and ultimately ruinous Bolshevik power. Figes does work in his extensive knowledge of the peasantry but also traces key players among the aristocracy, intelligentsia and other intellectual elite; his insights into socialist intellectuals make all too clear the seeds of the "people's tragedy" he is describing. I'm baffled by any criticism that the book neglects the culpability of the Bolsheviks in crafting the later murder of millions: it provides the richest account of those inner logics and political maneuverings I've ever seen. Its style was distracting only on those rare occasions when I paused to consider it, to figure out how he was carrying the narrative forward so irresistably. Altogether a magnificent book, and great for college courses... but some 700 pages, so give it two or three weeks on a syllabus, although I've used Part I on its own.

Want to finally understand "Dr. Zhivago"?, March 28, 2009
Like most people who consider themselves educated I thought I understood the Russian revolution. I knew practically nothing. This book, in one easy to read ( but difficult to "take" ) volume goes a long way to overcoming ignorance on a level such as was mine. Sure, I knew some names, Trotsky, Lenin, others. Sure, I knew the phrase "dictatorship of the proletariat". Sure. But I didn't even know that the "first" revolution came in the 1905 period as Tsarist power was ineffectually challenged through the creation of a quasi representative congress. Sure. I knew practically nothing. This book gives you a continuity in a single volume that you may wish you had not come to understand.

I don't see the point in recapitulating the entire book for you here. Others get off on doing that in their reviews. I'll just tell you what I got from reading this book: A two by four in the face. I had no idea of the suffering, stupidity, and uselessness of all the waste that was contained in the history of transition of Russia from Tsarist autocracy to the Bolshevik state under Lenin and then Stalin.

This book will make you very glad we never fought a major war with the Russians. Tough? After the Reds vs the Whites in a inane civil war? Tough? After generations of brutal autocracy. Tough? After the horrors of WW2 ( and in an area I know more about WW2 ). Thank God we never tangled with those people. I remember the Cuban missile crisis ( I'm that old. ) and reading this book made me cold with fear that comes from better understanding the history that shaped the Soviet Union that faced us in that time.

One thing that came from my reading this book was that when I rewatched one of my favorite movies, "Dr. Zhivago" I actually understood it for the first time. The scales fell from my eyes. I get it now. But how am I going to sleep tonight?

The moral of the Russian revolution is that a VERY small group of dedicated revolutionaries can overthrow and take control of a gigantic nation If their timing is perfect. ( And, this book teaches that perfect timing is really a function of fate and chance. A person should read several books about chaos theory before or after reading this book. Only in the comprehension of "tipping points" can be seen why events happened as they did. )

Read the book to overcome your own ignorance of the subject. Read the book to shake your head over needless carnage and waste of human life. Read the book to be afraid of the powerlessness of the individual in the face of gigantic social upheaval. And, if you love the movie "Dr. Zhivago" read the book so that you'll finally understand what what happening and why.

I recall a line from the movie, Zhivago's half brother, a RED general now, says, right at the end of the movie, "Yes, but do you know what it cost?" After you read this book you will have begun to have a glimmer of the answer to that question. I don't think it can be expressed in words. It feels like a gigantic pit of sorrow with a black hole at the bottom. How's that?

We must take care when meddling with gigantic systems that are very finely balanced. Pasha would have understood this very well following his stint as Strelnikof. You never know what might happen if you do X and think Y will occur but really you had no idea of the true causality at all ( if there even is any true causality ).

Then, later, as I have done, buy and view the silent film "Battleship Potemkin". I have "October" on order now.

A Great Account of the Revolution, March 7, 2003
This is about as non-partisan a history that you can find for something as ideologically charged as the Russian revolution. But of course, non-partisan is still not impartial: a truly impartial history is impossible and impossibly boring. What's really wonderful about Orlando Figes' account is the coupling of sober analysis with a more sophisticated partiality. It is also written very well, replete with zesty anecdotes. Now let me explain what I mean by non-partisan but partial.

Traditionally, a given history of the Russian revolution divides into the two obvious camps. The leftist account is especially repugnant because it extricates Lenin from the bloodbath that ensued, which is doubtless an exercise in monstrous duplicity. The rightist view is more factually sound but the incessant pounding of the ... gavel gets in the way of analysis. Their black and white view of history is only too quick to blast and their viewpoint is duplicitous in more senses than one, though to a much lesser extent than the leftist apologists.

I've actually liked the rightist view more because it clearly highlights the ... fruit of Leninism called Stalinism. But I've always wondered how they seemed to think that a revolution could be imposed more or less top-down. Granted, there was the galvanizing force called Lenin, but can one man's willpower really dominate a nation of 100 million+ people speaking diverse languages, largely illiterate, and alienated from the intelligentsia? I'm neither Russian nor a historian, thus, admittedly, my opinion carries little weight. But it seems to me that a revolution of this scale requires more willful participation than willy-nilly coercion at gunpoint, that, say, Paul Johnson would have you believe. (And anyone who is content with "Oh, but after all they're Russians" is perfectly irresponsible.)

Figes addresses this point exactly. The thesis of the book is that the revolution is a bottom-up event and not top-down as has been held popularly. This wonderful excerpt from his epilogue hammers the point home deliciously: "Their [the Russian people's] revolutionary tragedy lay in the legacies of their own cultural backwardness rather than the evil of some `alien' Bolsheviks. They were not the victims of the revolution but protagonists in its tragedy ... It was the weakness of Russia's democratic culture which enabled Bolshevism to take root." (pg.808). This is Figes' partiality on which his account of the revolution is built. And build it he does in the whopping 800 oversized pages.

His bias really shows in these three aspects: (1) in the barbarism of the peasants (2) in the countless descriptions of how the populace either willfully or inadvertently misconstrued Bolshevism and (3) in emphasizing the haphazardness and opportunism of Bolshevist policies.

As for (1), the book aims to show that horrific barbarism was not the sole property of the Bolsheviks, but shared in common with the people. It seems to me that apologists of the peasantry take a Dostoevskian populist view that holds the peasants to be, at bottom, upright people. Figes shows that this was hardly the case: the chapter titled "Icons and Cockroaches" contains a gruesome description of peasant mores (the Jewish pogroms are mentioned later). Here, a household maxim will suffice: "'Hit your wife with the butt of the axe, get down and see if she's breathing. If she is, she's shamming and wants some more'" (pg.97). (If you hold to the view that so-called backward societies are angelic, try Robert Edgerton's "Sick Societies".) On the other hand, Figes is also quick to point out that the Red Terror "was implicit in the regime from the start" (pg. 630). Frequent anecdotes of atrocities and atrocities committed in revenge are persuasive in arguing that brutality at least was equally shared.

As for (2), the rightist's argument is that Reds triumphed because they were more ruthless than the Whites in their application of [creating trouble]. But can you really control an entire regiment at gunpoint and hope to win a war? Figes offers a much more reasonable explanation: the very fact that the Reds could claim to be the champions of the revolution and use powerful symbols like the Red Flag gave it the necessary impetus (pg. 668). Afterall, how can a largely illiterate peasantry understand concepts like `socialism' and `communism'? The vagueness of their political position is very clearly shown, to name one example, in the existence of cults of Kerensky and Lenin. All that the peasants ultimately comprehended were land and security. In the end, the people willfully supported the Reds, because they appeared to uphold the crucial land reform, and were therefore the lesser of two evils.

As for (3), a typical example is his opinion of the origin of War Communism, that "much of it was in fact improvised" (pg. 614). Indeed, it would take an almost superhuman lucidity to plan the whole evolution into a police state from the very inception of Bolshevik rule. Figes' history of the revolution will show that Leninism "progressed" by fits and starts, often accompanied by clamorous disagreement among entrenched elements within the Party. Almost always, the external impetus was none other than the momentum of the Russian people.

I am not able to assess whether the numerous memoranda, documents, etc. cited are authentic enough to be called facts. But there is nothing overtly suspicious that I've found. In which case, the above three points point to Figes' conclusion that the revolution was the handiwork of the Russian population. His bias would then merely be the correct perspective.

Maxim Gorky, a writer who witnessed the revolution firsthand, wrote the following heartless indictment: "I do not believe that in the twentieth century there is such a thing as a `betrayed people'" (pg. 808). This may in fact be the chilling truth.

Wonderfully articulated - rich in every way., November 23, 1998
Figes' book is a remarkable achievement. He is able to capture the chaos, the confusion and the captivating power of revolutionary Russia without resorting to the dramatisation of his sybject. He tells Russia's tale from the perspective of the people - peasants, soldiers, workers - and from the great men who took centre stage - Lenin, Trotsky, Gorky, et al. Figes is fair and detailed in his account but he is also not afraid to make judgements or present an analytical viewpoint. He does not fall into the trap of simply recounting events - he seeks to shed light onto a the Revolution that shaped this century and does so with great success.

"A People's Tragedy" travels back into the 19th Century to examine the development of a revolutionary consciousness in Russia. Figes looks at the literary and theoretical heritage of the Revolution - from Tolstoy to Chernyshevksy. He explores the mentality of the Russian workers, soldiers and peasants - why did Marxism appeal to the people of Russia? He also provides fascinating insight into the psychology of the intelligentsia.

Like Simon Schama's "Citizens", Figes' book is a must-read for any student of revolution. He captures the broad and sweeping vista of the era but does not neglect the common people who lived through it. Or those who died for it. "The Russian Revolution launched a vast experiment in social engineering - perhaps the grandest in the history of mankind" says Figes. "A People's Tragedy" is a worthy chronicle of one of the most important events in history.

Absorbing and comprehensive, May 4, 2007
Wonderful. If there's a man who can write non-fiction books Orlando Figes is one. I wish he would write about other times and places, I would buy his books immediately. His other book on Russia's culture (I forgot the title) is also great. The best thing about this author is that anything he writes about, no matter how complicated it may seem or how foreign it may be, he makes it vivid and absorbing. Reading him is like having your best friend trying to make you understand something you've been studying but still can't get the gist of.

I like the way he presents us with the facts. It's not deferential to any political side. He talks about the people, not about ideas or policies. He lets us know how people lived, their environment, their heritage and personal backgrounds, how they felt and what they believed in, what they lacked and what they wanted. It's all about people. You see what they did, you know their circumstances, then you judge. I love that.

I did notice, though, that the author tends to explain (or should I say blame?) failure many times on lack of a consensus between factions, which seems to me a childish excuse, an easy scapegoat. Then, when he presents other versions of the facts, and compares them to his, he always makes sure his version stands middle-of-the-way between the "rightist" and the "leftist". But I doubt if there really exists any "rightist" version at all in some cases. Anyway, this book was a pleasure to read.
... Read more

Editorial Review

Editorial Review

Few know how close the world has come to annihilation better than the warriors who served America during the tense, forty-six-year struggle known as the Cold War. Yet for decades their work has remained shrouded in secrecy. Now, in this riveting new history, W. Craig Reed, a former U.S. Navy diver and fast-attack submariner, provides an eye-opening, pulse-pounding narrative of the underwater struggles and espionage operations between the United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that brought us to the brink of nuclear war several times.

Red November is filled with new revelations and never-before-reported stories that take you deep beneath the surface and into the action during the entire Cold War period from 1945 through 1992. Reed served aboard submarines involved in espionage operations, and his father was a top naval intelligence specialist intimately involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Reed is one of the first authors to obtain in-depth interviews with dozens of navy divers, espionage operatives, submariners, and government officials on both sides (including several Soviet submarine captains), who describe the most daring and decorated missions of the conflict, including the top-secret Ivy Bells, Boresight, Bulls Eye, and Holystone operations. Other events, whose full details have not been made public until now, include:

• The harrowing underwater cat-and-mouse chase in October 1962 that almost resulted in the firing of nuclear-tipped torpedoes by Soviet Foxtrot subs and could have started World War III
• The alarming collision between the submarine USS Drum and a Soviet Victor III–class sub (an incident the author experienced firsthand), the American boat's remarkable escape, and the all-out effort by enemy forces to hunt her down in 1981
• The role the author's father played in developing a highly classified, state-of-the-art system for detecting enemy subs that was instrumental in helping President Kennedy force Premier Khrushchev to back down at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis
• And the storm and resulting engine failure that trapped the USS Seawolf on the sea bottom during an espionage mission in Soviet waters that nearly took the lives of 190 sailors in 1981

Transcending traditional submarine, espionage, and Cold War accounts with its level of detail and first-person perspective, Red November is an up-close examination of one of the most dangerous periods in world history and an intimate look at the lives of those who participated in our country's longest and most expensive underwater war.

Reviews

A Discredited Conspiracy Theory, Speculation that Defies Physics and a Response to a SubmarineVet Comment, May 13, 2010
UPDATE OF 19 AUG:

In an intemperately worded comment posted in defense of RED NOVEMBER (RN) on all unfavorable reviews of that book, SumarineVets attacks the credentials of Loves Submarines (Norman Polmar) who is described as a (quote) self-proclaimed know-it-all who never served (in the Navy) (end quote). Assessments of RN by five Rear-Admirals and two Navy Captains, submarine and history experts who represent (quote) a who's who of naval intelligence (end quote), are offered as a counter to Polmar's review.

This appears to be a selective editing of comments by these senior naval officers, the most senior of whom wrote to Polmar, the author of more than 40 books on naval matters, saying: (quote) I can only say that your rather negatve review (of RN) was too charitable. It is one of the sloppiest books I have ever read. Full of mistakes of facts...uncorrobrated sea-stories, and out-and-out BS (end quote). This puts the SubmarineVet defense of RN in a new perspective which is: when you don't like the message (RN is simply a very bad book), attack the messenger, even if it requires distorting information.

MAIN REVIEW

Collectively, the first 34 reviews of RED NOVEMBER (RN) indicate that if you like "sea stories" and are not concerned with their historical or technical accuracy (whether important sections of the book are fiction or non-fiction), this book may be for you. HISTORICAL issues are addressed persuasively by Michael Dobbs' one-star review and by his responding comments to Craig Reed comments. TECHNICAL issues are addressed below. In his Amazon.com author's page (blog), Craig Reed admits to numerous errors in RN: "I must fall on my sword for some, and a few are somewhat embarrassing." Craig Reed also admits he rushed to complete RN in less than a year. He has requested assistance from both this reviewer and from "Love Submarines" to make RN "as accurate as possible," something he should have done before RN went to press. Read and compare the 5-star reviews, responding comments to those 5-star reviews, and the 1-star reviews. What should be obvious to all is that RN is simply a very poorly researched book replete with errors in many areas, both historical and technical. As discussed below, many of the factual/technical errors in RN resulted from Craig Reed's unquestioning acceptance of conspiracy theories and misinformation provided by earlier books.

This review addresses only those sections of RN that discuss the losses of the USS SCORPION and the Soviet submarine K-129, and then only two of the most egregiously erroneous claims: (1), that the Soviets sank the SCORPION with a torpedo and (2), that the K-129 impacted the bottom at 200-knots (230 mph). This will still leave a feast of factual and technical errors, many ludicrously wrong, for other reviewer to discuss.

- On page 214 of RN, the author describes the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) paper displays (lofargrams) that recorded the acoustic signatures associated with the loss of the USS SCORPION as "scribbles (that) verified a high-speed screw. The targeted submarine's signature shifted in width and size, indicating evasive actions as the torpedo neared. Seconds later, the paper filled with black ink as the high-speed screws caught up with the evading submarine and ended her life."

As discussed at length in the reviewer's one-star Amazon.com review of Ed Offley's SCORPION DOWN (SD) (which 75 of 77 readers found useful), there was no such detection by either SOSUS or the Canary Island hydrophone sensors. Fifteen individuals with a total of 400-years experience in SOSUS confirmed this conclusion. Craig Reed appears to have accepted Ed Offley's conspiracy theory that the Soviets sank SCORPION without making any effort to independently verify that conjecture. Reed then regurgitated Offley's interviews with "Students [at a Navy SOSUS training class in 1982] (who) were told that the recording (they were analyzing) was made during SCORPION's encounter with an Echo II (Soviet nuclear) submarine." (pp 214 RN)

Reed apparently never spoke to anyone with the technical expertise or direct operational experience to evaluate what Offley was told by Vince Collier and Richard Falck, a student and junior instructor at the ASW Training Center in Norfolk, VA. As discussed in the Amazon.com review of SD, Collier and Falck were deceived by a composite-tape of three separate and unrelated detection events made by the members of the school staff for training purposes and misrepresented to Collier and Falck as a real event, all this 14-years after the event supposedly happened. Where was the tape from 1968 to 1982 and what has happened to it since? Too many questions to which there are no answers.

The reviewer's 2008-2009 reanalysis of the SCORPION acoustic data, the first in 40-years, provided to the Chief of Naval Operations (CN)O) and the Office and Naval Intelligence (ONI), confirmed that the initiating events responsible for the loss of SCORPION were two small explosions that occurred one-half second apart at 18:20:44Z on 22 May 1968 and were contained within the submarine's pressure-hull. The source of these explosions, which are estimated to have been equal to the explosion of not more than 20-lbs of TNT each, has been determined from examination of a recovered battery component to have been the ignition of hydrogen outgassed by the SCORPION TLX-53-A main storage battery. This assessment was provided to the CNO and ONI in Aug 2010.

These battery-generated explosive events prevented the crew from maintaining depth-control. SCORPION sank to 1530-feet at which depth the pressure-hull and all internal bulkheads collapsed at 18:42:34Z on May 22, 1968 in less than one-tenth of a second with a force equal to the explosion of 13,200 lbs of TNT at 1530-feet: potential energy in the form 680 psi sea pressure almost instantaneously converted to kinetic energy as the water-ram entered the pressure-hull at supersonic velocity.

In addition to the acoustic evidence, there is the imagery of the SCORPION wreckage which shows one after hull-section "telescoped" within another section by 50-feet. This is the "signature" of collapse under enormous pressure - hydrostatic pressure - because such telescoping could result only from pressure applied symmetrically around the pressure-hull as would be the case with sea-pressure at great depth. A torpedo would have applied pressure asymmetrically, only at the point of impact, and SCORPION would be on the bottom relatively intact with one hole in her hull because the hull would have been fully-flooded (pressure-equalized) before the submarine sank to collapse depth. Instead, the SCORPION is on the bottom in two very badly damaged sections with the propeller and shaft some distance from the after section of the submarine.

There were no explosions from a torpedo or any other source EXTRRNAL to the SCORPION pressure-hull. SCORPION was lost because of an onboard problem (the two battery explosions explosions) the crew could not overcome. There was no Soviet involvement.

- On page 224 of RN, Craig Reed speculates the Soviet submarine K-129, which sank near 40-06N, 179-57E on 11 March 1968, impacted the bottom at a speed of 200-knots.

The problem with this speculation is that fully-flooded submarines are known to sink at speeds of 11-13 knots, e,g, the USS STERLET (SS 392) instrumented sinking on 31 Jan 1969 and the MIKE Class Soviet nuclear submarine (K-278) on 7 Apr 1989 (known from open-source information: the book FIRE AT SEA and then-Soviet press coverage).

Any speed in excess of about 11-13 knots would require the application of power (thrust). For a submarine, the horsepower required increases expotentially with increasing speed. Example: SKIPJACK could achieve about 80-percent of her maximum speed on 50-percent of maximum power. To increase speed 50-percent over maximum, SKIPJACK would have required about 3.5 times the maximum installed horsepower.

The K-129 would have required more than one-million (1,000,000+) horsepower (several times the total engine-power of a Boeing 747) to achieve 200-knots, and that assumes vertical descent with the bow down. (Note: the installed K-129 horsepower for submerged operations was 5400, good for about 15-knots.) At 200-knots, the sail, the after control-surfaces and probably the entire exterior "light" hull would have been carried away.

1974 Imagery of the K-129 wreck on the bottom in 16,400-feet of water showed the hulk to be in two largely intact sections, the bow through the sail, which, though badly damaged aft, was still intact forward with an undamaged leading edge, and the after, engineering section. Had the K-129 impacted the bottom at 200-knots, there would be little left other than pieces littered in and around the impact crater.

Notes: (1) during Soviet State-Commission acceptance trials on 30 Dec 1969, the PAPA Class Soviet nuclear submarine sustained super-structure damage at 42-knot; (2) no surface-ship launched, anti-submarine weapon has a "free-fall" sink-rate in excess of 30-knots even though designed to be hydrodyamically efficient compared to the K-129 which, with its huge sail, was hydrodynamically a "brick," and (3), the Soviet/Russian Shkval (VA-111) rocket-powered torpedo briefly achieves speeds of 200-knots "by producing a high-pressure stream of bubbles from its nose and skin, which coats the torpedo in a thin layer of gas and forms a local envelope' of supercavitating bubbles (Fed of Am Scientists website)," i.e., the torpedo does not encounter the enormous resistance of the water as did the K-129 hulk.

Also note that the sails of the THRESHER and the SCORPION were detached by the force of the pressure-hull collapse, and were not torn away by flow-force. The K-129 was fully-flooded before it sank to collapse depth.

Then, there is the time-distance problem. How could the K-129 have accelerated from about four-knots near the surface to 200-knots in 16,400 feet of water? If, for the sake of discussion, it is assumed the K-129 reached 200-knots at the moment of impact and acceleration was linear, what force would have produced such continuous acceleration over the circa 100-seconds it would have taken the K-129 to impact the bottom with an AVERAGE speed of 170 f/s (100-knots)? If one assumes a "glide-path" rather than a vertical fall, the problem becomes even more difficult to explain. Occam's Razor comes to mind.

Analyses of the acoustic detections of submarine-loss events and imagery of the wrecks are the only means by which the causes and effects of submarine disasters can be assessed unless the complete wreck is recovered. Unfortunately, neither Craig Reed nor the authors of the other SCORPION and K-129 conspiracy-theory books appear to have understood the implications of the acoustic and imagery data nor did they consult anyone who did.

As a result, there are four bad submarine-disaster conspiracy-theory books of which RED NOVEMBER may well be the worst because it advances the already-discredited conspiracy-theory that the Soviets sank SCORPION and propounds a 200-knot K-129 bottom-impact velocity conjecture that defies physics and is inconsistent with a mass of publicly-available information including imagery of the wreck.

The reviewer's SCORPION analyses were provided, pro bono, to the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV N87), Commander Submarine Force, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC). Freedom of Information Act requests for these unclassified documents should be made to the NHHC; ask for copies of the reviewer's letters of 14 Mar, 3 Apr, 30 Jun and 28 Oct 2009. These documents, summarized in Jul and Aug 2009 issues of the U.S. Naval Institute magazine PROCEEDINGS, were written to also address ancillary issues such as John Craven's 1968 conjecture that SCORPION had reversed course to deactivate a Mk-37 torpedo that has become active in a launch-tube. The 2008-09 reanalysis confirmed that during the 111.6-second period when Craven claimed the course reversal occurred, the fragmented sections of the SCORPION pressure-hull were sinking with less than a 100-foot departure from the vertical because the acoustic event that occurred at the start of the 111.6-second period was pressure-hull collapse.

An understanding of these four technically-complex letters is critical to a full appreciation of how much has been learned about what happened to SCORPION, and, as importantly, what DID NOT happen to SCORPION, i.e., no Soviet complicity in the disaster. If these letters can be posted as documents on an easily accessible website, the reviewer will so advise by editing this review.

ADDENDUM: As discussed in the letter of 14 Mar, the fragmented components of SCORPION were still above the bottom (11,100-feet) 200-seconds after pressure-hull collapse at 1530-feet. They could not have been on the bottom because the multiple small internal structure (spherical tanks) collapse-event signals that occurred between 193- and 199-seconds after pressure-hull collapse would not have been detected at a range of 821 nautical miles, the distance to the Canary Island hydrophones, They would not have been detected because acoustic signals generated on the bottom - including impacts - propagate through a repeating series of surface-reflected and then bottom-reflected paths with significant signal-loss through absorption with each bottom-bounce: as much as 20 dB depending on the bottom-composition. Since the SCORPION wreckage was still above the bottom in 11,100- feet of water 200-seconds after pressure-hull collapse at 1530-feet, the sink-rate of these components could not have exceeded - and probably was much less than - 28-knots (11,100 -1530 = 9570/200 = 48 f/s or 28-knots). This analysis provides yet another data-point that falsifies Craig Reed's conjecture in RN that the K-129 impacted the bottom at 200-knots.

SUMMARY COMMENTS:

(1) When the multitude of the factual and technical errors in RN are exposed, the following statement made by Craig Reed in his email of 3 May to the reviewer should be recalled: "I simply reported the facts provided to me by the experts via my research." These "experts" are acknowledged on page 347 of RN.

(2) With respect to the subjects of acoustics and fluid-dynamics discussed by this review, these experts appear to have been "uninformed."

(3) Did the author or his experts ever look at imagery of the SCORPION and K-129 wrecks, both of which are available on the Internet? (See Michael White's AZORIAN website for imagery of the K-129 wreck.)

(4) The reviewer encourages all to attend Craig Reed's RED NOVEMBER book-tour events and ask questions as appropriate.

BONA FIDES: in 2003, the reviewer, for 42-years the lead acoustic analyst at ONI, the national-lab for passive-acoustic analysis, wrote the Navy's official classified assessment of the acoustic, dynamic and temporal characteristcs of submarine pressure-hull and internal-bulkhead collapse events.

RESPONSE TO CRAIG REED COMMENT (see below):

Craig Reed:

Thank you for your response to my review of RED NOVEMBER (RN). Had you not stepped on the "bear trap" that the SCORPION issue represents, I would not have reviewed your book.

Comments:

(1) As noted in the first paragraph of my review: "This review addresses only those sections of RED NOVEMBER (RN) that discuss the losses of the USS SCORPION and the Soviet submarine K-129..." I did not "denigrate the entire book," indeed, I made no comment whatsoever about the rest of the book.

(2) Your apparent credibility problems with the SCORPION and the K-129 result from your use of information from Offley's SCORPION book and BLIND MAN'S BLUFF (BMB) without an independent verification by a second - or better yet - a third source.

Just as you appear to have been unable to find "official Navy reports" that describe the detection of acoustic signatures that represent a torpedo being fired at an evading SCORPION (pp 214 RN) - because no such reports exist - I doubt you can locate any "U.S. Navy findings" that discuss a K-129 sink-rate of 200-knots, pages 84 and 190 of BMB notwithstanding. Feeding off other author's misinformation is not research.

As discussed in Section V of my letter of 3 Apr 2009 to RADM Cecil Haney, OPNAV N87, Appendix A of USS SCORPION (SSN589) RESULTS OF NOL DATA ANALYSIS (U) (NOLTR 69-160 of 20 Jan 1970 Robert Price and Ermine Christian) states that the average sink-rate of the USS STERLET (SS 392) in 10,700 feet of water was 21.8 f/s or 12.9 knots.

I suggest you ask any hydrodynamics expert or marine design engineer or physicist about velocities of 200-knots for any submerged object that does not employ super-cavitating bubble-screen technology. You are fighting physics.

(3) With respect to examining my "heart and intentions," I further suggest you go up on the SCORPION-99 website and ask the surviving relatives and friends of the SCORPION crew what they think of the "hurtful conspiracy-theories" that you have propagated one more time in RN. It is such conspiracy-theories that "fail to honor" those lost on SCORPION by suggesting they were so professionally inept as to be sunk by a Soviet torpedo in mid-ocean, a torpedo fired either by a slow and very noisy Soviet submarine (Offley) or dropped by a noisy Soviet Ka-25 ASW helicopter (Sewell) that was not operationally evaluated by the Soviet until Sep 1968 - four months after SCORPION was lost - and then in the Med. Further, the Ka-25 helicopter was not configured to carry an ASW torpedo as large or heavy as the AT-2 conjectured by the Sewell's conspiracy-theory to have sunk SCORPION. Bottom line: you cannot deflect an unfavorable review of RN by claiming that your basic intent is to honor those who have served their country, and that a few errors don't really matter - not when those errors dishonor the SCORPION crew.

(4) With respect to "working together to make the book as accurate as possIble," that is your resonsibility, not mine. (Most authors try to make their books "as accurate as possible" BEFORE they are released, not AFTER, and then only because their lack of research and technical knowledge has been exposed.) You either already have in my review of RN or can obtain from the Jul and Aug 2009 issues of PROCEEDINGS or from my SCORPION analysis letters (via a FOIA request) all the information you need to correct RN, especially if you again limit your discussion of the SCORPION and K-129 to a few pages.

(5) I cannot help but wonder if more than one those "experts" who did research for RN objected to your discussion of the SCORPION but were ignored. (I know of one who did object but whose objections were dismissed.)

(6) A suggestion: if you rewrite RN, stick to what you know and delete discussions of SCORPION and the K-129 but have the grace to explain why in the foreword.

Bruce Rule

Non-fiction or fiction? (Updated), May 23, 2010
Other reviewers have commented on numerous inaccuracies in this book, particularly relating to the Scorpion incident. I am not qualified to pass judgment on those matters, but I can talk about the Cuban missile crisis. I am the author of an hour-by-hour narrative of the missile crisis entitled One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War. A few months ago, Mr Reed's publisher invited me to write a blurb for Red November as an expert on the crisis. I declined for two reasons which I communicated to the publisher at the time:

(1) Large sections of the book appear to contain invented dialogue, e.g. conversations between Soviet submarine crews at the height of the missile crisis, unsupported by any documentary evidence.
(2) The claim that Mr Reed's father, William Reed, personally briefed President Kennedy in the White House at the height of the missile crisis on anti-submarine intelligence operations strikes me as highly implausible. I have been through White House records very thoroughly for October 1962, and can find nothing to support this claim. If true, at a minimum, William Reed's name should have shown up in the White House gate records kept by the Secret Service which are publicly accessible at the John F. Kennedy Library in Boston. I invited Mr Reed to provide supporting evidence that his father had visited the White House during the missile crisis but he was unable to produce anything beyond family conversations.

UPDATE:
Since writing this review, I have had an exchange of emails with Mr Reed. This has prompted me to take a more detailed look at the sections of his book that deal with the Cuban missile crisis. There are numerous easily demonstrable errors of fact in these chapters. To cite just one example, wrong positions are provided for all four Soviet submarines that were tracked by U.S. intelligence in the vicinity of Cuba. In some cases, Mr Reed provides locations for the submarines that are more than 500 nautical miles from their actual locations. Please see the comments section for further details.

I stand by my original conclusion: there is as much fiction in this book as non-fiction, making it worthless as a reliable historical source.

Michael Dobbs
Author
One Minute To Midnight

Sinking RED NOVEMBER, May 21, 2010
With great reluctance I wrote a review of this book for a national magazine, to be published shortly.

The opening section, about Mr. Reed's father and his work for the Naval Security Groups--the Navy's communication intercept system during the Cold War--was very interesting. But when Mr. Reed got to the subject of submarines--U.S. and Soviet--the text was inundated with errors of fact, distorations, and illogical statemnts. Indeed, there were several pages, while discussing the loss of the Soviet missile submarine K-129 and its attempted salvage by the CIA lift ship Glomar Explorer, in which EVERY PARAGRAPH CONTAINED AN ERROR OF FACT.

This book contributes nothing to our knowledge of submarine operations during the Cold War except for the section on National Security Group activities. And, in the latter portion of the book, when Mr. Reed relates those activities to submarine losses, he again builds error upon error.

ADDED COMMENT * ADDED COMMENT * ADDED COMMENT

Several comments have been made about the naval officers who had a letter (Comment & Discussion) in the August issue of the Naval Institute Proceedings about my very negative review of the book Red November, which appeared in the June 2010 issue of the Proceedings. Those comments have neglected to include the FIRST paragraph of the commentary signed by those officers:
"Mr. Polmar rightly points out many specific errors of detail. Indeed, from our knowledge, the book is full of errors of fact. From that perspective we are reluctant to appear to lend credence to it as a historical work."
The most senior officer to sign that commentary, a former Director of Naval Intelligence, a few days earlier had sent me an e-mail that stated: "I can only say that your rather negative review was too charitable. It is one of the sloppiest books I have ever read. Full of mistaken facts [examples delete here], uncorrobrated sea stories, and out-and-out BS."
Further the unidentified "SubVet" who has been adding comments to one-star reviews on Amazon has called me a "know-it-all... who never served." I wore a uniform for almost four years in service of my country. Second, I would match my knowledge of submarines against Mr. Reed's any day or night. To be specific: (1) I have been to sea or on board submarines of the U.S., Soviet, British, Dutch, Swedish, Israeli, and German Navies; (2) I have been an advisor or consultant on submarine issues to three U.S. Senators, the Speaker of the House, two CNOs, and three Secretaries of the Navy; (3) I have participated in or directed several classified studies of submarine issues; (4) my analysis of the SSN-21 program for the Under SecDef (Fred Ikle) was a key contribution to the later decision to cancel the Seawolf submarine program; and (5) I have had more than 100 hours of one-on-one discussons with Soviet submarine designers, builders, and COs--among them the directors of the Rubin and Malachite submarine design bureaus, the chief designer of the Typhoon SSBN, the deputy chief designer of the Alfa SSN, and Admiral Chernavin, CinC of the Soviet Navy and a veteran submariner.
Can the (unidentifed) SubVet tell us his experience in submarine issues, programs, operations---and writing?
Norman Polmar (and I do love submarines)

No cigar.... too many errors!, May 15, 2010
Of some interest, particularly the sections in which Reed's father, William Reed, is involved in setting up the Boresight/Bullseye program during the early years of the Cold War. Some of this work was featured in an appendix in Craig Reed's previous book "Crazy Ivan". Reed's own experiences as a diver aboard SSNs during the 1970-80's are also of interest, and represent first person experience stories. Other parts of the book seem to be derived from other material, such as Huchthausen's "October Fury" for a description of the activities aboard the four Foxtrot SS during the Cuban Missile Crisis. During this section of the book, he has extensive quotations of dialog that supposedly occurred in the submarine some 47+ years ago! He also seems to buy wholesale (page 279) the largely discredited theories around the loss of the Scorpion in 1968, that it was sunk by an Echo II SSGN. The acoustic records rule out this possibility, as detailed in the review by R.B. Rule.

Curiously, he seems to repeat a tale from his earlier "Crazy Ivan" book about photographing the mysterious pod on the stern upper rudder of the Soviet Victor III class SSN. In "Crazy Ivan", he describes swimming over to the Victor III after locking out of his SSN and photographing the pod close up (and almost being spotted by the Victor crew). In that tale, a disastrous collision occurs between his submarine and the Victor III as the latter is getting underway. Upon returning to his submarine, he is trapped in the forward escape trunk after the collision and almost perishes from lack of oxygen. This time around, on pages 309-317, he is about to lock out to go photograph the Victor III when the collision occurs (due to the US submarine maneuvering), and he is again trapped in the escape trunk. This time, the accident occurs before he get a chance to swim over to the Victor III. As I was unsure which version was the correct one, Mr. Reed has kindly indicated in the comments section below that the present book has the correct version.

His Chapter 13 on the Glomar Explorer/ K-129 is just plain wrong! The submarine was not intact with a 10 foot hole, it was in two pieces as can be seen in photos on Michael White's Azorian web site. The target for recovery was the forward section only. The K-129 did not hit the bottom at 200 knots, nothing falls that fast underwater; plus a 200 knot impact would have shattered what was left of the submarine. The "claw" (actually termed the Capture Vehicle, or CV) had 8 beams and davits, not 5; 3 on the starboard side and 5 on the port side. The K-129 itself was resting on its starboard side on the bottom. All of the beams and davits were engaged under the wreck at the time of the lift, not "3 of the 5". Failure of some of the beams caused the partial loss of the wreck. The HMB-1 barge was never at the mid-Pacific recovery site with the Glomar Explorer, its role was to simply act as a place to assemble the CV, and then transfer the CV into the Glomar Explorer. To accomplish this, the barge was towed to shallow waters off of Catalina Island where it submerged, the roof retracted and the CV transferred through the open bottom of the moonpool into the Glomar Explorer by the Explorer's docking leg system. The barge then returned to Redwood City, Ca. There are quite a number of contemporary sources of correct information on the entire operation.

The book is riddled with factual errors, possibly due (as noted by another reviewer) to overuse of the internet as a "source". Some examples: on page 12, the Cubera (SS-347) spots a "Soviet aircraft carrier" in the late 1940s. In fact, the Soviets had no aircraft carriers at that point, nor for some time in the future. On page 20, he describes the Soviet November class (Project 627) SSN as "secretly training for another top secret mission, sneaking close enough to New York harbor to fire a 27 meter long nuclear torpedo". It is true that the original Project 627 plans called for the submarine to have a single huge bow tube (which was also almost 5 feet in diameter!) to fire such a massive, long range T-15 thermonuclear torpedo, but the plans were changed in 1954, and the class built with eight conventional 21 inch diameter bow tubes. Hey, you can't cram a 27 meter (actually, the plan was for 23.5 meter length; but that's still about 75 feet long) torpedo with a 5 foot diameter into a standard tube!

Next page (21) we are told that the "several Zulu and Golf class boats could now hurl 3,200 ton nuclear warheads at the United States from over a thousand miles away". Well first, the warheads didn't weigh 3,200 tons-the entire submarine and missiles didn't displace 3,200 tons. Second, the earlier R-13 missile had a range of roughly 325 nm, and the later R-21 (carried by the Golf II class) had a range of 750 nm (even the internet has that right!). On page 62, we learn about John Arnold, who "had previously served aboard the USS Scorpion (SS-278), a diesel boat that almost collided with a Soviet November class nuclear submarine". Great, except Scorpion (SS-278) was sunk in early 1944 with all hands on her fourth war patrol. Reed also lists the torpedo warheads on the Foxtrot submarines during the Cuban Missile crisis as "15 megaton". In fact, the only Soviet nuclear torpedo of that era, the T-5 torpedo, had a ten kiloton yield. A 15 megaton fusion device would still be quite large (especially in 1962!), requiring considerable amounts of lithium deuteride and would not remotely even fit inside the limited diameter of a torpedo. I could go on, but you get the idea. Clearly he needed someone to do some serious fact checking for his manuscript!

Red November, June 4, 2010
I have a lot of respect for comments by Mr. Rule, he knows what he's talking about
when it comes to the USS SCORPION (SSN-589).
The following comments are from a retired TMCS(SS):
1. PP 8 - "The most any smoke boat could stay underwater running on batteries........"
Why didn't they se lithium hydroxide CO2 absorbent canisters stored in most
compartments?
2. PP 10 - ".........where green MK 14 torpedoes waited........"
MK 14 and MK 23 torpedoes carried by subs during and after WWII were never
painted green. They were coated with TECTYL, a rust-preventive, solvent-cutback
compund (Polar type) MIL-C-16173 Type III, using a 4" paint brush.
3. PP 51 - "........had fired MK 14s at the German Navy 17 years earlier."
When and where were these torpedoes fired? SubRon 10 stationed at Roseneath,
Scotland consisted of USS BEAVER (AS-2), USS GUNNEL (SS-253), USS HERRING (SS-233),
USS HADDO (SS-255), USS BARB SS-220), USS BLACKFISH (SS-221), and USS HAKE (SS-256).
They participated in "OPERATION TORCH" and never fired any torpedoes at the German
Navy.
4. PP 51 - "...........driven by a couple of large diesel engines and electric motors."
The actually carried four (4) GM Model 278A "V" 16 diesels and four (4) GE electric main
motors.
5. PP 74 - "...........and with a loud clank, pulled the spring-loaded hatch shut above him."
Didn't anyone spin the hatch wheel to dog the hatch?
6. PP 75 - "...........as the boat leveled off at one hundred meters."
Didn't the Diving Officer order "Make your depth 100 meters?"

These comments may appear to be "nit-picking" but getting it right the first time can avoid this.

Respectfully, Robert F. Marble TMCS(SS) USN (Ret) - Mission Viejo, CA

A mixed stew of fact and fancy...., May 22, 2010
Mr. Reed has given us a book which appears to lack an overall structure and suffers from extremely poor fact checking and too many editorial errors.


Three of his chapters reveal heretofore unpublished details of Naval Security Group (NSG) activities during the 1960s from his father's personal reminisces. The author combined the information from these family experiences with what appears to be historical research on NSG activities during the 1960s-1970s, providing the reader with a good, if a bit overhyped, view into these "Black" arts that will probably remain officially classified for another 50 years. From this "meat", the stew is despoiled by two chapters regurgitating the conspiracy theory nonsense of Offley, Sewell and others concerning the K-129, Project Azorian/Jennifer, and the loss of USS Scorpion. A large percentage of his discussion on K-129 and Scorpion is dated, incorrect, erroneous, or conspiracy-theory speculation.


Most of the book consists of submarine SpeOps (special operations) sea-stories told to the author by some "200" sailors interviewed for this book. Unfortunately, the author appears to have had insufficient personal experience or general knowledge of the technical and naval activities of the Cold War to separate truth from fiction in these stories, which the author offers up as "fact" in the wide-eyed innocence of a 14-year old virgin.

For example, on page 11 - in a story concerning the penetration of Sevastopol's harbor by a US submarine, the author reports that the entry across the "Dardanelles" had a Soviet iron gate, as if the Dardanelles was the at the mouth of Sevastopol's harbor. Later on page 12, he tells of this same US submarine going deep within the Sevastopol's harbor and avoiding Soviet ASW efforts by dodging between ancient buildings 300 feet below the surface of the harbor. Both these inanities come from a Machinist Mate 3rd Class source who was aboard the submarine at the time, but who certainly had no access to the periscope on that mission. This unreliable hearsay is "supported" by the author in the notes for this chapter, referencing a Ballard expedition into the Black Sea which reported a mud-and-dabble hut found off shore the Crimean at a 300-foot depth. The author would have us believe that a 7,000 year old mud hut from the area supports this bar-talk from a man who had no access to any actual sighting, and who was uneducated as to the location of the Dardanelles.


On page 1, the author talks about the Soviet fleet in May of 1952 as "...including ballistic missile submarines..." -- WRONG -- over three years later, on 16 Sep 1955, the Soviet ZULU SSB "B-67", launched the first ballistic missile ever fired from a submarine. Ballistic missile submarines did not join the Soviet navy as operational units in any numbers (ZULUs, GOLFs, and HOTELs) until over half a decade later.


Another story, on page 16, - referring to the "fall of 1953" - the author states that ---"Six SOSUS stations were now deployed..." WRONG - the first station activated was NAVFAC Ramey, Puerto Rico, commissioned Oct 1954 and the first six NAVFACs were not operational until sometime in 1955 as can be verified within 60-seconds of internet research.

Practically every sea-story contains many such errors of fact -- errors that the author swallowed whole, in open credulity, without editing for error, exaggeration, or the effects of the fourth whiskey or the eighth beer. To call this book "non-fiction" is mislabeling.

More than anything else, Red November is a collection of submarine sea-stories with all of their gee-whiz and zap-bang moments --told by participants who exaggerate their own knowledge and/or the veracity of memories from 40 years ago. Red November may be entertaining but it is not informative in its present state -- full of factual error and patent nonsense.

Good storytelling offset by nutty conspiracy theory stuff, August 4, 2010
Craig Reed tries to tackle a hard topic and from the viewpoint of someone who was there. I found very interesting the materials about his own career and about his father's career with the navy. The victories of the U.S. Navy in spying during the Cold War were very interesting indeed.

Sadly, all these victories were rendered moot by one man, John Walker. Thanks to him the Soviets knew not only what we were sending encoded, but who we were talking about. Also, he was plugged in enough that they knew which lines were tapped and generally sent false data via them.

His stories about the USS Scorpion are complete and totally wrong. This is a crackpot conspiracy theory which has been completely and totally discredited. For what ever nut thinks otherwise the established theory is that the Scorpion was sunk by a torpedo which became active in the tube. Given the Scorpions tactical advantages the Soviets would have needed about 4 to 5 subs to sink it.

Also, regarding the K-129 the simple fact is that no discernible increase in U.S. understanding of Soviet capabilities in the years after. If we had captured an intact sub like he hints at, major changes to ASW gear would have taken place. Non did and what did change was more evolutionary than revolutionary.

Sadly, this book takes a good sub story and tries to be a mystery thriller and fails. Reed would have been better to stay with what he knew!

Do a Fact Check, May 20, 2010
Thanks to the author and his father for their service to our Country. This novel makes for good reading for just about anyone except the qualified submariners. The conclusions reached on the K-129 and Scorpion are not true as explained comprehensively by previous reviewers. There are abundant errors elsewhere in the book and many sound like sea tales, making little sense to qualified submariners.

This is a great sea story - It answered a lot of questions for me., May 23, 2010
I really enjoyed and appreciated this book because it filled in a lot of gaps for me regarding the source of leads regarding possible Russian sub contacts we received. Like the author, I too was an Fire Control Technician trained in the Mk 113 Fire Control System, was the boat's photographer, and deployed on a nuclear fast attack sub in the area of Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk with spooks aboard (we called them "Gum Shoes"). I read this book as an anecdotal history with all historical accounts filtered through the author's personal history and contacts. I've read most of the published books regarding the Seawolf and K-129 and did not take the author's analysis as settled gospel.

"Great Cold War Stories" early 80's Pacific Submariner, August 16, 2010
I served on a boat out of Bangor, WA and later Pearl Harbor, HI and think we did many of the things the author writes about. I was an engineer so I didn't always have time to be forward knowing whatever we were doing exactly beyond scuttlebutt, losing money playing poker to spooks, etc. I know I learned some Russian words for the thickness of ice, I also know I signed papers to never reveal whatever it was we did. This book comes close to describing only what I can imagine the boat was doing. I know what we did for training before heading west, so this was a really interesting book. I know I'm in the VFW for awards my boat won even though there was no "war" war. I didn't give it a fifth star really only be cause so many submariners were finding fault with the facts. I don't know, I did like the book a lot, and I would like to read others about the cold war years of Sturgeon class boats. ... Read more

Editorial Review

At dawn on 10 July 1941, massed tanks and motorized infantry of German Army Group Center's Second and Third Panzer Groups crossed the Dnepr and Western Dvina Rivers, beginning what Adolf Hitler, the Fuhrer of Germany's Third Reich, and most German officers and soldiers believed would be a triumphal march on Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union. Less than three weeks before, on 22 June Hitler had unleashed his Wehrmacht's [Armed Forces] massive invasion of the Soviet Union code-named Operation Barbarossa, which sought to defeat the Soviet Union's Red Army, conquer the country, and unseat its Communist ruler, Josef Stalin. Between 22 June and 10 July, the Wehrmacht advanced up to 500 kilometers into Soviet territory, killed or captured up to one million Red Army soldiers, and reached the western banks of the Western Dvina and Dnepr Rivers, by doing so satisfying the premier assumption of Plan Barbarossa that the Third Reich would emerge victorious if it could defeat and destroy the bulk of the Red Army before it withdrew to safely behind those two rivers. With the Red Army now shattered, Hitler and most Germans expected total victory in a matter of weeks.

Reviews

Soviet Reserves slow the German advance, October 22, 2010
This is the first of a two part series covering the strategically important battles for control of the Dvina-Dnepr River defense zone which includes Smolensk, the important communication center and gateway to Moscow. Smolensk, on the Dnepr, and the surrounding area that is bracketed by Velikie Luki / Toropets to the north and Krichev / Roslavl to the south is the primary battle zone.
This is the area Stalin, with the help of his new reserve armies, wanted to stop and destroy AGC led by Guderian's 2nd PzG and Hoth's 3rd PzG and supported by the 9th, 4th and 2nd Armies. Though having greater manpower, the Red Army had fewer modern tanks to stop the panzers but the lack of T-34s was compensated for by effective artillery. Involved with their fragmented defense and the eventual counter offensives would be the Western, Reserve, Bryansk and Central Fronts.
Along with the above background info, Mr Glantz describes prewar doctrine, the plans for Operation Barbarossa, lists opposing forces, casualties to date, and the disadvantages the Germans would face in Russia then highlights the phenomenal advance of the Panzer Groups in the first weeks of war before starting the battle action. Stalin's plans to stop the Germans at the Rivers with his reserves is then discussed. This preamble is not only interesting but an imperative for most of us. In addition to the big picture, the ebb and flow of the daily sometimes hourly maneuverings will be presented through sitreps with the thoughts, concerns and reactions of the key commanders as they counter the enemy's advance. I find this coverage of this micro planning process most engaging, making the battle more real, personal but the author takes this practice to the limit. Any more of these reports and it would overpower his own narrative.

The main coverage begins on July 10th as the Germans were advancing on the key towns of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev near the Dnepr River and will continue until August 24th. By that time the city of Smolensk and parts of the surrounding area had been captured but there is much left to do to secure the surrounding areas around the important towns of Yartsevo, Yelnya, Roslavl as well as liquidating the surviving pockets before diverting to Kiev. The tactical description is very good. Units of both sides are included as is the impact of terrain and weather conditions, logistics or if artillery was involved.

The author will show in his usual competent style, backed by diary entries and situation reports of all levels the operational details, usually down to division level, of these horrific battles that would cost both sides severely. Especially noteworthy is the coverage of the siege of Mogilev, closing the Smolensk pocket and the fanatical fighting in the Solovevo corridor. Also important is the Velikie Luki Counter, the assault on Geyr's 24th PzC, the Timoshenko's Offensive of 7/23, the Counter at Yelnya and the Dukhovshchina Offensive in mid August to name just a few. The Russians made little gains for their trouble but inflicted high casualties and demoralized the German forces. It gave Stalin time to form more armies to protect Moscow. The Russian resistance was so severe, it persuaded Hitler to go after easier prey on the flanks and had AGC slow the offensive in the center (Directives 33, 34) and sent Hoth north and Guderian to Kiev to help AGS.

Besides good coverage of the command decisions of Hoth and Guderian, the author also discusses Kluge, Bock, Weichs and Strauss as well as Timoshenko, Rokossovsky, Zhukov, Lukin, Kachalov, Kurochkin, Yeremenko and Konev on the Soviet side. Prior to the actual battle, the author presents the plans of the offensive giving the reader a better understanding of how the battle is to be prosecuted. Using communiques from dictators to the battlefield, Stalin's obsession to always attack and Hitler's impatience, indecision and changes in objectives is well covered. Its interesting to watch Hitler and Halder go from highly confident to seriously concern as the German war machine gets shredded. Hitler realizes the Soviets were far from vanquished and at a time when his panzer strength was at its lowest level and their supply lines the longest.

In addition to the extensive ground coverage, Mr Glantz also provides poignant analysis and conclusions throughout the book to help the reader gain a fuller appreciation of the battle action and the ramifications that will emerge from those battles. Some of his conclusions are: the Germans had tactical momentum but the price they were paying for their gains was too high and was unsustainable. Besides the lengthy delay and high casualties, supplies were exhausted, the panzers and trucks that remain were worn out and in need of major repairs. These shortages so early in the war would not bode well as the war stretches beyond the limits of Barbarossa. Both 3rd and 2nd PzGs, besides needing time to refit, had been delayed in redeploying to the flanks to help take Leningrad and Kiev respectively. As AGC moved further east the front line expanded, placing greater strain on its forces not to mention the ever growing supply lines.
The German command were arguing terribly and losing cohesion among themselves over the current battle and the plans for Moscow regarding diverting to Kiev. The German Command was clearly irrational, desperate; their forces were exhausted and poorly supplied, machinery poorly maintained and the rainy season and then winter fast approaching. Hitler and his generals were well aware of how Napoleon lost his Army in 1812 but they ignored all logic and history and pursued the impossible dream: Moscow. Its also pointed out that by August with German over-extension and with panzer divisions at less than half strength if Timoshenko had better communications, coordination and logistics with his armies, the German losses would have been greater. With Mr Glantz's level of detail and insight, the ramifications of this battle was having on both sides is clearly spelled out.

The many maps show the daily progress of the German pincers slowly, hypnotically closing around the Soviet armies near Smolensk. Maps for August show the little progress at the line that includes Yartsevo, Yelnya and Roslavl. The key cities and rivers are shown and will be handy landmarks from which you'll be able to follow the action. These maps will be essential in following the densely packed narrative and are spread out throughout the book so that the proper map is always near. Map pointers are given to show the relevant map. Some of the maps are recent creations and cover the sector while smaller area maps are original German maps. The newer maps have better clarity but less detail, not showing all the locations in the narrative. A few maps are slightly darken or blurred and are harder to study. Some maps have text typed over the map that blocks out features. A number of sector maps were missing Army boundary lines. There are also 28 photos of the key commanders; many photos are only thumbnail in size.

There are extensive Endnotes that provides additional ancillary info and an Bibliography if further study is desired. Knowing German or Russian will help. Within the Appendix and throughout the book, there are abbreviated Orders of Battle for both sides. These OBs are an excellent reference if needed. A useful Index is also provided that break down commanders, units, battles, cities and rivers.
This critical sector saw some of the harshest, complicated series of attacks, counterattacks and pocket liquidations that were sending troops in every direction, making an operational nightmare for the officers in 1941 but Mr Glantz does an excellent job of simplifying these complexities and with the use of the many maps and tables an interested reader will be able to follow the action and gain a true appreciation of this strategically critical struggle that saw the Soviets, despite the costs, succeed in slowing the German advance and eliminate the ability of Germany to win the war in 1941.

This book nearly rivals the author's "Armageddon" for comprehensiveness and definition and for those who enjoyed it should like this one as well. If you're new to reading Glantz, you should be warned that this book is technically challenging requiring your full attention and with little anecdotal experiences may be considered dry. In providing a few aspects of the battle, I've tried to show the potential reader a glimpse of how much information the author has researched and choreographed into his book. Though it must also be said that the Russian side dominates this book and while the German side is not overlooked there were times throughout the book when, I felt, there could have been more to the German side. A prime example concerns the assault on Mogilev. While the details of the Russian garrison to hold the city and the relief attempts to free that garrison was comprehensive, the German maneuvers to take the city were found wanting. You had to see some of the German assault vicariously through Russian eyes. In a few instances confirming data was thin. This is the area where "Armageddon" has the edge. Despite the minor criticism, the volume of info presented is far above anything I've read before, making this book five stars.

From my perspective, I recognize and appreciate the author's huge effort and time invested in providing the history of this pivotal campaign and for anyone who is seriously interested in the eastern front, this is a must read book and is highly recommended.

You'll need to do more than just "Glantz" at this book, November 19, 2010
"BARBAROSSA DERAILED: THE BATTLE FOR SMOLENSK 10 JULY-10 SEPTEMBER 1941 VOLUME 1: The German Advance, The Encirclement Battle, and the First and Second Soviet Counteroffensives, 10 July-24 August 1941", by historian David Glantz, is his latest work on the eastern front, this time covering the complex battles in and around Smolensk. This is the first volume of a planned four volume effort, with volume two to cover the German offensives on the flanks and the third Soviet counteroffensive from 25 August-10 September 1941. Volume 3 will be literal translations of specific orders and reports, while volume 4, if published, will consist of maps, archival and otherwise, with hopefully some in color.

The study begins by briefly covering the fighting on the Eastern Front up to 10 July and providing the strategic plans for both sides. The detailed coverage basically begins on 10 July, with the Germans advancing towards Smolensk. As the campaign progresses, and in addition to describing and analyzing the on-going combat and tactical situation for both sides, Mr Glantz provides actual orders, communiqu�s, and unit diary entries down to the divisional level (sometimes paraphrased) to show what the units and commanders were actually thinking, what their morale was, what orders they gave/received, and how they played out. This adds greatly to one's understanding of the complete picture of the campaign, but it also adds a lot of complexity to the book. But nothing in life comes free. Volume one also includes a lot of maps, and using them as you read along is critical to understanding what is happening. Some of the maps are almost too small or "smudged" to be readable, but they're generally adequate for their purpose. (Hopefully bigger and better maps will be included in volume four.) Volume one basically takes you up 24 August 1941, which is where volume 2 should begin.

If you're never read a book by Mr Glantz and are not a somewhat serious World War II buff, this probably isn't the book you should start with. In his preface, Mr Glantz says that this work should be studied and read, which is the right way to approach this book. Mr Glantz is "the" foremost expert on the Soviet side of World War II, and is probably first and foremost a serious historian and secondarily a writer, so his books typically contain very little "I was there" sort of anecdotes, and are not easy reads.

I own the majority of Mr Glantz's books. A criticism of some of his earlier works was that he relied too much on Soviet sources, and that by relying primarily on Soviet sources, some of his facts and analysis could have the same type of inaccuracies as those works that relied primarily on German sources. However, Mr Glantz has incorporated more and more German sources into his books, and his more recent works contain large (or should I say massive) amounts of archival data from both sides. While in my opinion Mr Glantz remains slightly skewed toward the Soviet point of view, much the way that most American Civil War authors marginally favor either the North or the South position, I do not feel this mild bias impacts his presentation and expert analysis. (Most, if not all, World War II authors also do the same.)

This is a very hard book to rate. Mr Glantz provides information, data, and analysis that you cannot get anywhere else, and his access to and utilization of the former Soviet archives is literally second to none. If you're a serious World War II history buff, you must have his books on your shelf regardless of whether or not you agree with his analysis and conclusions. However, you'll often have to work hard for what you get. I have to admit that while I own most of Mr Glantz's books, I haven't finished all of them, as sometimes his writing is too dry or takes too much effort for what to me is just a pleasurable hobby. However his books are indispensible in getting a clear view of operations from the Soviet side, and I'll keep buying them as long as he keeps writing them. I give the book four stars, and highly recommend it to the grognards among us.

Another offering in Glantz's magnum opus, November 10, 2010
This is the latest offering in Glanzt's study of the war in the east during WWII. This, and most of his other selections, is not for the faint of heart - it is clearly aimed at the scholar of the era who already has a familiarity with the course of events. He focuses on bringing us the facts contained in the primary sources - the records from the army headquarters on each side. In conjunction with period maps (badly photo copied) and rough top level original maps (with little detail other than place names and rivers), he attempts to give us a factual accounting devoid of the biased reporting produced in the immediate post war period of what occurred. It takes a lot of effort even for the astute student to keep up with the discourse - this is not a narrative telling and really is best viewed as a source book than anything else. That said, this is VERY valuable work - just take it for what it is - a serious scholarly study, not an entertaining narrative.

Another Large "Chunk" of Eastern Front History Revealed, December 19, 2010
Over the past two decades, David M. Glantz has not only proven himself as a prodigious researcher but has almost single-handedly managed to re-write large chunks of the history of the Eastern Front 1941-45 for English-language readers. While still immersed in producing the final volume of his magnum opus trilogy on the Stalingrad campaign, Glantz decided to embark on an equally ground-breaking four-volume project on the Smolensk campaign of 1941. I doubt any other historian alive would attempt such gargantuan tasks simultaneously and certainly few are capable of this depth of research. Barbarossa Derailed is the first volume in this new series and it covers the fighting from 10 July to 24 August 1941, while the second volume will complete the narrative and the last two volumes will provide archival documents and more maps. This book is not for the faint-hearted and it is a serious, ultra-detailed piece of archival research, but readers who can successfully traverse its 581 pages will find a large dose of fresh information on the Smolensk campaign that has not heretofore appeared in English. As a piece of research, this book deserves six out of five stars. However as a piece of history, Barbarossa Derailed is seriously undermined by three basic problems. First, about half the book consists of translations of Soviet army-level daily reports, which are tedious to read after awhile and often not very informative. Second, the author presents a hypothesis about the meaning of the campaign based upon the damage inflicted upon the German forces involved, but never fully supports this with quantitative data. Finally, the author never really delves below the division/corps level, so needless to say, there is no human component and relatively sparse tactical detail. It is difficult to convey the ferocity of combat without adding soldier perspectives. Overall, this is an essential book to have for anyone seriously interested in Eastern Front history, but it is really a dump-truck full of facts about the Red Army's operations in July-August 1941, but with limited balance from the German side, marginal effort at analysis and no heart.

Barbarossa Derailed consists of twelve chapters, seven appendices and 107 B/W maps. The author spends only a modest 22-page chapter describing German and Soviet pre-war planning and the opening border battles before jumping right in to the German advance toward the Western Dvina and Dnepr rivers in early July 1941. Each chapter thereafter tends to cover about a week of campaign time. As mentioned, the narrative is heavily based upon Soviet daily reports from the Western Front and its constituent armies but oddly, there is no effort to use German daily reports to provide balance. Thus, Barbarossa Derailed is very heavily skewed to the Soviet perspective, which has been noticeable in many of Glantz's previous books. However at this point in the war, Soviet commanders were routinely executed for tactical failures and many of the reports seem to be deliberately disingenuous or outright deceptive, particularly when Soviet troops lose ground. The author does add his own commentary and analysis between reports, but often fails to challenge obvious falsehoods such as outrageous Soviet claims to destroying hundreds of German tanks or entire regiments. If he had checked the German records, this could have been a ne plus ultra piece of historical work, but the consistent one-sidedness eats away at this volume. Instead, the author relies on sources such as Halder's and von Bock's diaries, which lack the statistical data necessary to assess tactical operations. Furthermore, the author also makes a number of casual errors in German nomenclature, such as referring to the Grossdeutschland regiment as an SS unit, and Panzergruppe 2 as `Armeegruppe Guderian.'

There is a considerable amount of fresh information in this volume, ranging from the siege of Mogilev, Guderian's destruction of Group Kachalov, Timoshenko's counteroffensive in August 1941 (three chapters) and the fighting around Velikie Luki. Much of this information is pure gold to specialist readers (all six of us?). There is no doubt that Glantz succeeds in demolishing previous myths about the Red Army being little more than a speed-bump at this phase and showing that the Germans became enmeshed in a grinding 2-month battle of attrition around Smolensk.

The author's main hypothesis and conclusion is that despite impressive tactical triumphs in the opening weeks of the campaign, the German Army Group Center was first brought to a virtual halt east of Smolensk and that the Soviet Western Front inflicted painful damage upon a number of panzer and infantry divisions which had repercussions later when the Germans made their drive on Moscow. Unfortunately, the author does not really back up these assertions with hard numbers. For example, the author claims that both the 7th Panzer Division and three infantry divisions (5, 28, 161) were all decimated at Smolensk, yet none of these units were pulled out of the line. The assertions of damage inflicted on these units appears derived primarily from Soviet, not German sources. Even if the Soviets succeeded in mauling four German divisions at Smolensk, the Germans had 136 divisions in Russia, so these losses could hardly be sufficient to "derail" Barbarossa. Indeed, closely reading Glantz's narrative reveals that the Germans were inflicting grossly disproportionate losses on the Red Army for much of the Smolensk campaign - on the order of 20-to-1. Even Soviet losses are not well addressed, although it is clear that the Western Front was badly hurt at Smolensk and left without much armor or artillery left. At the strategic level, the author is more successful making his case that the stiff Soviet resistance encouraged Hitler to turn away from Moscow and follow the path of `least resistance' toward Kiev. Although the author sees Kiev as a gambit, he concludes that it was the `correct' move at the time.

Details and new perspectives, December 16, 2010
Having visitied the Smolensk region back in 2006, I have a better appreciation for the stunning details that have gone into this book. Davids accecss to new material gives him a minute by minute account of what actually progressed in the time leading up the battles and the aftermath. The ability to give firsthand accounts and provide headquarters documentation from OKH and Stavka, allows us to see how seemingly insignificant events to history, ended up being "deal breakers" when it came to the outcome of the battles, and eventually the war itself. I remember speaking with a woman on a bench in the city near the rail yard bridges, and she told me that she was an engineer during "The Great Patriotic War" and had rebuilt all of the ones destroyed by the bombing. Fasinating, but this is the essence of this work. It is the small, day to day things that we gleen from it that give the amature like myself, a peek at what it was like back then. War is very chaotic, and to be able to put it in a readable, digestable form as Mr. Glantz has done is truly remarkable. Being a vet, I understand the "fog of war" better than most. This work clears away the fog, focuses on the facts, and leaves us with the bright picture of a time in history that is mostly forgotten as to its huge importance to our world and where we are today.

Other Western World War II Historians are "Pale Riders" compared to Colonel David M. Glantz, December 14, 2010
Dear Sir or Madam:
Without doubt, in the last dozen years since U.S Army Colonel David M. Glantz published his widely received first book on the The German-Soviet War of 1941-1945, "Clash of Titans", has Colonel Glantz emerged as the #1 published Historian, Writer and Authority on the Russian Front in World War II. Par none.
I'm someone that does extensive research at the Archival level on "Unknown Battles and Operations" of the U.S Army in World War II and I'm completely blown away that Soviet Armed Forces had launched such a large and powerful series of co-ordinated Counteroffensives against German Army Group Center starting less than 3 weeks after Hitler invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 where 8 out of 10 of all German Army and Waffen SS Battle Casualties, sustained on all Fronts, during the entire Second World War.
I had though that the German High Command had made a critical mistake in turning South toward Kiev in the Ukraine in September 1941 instead of continuing to the major attack in the Smolensk Sector towards the main objective of Moscow.
After reading Colonel Glantz's book, I now realize why the German High Command became disillusioned at the amount of "Reserve Soviet Armies" which were being thrown against German Army Group Center which certainly "derailed Operation Barbarossa" in its main objective of capturing Moscow until it was too late with the Russian Winter.
I hope Colonel Glantz could also influence President Medyedev and Putin to "open up" the Captured "German Military Unit Records" that the Soviet Army captured in World War II German Military Archives in Potsdam at the end of World War II near Berlin. All German Military Unit commanders had to "retire" their "Operational Records" to the Potsdam Archives during World War II.
German Military Unit Records missing, for certain Battles and dates, from the National Archives in the United States are always listed as being in the Russian Federation Central Military Archives in Podolsk even though many of these captured German Unit Records are not for Eastern Front Operations, but for Western Front, Italian Front, Sicilian Front all the way back to North Africa. Whatever Front, the German Armed Forces fought on, their "Military Operational Records had to be "retired" to the German Military Archives in Potsdam which was a "goldmine" captured by the Russians in May of 1945.
Right now, after being opened under President Yeltsin, President Putin and Medyedev have "resealed" them because their not "translated" from the German.
Finally, do put "Barbarossa Derailed" on your purchase list if your a World War II hobbyist, researcher historian or Author. Five Stars well deserved to the "United States General of the Army" as Historian of Historians of the Eastern front in World War II- Colonel David M. Glantz. Sincerely, Daniel P. Kneeland, Grafton, Ma.

More substandard maps, November 7, 2010
Once again Colonel Glantz has given us the details of a great historical period with maps galore that are useless. Please do better next time is a plea in vain. The maps should be readable, but they are not. ... Read more